Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On the evening of July 15, 2007, Defendant Benjamin Montoya, his girlfriend, his seventeen-year-old brother, and several companions were gathered in the front yard of Defendant's family home. A group of young men in a Cadillac drove by, honking, yelling, and displaying gang signs. At least some of Defendant's group belonged to a rival gang. A few minutes later, the Cadillac returned and, along with a Ford Expedition and a third car, stopped at a nearby vacant lot. When the occupants continued yelling and called Defendant's group over, Defendant and his friends started walking toward the vacant lot to confront approximately fifteen people who got out of the three stopped cars. Guns were pulled on both sides, and Defendant's brother was severely wounded by gunshots to his leg and abdomen. Defendant and his friends retreated to his home, dragging Defendant's brother to their driveway. The Cadillac group briefly chased Defendant and his friends before going back to their cars. The three cars initially left the area, but the Expedition turned around and came back toward Defendant's house, gunfire coming out of the car. Defendant returned fire using an AK-47 rifle. While his friends were trying to help his brother in the driveway and stop the bleeding from the gunshot wounds, Defendant ran outside and began shooting at the Expedition. The driver, victim Diego Delgado, was shot seven times and died of multiple gunshot wounds, including one shot to the back of the head. One of the issues raised on appeal of the subsequent prosecutions and convictions of those involved "the theoretically separate offenses of causing great bodily harm to a person by shooting at a motor vehicle and the homicide resulting from the penetration of the same bullet into the same person." The Supreme Court held that current New Mexico jurisprudence precluded cumulative punishment for both crimes, and it therefore overruled "New Mexico v. Gonzales" (824 P.2d 1023 (1992)), and the cases that followed it. In addition, the Court held that in a felony murder prosecution where the evidence will support a conviction for either second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is fundamental error for the felony murder essential elements jury instruction to omit the defining requirement that the accused did not act in the heat of passion as a result of the legally adequate provocation that would reduce murder to manslaughter. View "New Mexico v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clifton Skidgel had been trying for over thirty years to get the attention of the state courts to correct his parole eligibility for the life sentences imposed on him after he pled guilty to four counts of first-degree murder in 1980. He sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to review the district court's summary dismissal of his most recent petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court granted certiorari on the issue of the district court's order that Petitioner must serve thirty instead of ten years before consideration for parole, which the court ordered in reliance on our opinion in "Quintana v. New Mexico Department of Corrections," (668 P.2d 1101 (1983)); and denied certiorari on all remaining issues. After review, the Court expressly overruled Quintana to the extent that it was inconsistent with "Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections," (866 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1989)), reversed the district court on Petitioner's parole eligibility, and ordered the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus providing that Petitioner shall become eligible for parole consideration upon the completion of ten years of imprisonment on the life sentence he was then serving. View "Skidgel v. Hatch" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Donovan King was suspected of aggravated battery. In an interrogation room at the Farmington Police Department, a detective advised King of his rights and asked if he understood them. King replied, "Yeah." The detective then asked him if King wished to answer any questions. King answered, "Not at the moment. Kind of intoxicated." After telling King that intoxication was not a reason that King could not talk to him, the detective placed a waiver of rights form in front of King, tossed a pen in King's direction, and said, "Sign this for me if you wish to answer questions," indicating where King should sign. King responded, "Like I said[,] not at the moment." Undeterred, the detective repeated that intoxication was not a reason for not giving a statement, persisted in questioning King, and eventually elicited an incriminating statement from him. The district court granted King's motion to suppress the statement because King had twice unambiguously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Because King was ultimately charged with an open count of first-degree murder, the State appealed the district court's ruling to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Mexico v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Fernanda Cobrera was charged with criminal damage to property having a value greater than $1,000, resulting from her alleged destruction of household goods located in the home of her estranged husband. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the prosecution had to present evidence of the property's age and condition in order to satisfy its burden of proving the monetary value of the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that in cases where common household items have been irreparably damaged, it is sufficient for the State to introduce evidence of the items' purchase price. View "New Mexico v. Cobrera" on Justia Law

Defendant Alicia Gonzales got into her car after a night of heavy drinking and began to drive to the Albuquerque International Sunport to pick up her husband. On the interstate, Defendant, sideswiped one vehicle and plowed into the back of another in which two children, Manuel Delfino and Deandre Fortune, were riding. While the adults in the front seats were uninjured, one of the children died from their injuries, and the other received minor injuries. Defendant was later indicted on multiple charges stemming from the crash. She was charged with one count of intentional child abuse resulting in death (or negligent in the alternative), one count of intentional child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm (or negligent in the alternative), one count of aggravated DWI, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. "Curiously," the State did not charge Defendant with vehicular homicide. Defendant was convicted of negligent child abuse, but that charge was later reversed by the Court of Appeals for lack of substantial evidence. She was also convicted of DWI and leaving the scene of an accident. The State, barred by double jeopardy from retrying Defendant for child abuse, then sought to prosecute Defendant for vehicular homicide. The Court of Appeals did not allow the vehicular homicide charge, again, on double jeopardy grounds. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed only that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion denying the State a new trial for vehicular homicide. The Court of Appeals concluded that under the facts of this case, vehicular homicide was a lesser included offense of negligent child abuse resulting in death, and as a result, double jeopardy barred a new trial. The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide whether vehicular homicide was such a lesser included offense. Instead, the Court came to a similar conclusion based on the related principle of joinder. "This is not a case in which the charge the State now [sought] to bring, vehicular homicide, was unknown at the time Defendant was indicted. The State had at least three different opportunities to join these offenses." