Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in New Mexico Supreme Court
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In 2011, Norman Benally was driving a black Cadillac Escalade with a nonoperating headlight. A police officer stopped Benally, and during the stop, he smelled marijuana. The officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, but Benally declined. Officer Largo called for the assistance of the K-9 patrol unit. (NM)K-9 Tiko alerted the officers to the presence of controlled substances. Shortly thereafter, Danielle Benally, who was the registered owner of the vehicle, arrived at the scene. She also refused consent to the officers’ search of the vehicle. The vehicle was then seized and towed to the Police Department’s gated and locked impound lot. There, evidence tape was placed on the vehicle and sealed so that no one but the police officers could enter it. Thereafter, the State sought a warrant to search the vehicle for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and money linked to drug transactions. A warrant was issued, and the following day, law enforcement agents searched the vehicle. They found close to 600 grams of marijuana; a digital scale; Benally’s wallet (with money in it), his driver’s license, and his social security cards; and Danielle Benally’s wallet (which also had money in it), credit cards, and EBT cards. In total, law enforcement officials discovered $1295 during the search of the vehicle. The State ultimately filed a criminal complaint against Benally, charging him with distribution of marijuana, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the same time, the State filed a complaint for the forfeiture of the $1295, alleged to be drug proceeds. Benally moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint as untimely, arguing that the forfeiture complaint was filed more than thirty days after police officers seized and sealed the vehicle containing the currency. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and later dismissed the forfeiture complaint as untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed: because the 2002-version of the applicable seizure statute controlled, and because the officers “ma[de] a seizure” of the money when they seized the vehicle, it was error for the trial court to dismiss as untimely. View "New Mexico v. Benally" on Justia Law

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Defendant Dorall Smith appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and criminal damage to property. Defendant raised ten issues as grounds for appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence of deliberate intent to support a conviction for first-degree murder; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to use recalculated DNA results that were not disclosed to Defendant until the eve of trial, necessitating that defense counsel retain its own expert in the middle of trial to analyze the DNA evidence; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering defense counsel to obtain a DNA expert midtrial, and then requiring that expert to expedite his analysis; (4) the trial court improperly admitted autopsy photographs and the testimony of a supervising pathologist in violation of the constitutional right to confrontation; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of prior bad acts contrary to its previous order in limine; (6) the trial court abused its discretion by joining Defendant’s two cases; (7) a three-year delay amounted to a violation of Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial; (8) Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; (9) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motions for mistrial; and (10) his convictions should be reversed based on a theory of cumulative error in light of the all the issues he raises. The Supreme Court, after review, rejected all of defendant's claims on appeal and affirmed his convictions. View "New Mexico v. Smith" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Jeremy Nichols of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm, finding him guilty on a theory of negligently permitting medical neglect of his six-month-old son Kaden Nichols that allegedly resulted in the child’s death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the conviction was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, and as such, reversed the conviction and dismissed the charge. View "New Mexico v. Nichols" on Justia Law

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Four years and three months after Defendant Mark Serros was arrested and charged with sexually abusing his nephew, the district court dismissed his case, concluding that his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution had been violated. Among other things, the district court found that Defendant had suffered extreme prejudice as a result of the length and circumstances of his detention. A divided Court of Appeals reversed. The majority reasoned that the delay in bringing Defendant to trial could not be attributed to the State, faulting Defendant because he had agreed to numerous requests to extend the time for commencing trial and had twice requested new counsel. The dissent concluded that the delays resulted primarily from the “negligence and disregard” of Defendant’s attorneys and that, whether or not the State was at fault, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed: the Court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the length and circumstances of Defendant’s pre-trial incarceration resulted in extreme prejudice. The Court therefore hold that dismissal was appropriate because Defendant did not cause or acquiesce in the numerous delays in his case and because the State failed in its obligation to bring Defendant’s case to trial. View "New Mexico v. Serros" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment plus 18 years. Relying on “Santobello v. New York,” (404 U.S. 257 (1971)), the New Mexico Supreme Court held previously that a plea-bargained sentence must be fulfilled by the prosecution, and if not, will be enforced by the courts. In this first-degree murder appeal, the Court applied that principle to a prosecutorial promise to dismiss defendant’s tampering-with-evidence charge if the defendant would locate and produce the murder weapon. Defendant indeed produced the weapon, but the prosecutor did not drop the charge as promised and defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the tampering conviction. Defendant’s remaining convictions were affirmed, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

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Defendant Norman Davis was convicted of possession of marijuana after New Mexico State Police consensually searched his greenhouse and seized 14 marijuana plants. That search was the result of “Operation Yerba Buena 2006,” conducted by a coordinated law enforcement effort that allegedly discovered marijuana plants growing on Davis’ property. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court’s review was whether that aerial surveillance, and the manner in which it was conducted, amounted to a warrantless search of Davis’ property. Concluding that his federal constitutional rights were violated in this instance, the Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary, and reversed Davis’ conviction. View "New Mexico v. Davis" on Justia Law

