Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Paul Wayne Lovett was charged with murdering two women in two separate, unrelated incidents as well as criminal sexual penetration with respect to one of the victims. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(A) NMRA the two murder charges were joined in one complaint, indictment or information with the intent to try the two murder charges together in one trial. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(C) NMRA Defendant moved to sever the two murder charges into two separate trials. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to sever, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of both counts of first-degree murder in one joint trial. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the murder charges into separate trials. Because the error constituted reversible, non-harmless error in relation to one of the murder convictions, the Court vacated that conviction while upholding the other first-degree murder conviction as well as the conviction for criminal sexual penetration.

The City of Santa Fe (City) charged Julio Marquez with two violations of the Santa Fe City Code (SFCC), including Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs (DWI). After the City rested its case at trial, the district court sua sponte ruled that the arresting officer's DWI investigation was unlawful and on that basis entered an order suppressing all evidence from the investigation, therefore dismissing the DWI charge against Marquez. The City appealed. Under New Mexico law statutes, constitutional double jeopardy principles bar the City from retrying Marquez and therefore the appeal should have been dismissed. The Court nonetheless wrote to cast light on the unintended consequences that could follow (and, in this case, did follow) from waiting until trial to consider suppression issues; to clarify that the Rules of Criminal Procedure require a motion to suppress evidence to be made within twenty days of entry of a defendant's plea, absent good cause shown; and to expand the applicable rule to require district courts to adjudicate the suppression of possibly illegally obtained evidence prior to trial, unless good cause exists for delaying such rulings until trial.

Two cases were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion. In the first, Defendant Abdul Muqqddin was charged with five separate counts when a police officer discovered him lying under a car in an attempt to drain the gas tank: auto burglary; criminal damage to property; possession of burglary tools; larceny; and concealing identity. A jury trial was held. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all charges. The district court granted the motion in regard to the possession of burglary tools charge, but denied the motion in regard to the other charges. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all the remaining charges, including auto burglary. Before his trial, Defendant Edgar Dominguez-Meraz filed a motion to dismiss the burglary charge filed against him. He was charged with burglary for allegedly removing the two rear wheels of a vehicle and the lug nuts of the front wheels. The motion acknowledged that Defendant Dominguez-Meraz was one of two individuals apprehended near a vehicle missing two rear tires and lug nuts from the front wheels. He argued, however, even if those facts were true, as a matter of law he could not be convicted of burglary for those actions because there was no entry as required by the statute. The district court agreed with Defendant Dominguez-Meraz and ordered the burglary charge dismissed. The issue presented before the Supreme Court by these cases concerned the "outer limits" of New Mexico’s burglary statute. In more than 40 years, the Court issued only one burglary opinion. Over that same time, the Court of Appeals has issued numerous opinions that significantly expanded the reach of the statute without any parallel change in the statute itself. The Court took the opportunity to review "the unprecedented scope of that expansion." Ultimately, the Court concluded that New Mexico case law had "gone astray." The Court reversed the two cases upon which these appeals relied as authority, vacated Muqqddin's conviction and affirmed the dismissal of the burglary charge against Domminquez-Meraz.

While aimlessly driving around Roswell in 2008, Defendant Julian Tafoya shot and killed Andrea Larez, and shot and injured Crystal Brady. Larez and Brady were sitting in the front of the car and Defendant and his girlfriend, Kaprice Conde, were sitting in back. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder with the predicate felony of "shooting at or from a motor vehicle," attempted first degree murder, and tampering with evidence. The trial court also found Defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the jury issued a special verdict finding that Defendant committed the above crimes with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventeen and one-half years. Defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court. Principal among Defendant's contentions on appeal, he argued: (1) that his felony murder conviction should have been reversed because shooting entirely within a motor vehicle is neither shooting "at" nor "from" a motor vehicle and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for his felony murder conviction; (2) that shooting at or from a motor vehicle cannot serve as the requisite collateral felony for a felony murder conviction; (3) that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the felony murder conviction and enter judgment for second degree murder. The Court did not reach Defendant's second argument on appeal. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder.

Defendant Luciano Guerra was convicted of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence in the fatal stabbing of Andrew Gama during a fight in March 2010. In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial when two defense exhibits left on counsel table after closing arguments were not included with other exhibits provided to the jury during deliberation; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure the return of the two exhibits for delivery to the jury room; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction; and (5) through various other claimed errors the district court denied him due process of law. The Supreme Court used this opinion to clarify the standard for sufficiency of evidence to support tampering-with-evidence convictions and reversed Defendant's tampering conviction. The Court rejected the remainder of Defendant’s claims and upheld his first-degree murder conviction.