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on somewhat different grounds. View "New Mexico v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Respondents the State of New Mexico and Warden Erasmo Bravo appealed the district court's grant of Petitioner George Quintana's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition based exclusively on the allegations contained in petitioner's amended petition, together with a supporting affidavit from one of petitioner's trial counsel admitting to being ineffective in her representation of him. The district court's rationale for this "unorthodox" decision was Respondents' failure to timely file a response to the amended petition and their failure to appear at a scheduled motions hearing, despite having received notice of the hearing. The reason for Respondents' failure to file a response and appear at the hearing was due to a conflict of interest that arose when the attorney affiant went to work for the District Attorney in the same jurisdiction. The district court was aware of the conflict and the confusion regarding whether an attorney from the Attorney General's office or an attorney from a district attorney's office from another jurisdiction would represent Respondents. Despite acknowledging the existence of the conflict and the confusion about who would represent Respondents, the district court vacated petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the conduct of the District Attorney and the Attorney General did not rise to the level of stubborn resistance to the district court's orders that would justify the extreme sanction of vacating petitioner's jury convictions without both considering a response from Respondents and after having had a full evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quintana v. Bravo" on Justia Law

Defendant Greg Collier was indicted in August 2006 for fourth-degree extreme cruelty to animals after a horse he owned died. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State's request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State could retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State could retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar retrial on the lesser included offense. View "New Mexico v. Collier" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether "Crawford v. Washington" (541 U.S. 36 (2004)) and subsequent related case law precluded a forensic pathologist from relating subjective observations recorded in an autopsy report as a basis for the pathologist's trial opinions, when the pathologist neither participated in nor observed the autopsy performed on the decedent. The Court answered this question affirmatively and concluded that there was a Confrontation Clause violation because: (1) the autopsy report contained statements that were made with the primary intention of establishing facts that the declarant understood might be used in a criminal prosecution; (2) the statements in the report were related to the jury as the basis for the pathologist's opinions and were therefore offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted; and (3) the pathologist who recorded her subjective observations in the report did not testify at trial and Defendant Arnoldo Navarette did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court did not address remaining issues raised by defendant as without merit. View "New Mexico v. Navarette" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Hall was convicted of a sex crime in California pursuant to a plea agreement. He then moved to New Mexico and was charged with the fourth-degree felony of failing to register as a sex offender. The New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires a person convicted of any of twelve enumerated sex offenses, or who is convicted of an sheriff for the New Mexico county in which that person resides. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was what constituted an equivalent offense and how a court makes that determination. Upon review, the Court held that an offense is "equivalent" to a New Mexico offense for purposes of SORNA, is if the defendant's actual conduct that gave rise to the out-of-state conviction would have constituted one of the twelve enumerated offenses requiring registration. View "New Mexico v. Hall" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joseph C. Perry, Petitioner, was a prison inmate at the Penitentiary of New Mexico serving sentence at the Lea County Correctional Facility for battery against a household member as well as for a parole violation for fraud over $2,500. In 2006, Petitioner was transported to the Otero County Detention Center for an arraignment relating to the fraud charge. While at the Otero Center, Petitioner raped inmate Joshua Sommer. Upon discovering Petitioner’s pending criminal charge for rape in Otero County District Court, the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) pursued disciplinary action against him for the same rape incident. A disciplinary hearing was scheduled at the Lea County Facility. A hearing officer conducted the hearing, documenting the proceedings and the evidence in a form entitled "Disciplinary Summary of Evidence and Proceeding," the tape of which was lost. The hearing officer ultimately concluded that Petitioner committed rape and threats to other inmates. NMCD forfeited Petitioner’s earned good time (69 days) and placed him in Level VI Disciplinary Segregation at a maximum security facility for a period of 455 days. In 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the Santa Fe District Court, asserting five grounds for habeas relief. Just over three weeks later, Petitioner was convicted in Otero County on second-degree felony of criminal sexual penetration and the third-degree felony of bribery or intimidation of a witness, based on the same rape incident. Approximately a year later, the State filed an amended response to an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and attached the judgment and sentence from Otero County. The central issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether NMCD had violated Petitioner’s due process rights by denying him an opportunity to call witnesses or otherwise elicit written testimony at his prison disciplinary hearing. At the conclusion of the habeas hearing, the district court agreed with Petitioner’s contentions and issued an order granting remedies with respect to its earlier findings of due process violations. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s intervening criminal convictions for rape and witness intimidation, the district court ordered NMCD to (1) restore Petitioner’s good-time credits, (2) remove the disciplinary hearing findings from Petitioner’s record, (3) never use findings of the disciplinary hearing against Petitioner in any way, including in present and future decisions relating to classification and placement within the prison system, and (4) never pursue the same factual allegations that were the subject of the disciplinary hearing in later proceedings against Petitioner. The NMCD appealed; the Supreme Court reversed: "In focusing on Petitioner’s procedural due process rights, the district court appears to have lost sight of the reason for such a hearing. The court failed to appreciate the significance of the intervening criminal convictions - not to whether due process was violated - but, pivotally, to what remedy was appropriate under the circumstances." View "Perry v. Moya" on Justia Law