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DeAngelo M. (Child) was thirteen years and eight days old when, during a custodial interrogation by three law enforcement officers, he made inculpatory statements regarding a burglary, which connected him to a murder. Had Child made his statements nine days earlier, his statements would not have been admissible against him in any delinquency proceedings. Had Child been fifteen years old at the time of his statement, his statement would have been admissible if the prosecution proved by a preponderance that Child’s statement was elicited after waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights. However, because Child was thirteen years old and his statement was given to a person in a position of authority, there was a rebuttable presumption that his statement was inadmissable. The Court of Appeals held that to rebut the presumption, the prosecution had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, through expert testimony, that “Child had the maturity and intelligence of an average fifteen-year-old child to understand his situation and the rights he possessed.” The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because the prosecution did not meet this burden and remanded for a new trial. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that Section 32A-2-14(F) required the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child makes a statement, confession, or admission to a person in a position of authority, the child: (1) was warned of his constitutional and statutory rights; and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. To prove the second element, the recording of the custodial interrogation which resulted in the statement, confession, or admission must prove clearly and convincingly that the child’s answer to open-ended questions demonstrated that the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child had the maturity to understand each of his or her constitutional and statutory rights and the force of will to insist on exercising those rights. Expert testimony may assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence or determining the facts, but it is not essential. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case did not prove that Child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right. Therefore, his statement should have been suppressed. View "New Mexico v. DeAngelo M." on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Defendant Vincent Montoya of kidnapping with the intent to inflict a sexual offense upon his girlfriend (Victim). Defendant was also convicted of two other crimes not relevant to this appeal. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on "the confusing interplay" between an accused's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," and New Mexico's rape shield law designed to protect a victim's privacy. Because the Court determined that the accused was denied an opportunity to fully confront his accuser and because this error could have affected the jury's verdict, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

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A jury returned a guilty verdict against defendant for intentional and negligent child abuse causing great bodily harm to an infant, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that under the particular circumstances of this case, the district court erred: (1) when it rejected defense counsel's request for separate jury instructions for intentional and negligent child abuse; (2) that the evidence offered to support the charge of criminally negligent child abuse resulting in great bodily harm failed, according to the State's own witnesses, to prove that Defendant's actions caused the infant's injuries; and (3) that the evidence of intentional child abuse resulting in great bodily harm, in this case, an allegation that the accused intentionally suffocated the infant, failed to prove that charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and order the charges dismissed with prejudice for lack of sufficient evidence. View "New Mexico v. Consaul" on Justia Law

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A Curry County grand jury indicted Defendant Julian Gutierrez on three counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor based on the testimony of Defendant’s daughter that he touched or pinched her breasts on several occasions when she was fifteen years old. At the time of the alleged incidents, Defendant was estranged from his daughter’s mother, who lived in Lubbock, Texas. After Defendant’s indictment, his daughter moved out of their home to stay next door with her paternal grandparents. On the first scheduled day of trial, Defendant informed his attorney that he had been provided with a statement written by his daughter that related to a recent visit by prosecution representatives to her school. When defense counsel asked for a hearing on the new revelations, the prosecutor admitted not having disclosed to the defense anything about the pretrial encounter at which the daughter attempted to recant her grand jury testimony. The next morning, when Defendant’s daughter did not appear to testify and the State could not locate her, the State asked the district court to make a finding of manifest necessity and declare a mistrial. Two weeks later, the daughter still not having been located, the district court declared a mistrial over the objection of the defense and permanently discharged the jury. The court rejected Defendant’s argument that determining manifest necessity required considering the “intertwined” matter of prosecutorial misconduct in the encounter with the daughter, saying that it would address the propriety of that encounter separately “at a later date.” Another two weeks passed, and the daughter had been arrested on the bench warrant. The court held hearings on Defendant’s motions to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct and to preclude retrial for lack of manifest necessity justifying the mistrial. The ultimate issue this case presented to for the Supreme Court's review centered on the boundaries between proper and improper prosecutorial conduct in dealing with recalcitrant witnesses and of the circumstances in which a mistrial and retrial may take place without violating constitutional double jeopardy protections when a witness does not appear for trial. Following federal double jeopardy principles in United States Supreme Court precedent, the New Mexico Court concluded that a prosecution witness’s failure to appear for Defendant’s trial did not constitute manifest necessity for granting a mistrial after a jury had been selected and sworn to hear his case. Because empaneling a new jury and retrying Defendant would violate his double jeopardy protections under the United States Constitution, the Court remanded this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss. View "New Mexico v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law