"Speedy trial analysis under the United States Constitution requires a balancing and weighing of several factors, including the length of delay, the cause of the delay, timely assertion of the right, and prejudice to the accused." In this case, one of those factors (the cause of the delay) weighed heavily against the State based on its own dilatory and deceptive conduct in prosecuting the case. The district court dismissed the charges even though the remaining factors favor the accused only slightly. The Court of Appeals reversed, due to the lack of perceived prejudice to the accused. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion and reversed, remanding the case to the district court for a new speedy trial hearing.

Defendant Jose Ordunez pled guilty to a 2004 fourth-offense aggravated DWI. He was incarcerated for six months and then served a lengthy probationary period. In 2007, Defendant was arrested for another DWI in violation of his 2004 probation conditions, but a probation revocation hearing was not held before the probationary term from the 2004 DWI had expired. The district court concluded that the applicable New Mexico statutes precluded revocation of Defendant's probation after his probationary term had expired and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of the case. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusions of the district court and the Court of Appeals that Defendant's probation could not be revoked after it had expired.

On the morning of January 21, 2006, Defendant-Petitioner Michael Swick, along with his cousin, Benito Lopez, and the victim, Alex Ogle, began a day of cruising and drinking alcohol in a borrowed Jeep. Late in the afternoon, Defendant and his cousin also consumed cocaine. After getting a jacket from the Jeep, Lopez walked back toward the place where he had left Defendant and Ogle. When he arrived, he found Defendant standing, holding a large 15-pound rock, with Ogle lying on the ground beneath him. Defendant had stabbed Ogle and bludgeoned him on the head with the rock. Defendant and his cousin walked from the crime scene and had agreed to steal a car as they approached the home of Carlos and Rita Atencio. Mrs. Atencio answered the door, and they told her that their Jeep was stuck. She let them in so that they could use the telephone. When they entered the house, Defendant stabbed Mrs. Atencio, and both men continued to beat, stab, and slash her and her husband. Defendant and his cousin left with $14.00 and a van owned by the Atencios. Defendant was indicted with first-degree murder for Ogle’s killing. The indictment also charged him with 25 additional counts for the offenses at the Atencio home. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder of Ogle and guilty of all of the remaining charges against him related to the Atencios. Defendant appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, raising issues regarding double jeopardy, jury instructions, and challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals upheld all of his convictions. Upon its review of the case, the Supreme Court :(1) vacated both of Defendant's convictions for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and his two convictions for aggravated burglary based on battery because these convictions violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on the second-degree murder conviction because the instruction regarding second-degree murder was erroneous; (3) affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the self-defense jury instruction; and (4) affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial.

Defendant-Petitioner Laybe Torres was convicted by a jury of Driving While Intoxicated (seventh or subsequent offense). While Defendant was initially pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt during a routine seatbelt enforcement operation, the arresting officer subsequently initiated a DWI investigation after smelling alcohol, observing Defendant’s bloodshot eyes, and noting Defendant’s slurred speech. In his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel had lied when commenting on the absence of a seatbelt citation during his closing argument, implying that a citation did in fact exist. The prosecutor also waved around what appeared to be a copy of the seatbelt violation, which had not been introduced into evidence, in front of the jury while accusing defense counsel of lying. Defense counsel promptly moved for mistrial, and the trial court, after excusing the jury from the courtroom and discussing the issue with counsel, instructed the jury to "disregard the statement of the prosecution as to opposing counsel lying." Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because the prosecutor's improper actions were limited in scope and duration, and because the seatbelt violation issue was peripheral to the evidence presented and the elements of the crime for which Defendant was on trial, the trial court's prompt offering of a curative instruction was a sufficient response. The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for mistrial and therefore the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

This case required the New Mexico Supreme Court to apply the context-specific inquirt established by the federal Supreme Court in "Michigan v. Bryant" (131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011)) to evaluate whether an out-of-court statement was testimonial. Defendant Harrison Largo's main issues concerned the admission into evidence out-of-court statements by victim Freida Smith: portions of the 911 tape in which she communicated to the operator that Defendant shot her, and a sheriff's deputy's testimony that the victim identified Defendant as the one who shot her. Upon review, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements that identified him as her shooter. The Court concluded those statements in this instance were not testimonial. Additionally, the Court concluded that the victim's statements were properly admitted as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court found sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction on first-degree murder charges, and affirmed the trial court's judgment.