Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this first-degree murder case, the State improperly admitted into evidence a diary of the decedent which was inadmissible hearsay. Because the diary was important to the State's case, and the State repeatedly relied upon its contents throughout the trial, the Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless and the convictions should have been reversed. View "New Mexico v. Leyba" on Justia Law

By the time Defendant Wayne Bent was indicted, the grand jury allegedly had exceeded its statutory term of service. Having been convicted subsequently of most of the charges in the indictment, Defendant appealed on the basis of that untimely indictment. He claimed that the untimely indictment deprived the grand jury of jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court should overturn the subsequent jury verdict against him. Persuaded by this argument, the Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that statutory challenges to the indictment like those presented by this case must be adjudicated before trial and before a verdict issues on those same charges. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court for consideration of all other issues raised but not yet decided in Defendant's appeal. View "New Mexico v. Bent" on Justia Law

Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of a car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed his crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Defendant argued: (1) his felony murder conviction should be reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle pursuant to statute, and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant on both arguments raised, and reversed his first degree murder conviction for entry of second degree murder. View "New Mexico v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that overturned the district court's denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence discovered during a traffic stop of Defendant Gunnar Olson. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the valid traffic stop to an investigation of prostitution solicitation and that Defendant's subsequent consent to a protective search of his fanny pack was not a fruit of a prior unlawful search or seizure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned the use of multiple levels of anonymous hearsay reports in the probable cause portion of a search warrant affidavit. The Court granted Defendant David Haidle’s application for interlocutory appeal to review the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained at his home through execution of a magistrate court search warrant. The district court found that the warrant was issued without constitutionally adequate probable cause but refused to suppress pieces of blood-stained carpet on the theory that the carpet inevitably would have been discovered in a potential future search. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the search warrant was invalid, but reversed the ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine would make the unlawfully seized carpet evidence admissible.

Defendant Paul Wayne Lovett was charged with murdering two women in two separate, unrelated incidents as well as criminal sexual penetration with respect to one of the victims. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(A) NMRA the two murder charges were joined in one complaint, indictment or information with the intent to try the two murder charges together in one trial. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(C) NMRA Defendant moved to sever the two murder charges into two separate trials. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to sever, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of both counts of first-degree murder in one joint trial. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the murder charges into separate trials. Because the error constituted reversible, non-harmless error in relation to one of the murder convictions, the Court vacated that conviction while upholding the other first-degree murder conviction as well as the conviction for criminal sexual penetration.

The City of Santa Fe (City) charged Julio Marquez with two violations of the Santa Fe City Code (SFCC), including Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs (DWI). After the City rested its case at trial, the district court sua sponte ruled that the arresting officer's DWI investigation was unlawful and on that basis entered an order suppressing all evidence from the investigation, therefore dismissing the DWI charge against Marquez. The City appealed. Under New Mexico law statutes, constitutional double jeopardy principles bar the City from retrying Marquez and therefore the appeal should have been dismissed. The Court nonetheless wrote to cast light on the unintended consequences that could follow (and, in this case, did follow) from waiting until trial to consider suppression issues; to clarify that the Rules of Criminal Procedure require a motion to suppress evidence to be made within twenty days of entry of a defendant's plea, absent good cause shown; and to expand the applicable rule to require district courts to adjudicate the suppression of possibly illegally obtained evidence prior to trial, unless good cause exists for delaying such rulings until trial.

Two cases were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. In the first, Defendant Abdul Muqqddin was charged with five separate counts when a police officer discovered him lying under a car in an attempt to drain the gas tank: auto burglary; criminal damage to property; possession of burglary tools; larceny; and concealing identity. A jury trial was held. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all charges. The district court granted the motion in regard to the possession of burglary tools charge, but denied the motion in regard to the other charges. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all the remaining charges, including auto burglary. Before his trial, Defendant Edgar Dominguez-Meraz filed a motion to dismiss the burglary charge filed against him. He was charged with burglary for allegedly removing the two rear wheels of a vehicle and the lug nuts of the front wheels. The motion acknowledged that Defendant Dominguez-Meraz was one of two individuals apprehended near a vehicle missing two rear tires and lug nuts from the front wheels. He argued, however, even if those facts were true, as a matter of law he could not be convicted of burglary for those actions because there was no entry as required by the statute. The district court agreed with Defendant Dominguez-Meraz and ordered the burglary charge dismissed. The issue presented before the Supreme Court by these cases concerned the "outer limits" of New Mexico’s burglary statute. In more than 40 years, the Court issued only one burglary opinion. Over that same time, the Court of Appeals has issued numerous opinions that significantly expanded the reach of the statute without any parallel change in the statute itself. The Court took the opportunity to review "the unprecedented scope of that expansion." Ultimately, the Court concluded that New Mexico case law had "gone astray." The Court reversed the two cases upon which these appeals relied as authority, vacated Muqqddin's conviction and affirmed the dismissal of the burglary charge against Domminquez-Meraz.

While aimlessly driving around Roswell in 2008, Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of the car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed the above crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Principal among Defendant's contentions on appeal, he argued: (1) that his felony murder conviction should have been reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot serve as the requisite collateral felony for a felony murder conviction; (3) that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the felony murder conviction and enter judgment for second degree murder. The Court did not reach Defendant's second argument on appeal. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder.

Defendant Luciano Guerra was convicted of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence in the fatal stabbing of Andrew Gama during a fight in March 2010. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial when two defense exhibits left on counsel table after closing arguments were not included with other exhibits provided to the jury during deliberation; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure the return of the two exhibits for delivery to the jury room; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction; and (5) through various other claimed errors the district court denied him due process of law. The Supreme Court used this opinion to clarify the standard for sufficiency of evidence to support tampering-with-evidence convictions and reversed Defendant's tampering conviction. The Court rejected the remainder of Defendant’s claims and upheld his first-degree murder conviction.