Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

"Speedy trial analysis under the United States Constitution requires a balancing and weighing of several factors, including the length of delay, the cause of the delay, timely assertion of the right, and prejudice to the accused." In this case, one of those factors (the cause of the delay) weighed heavily against the State based on its own dilatory and deceptive conduct in prosecuting the case. The district court dismissed the charges even though the remaining factors favor the accused only slightly. The Court of Appeals reversed, due to the lack of perceived prejudice to the accused. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion and reversed, remanding the case to the district court for a new speedy trial hearing.

Defendant Jose Ordunez pled guilty to a 2004 fourth-offense aggravated DWI. He was incarcerated for six months and then served a lengthy probationary period. In 2007, Defendant was arrested for another DWI in violation of his 2004 probation conditions, but a probation revocation hearing was not held before the probationary term from the 2004 DWI had expired. The district court concluded that the applicable New Mexico statutes precluded revocation of Defendant's probation after his probationary term had expired and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of the case. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusions of the district court and the Court of Appeals that Defendant's probation could not be revoked after it had expired.

On the morning of January 21, 2006, Defendant-Petitioner Michael Swick, along with his cousin, Benito Lopez, and the victim, Alex Ogle, began a day of cruising and drinking alcohol in a borrowed Jeep. Late in the afternoon, Defendant and his cousin also consumed cocaine. After getting a jacket from the Jeep, Lopez walked back toward the place where he had left Defendant and Ogle. When he arrived, he found Defendant standing, holding a large 15-pound rock, with Ogle lying on the ground beneath him. Defendant had stabbed Ogle and bludgeoned him on the head with the rock. Defendant and his cousin walked from the crime scene and had agreed to steal a car as they approached the home of Carlos and Rita Atencio. Mrs. Atencio answered the door, and they told her that their Jeep was stuck. She let them in so that they could use the telephone. When they entered the house, Defendant stabbed Mrs. Atencio, and both men continued to beat, stab, and slash her and her husband. Defendant and his cousin left with $14.00 and a van owned by the Atencios. Defendant was indicted with first-degree murder for Ogle’s killing. The indictment also charged him with 25 additional counts for the offenses at the Atencio home. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder of Ogle and guilty of all of the remaining charges against him related to the Atencios. Defendant appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, raising issues regarding double jeopardy, jury instructions, and challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals upheld all of his convictions. Upon its review of the case, the Supreme Court :(1) vacated both of Defendant's convictions for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and his two convictions for aggravated burglary based on battery because these convictions violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on the second-degree murder conviction because the instruction regarding second-degree murder was erroneous; (3) affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the self-defense jury instruction; and (4) affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial.

Defendant-Petitioner Laybe Torres was convicted by a jury of Driving While Intoxicated (seventh or subsequent offense). While Defendant was initially pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt during a routine seatbelt enforcement operation, the arresting officer subsequently initiated a DWI investigation after smelling alcohol, observing Defendant’s bloodshot eyes, and noting Defendant’s slurred speech. In his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel had lied when commenting on the absence of a seatbelt citation during his closing argument, implying that a citation did in fact exist. The prosecutor also waved around what appeared to be a copy of the seatbelt violation, which had not been introduced into evidence, in front of the jury while accusing defense counsel of lying. Defense counsel promptly moved for mistrial, and the trial court, after excusing the jury from the courtroom and discussing the issue with counsel, instructed the jury to "disregard the statement of the prosecution as to opposing counsel lying." Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because the prosecutor's improper actions were limited in scope and duration, and because the seatbelt violation issue was peripheral to the evidence presented and the elements of the crime for which Defendant was on trial, the trial court's prompt offering of a curative instruction was a sufficient response. The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for mistrial and therefore the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

This case required the New Mexico Supreme Court to apply the context-specific inquirt established by the federal Supreme Court in "Michigan v. Bryant" (131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011)) to evaluate whether an out-of-court statement was testimonial. Defendant Harrison Largo's main issues concerned the admission into evidence out-of-court statements by victim Freida Smith: portions of the 911 tape in which she communicated to the operator that Defendant shot her, and a sheriff's deputy's testimony that the victim identified Defendant as the one who shot her. Upon review, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements that identified him as her shooter. The Court concluded those statements in this instance were not testimonial. Additionally, the Court concluded that the victim's statements were properly admitted as a dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court found sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction on first-degree murder charges, and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

A jury found Defendant Graciela Guerra guilty of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of her daughter-in-law, Brenda Guerra, in an Alamogordo motel room. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear her direct appeal. The Court addressed Defendant’s arguments that the district court: (1) erred by denying Defendant’s self-defense instruction; (2) abused its discretion when it excluded, for lack of notice under Rule 5-602(F) NMRA, expert testimony about Defendant’s incapacity to form specific intent; (3) abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony related to whether the victim’s wounds would have been fatal if treated; (4) abused its discretion when it excluded letters Defendant wrote while in prison; (5) and abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant also made a claim of cumulative error. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Angel Arrendondo testified during his trial that he shot and killed Alfego "Ace" Aragon in self-defense. Defendant claimed that Aragon shot at him numerous times, wounding him once in the shoulder. Witnesses testified that Aragon did not own a gun and was not armed. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling. Defendant raised several issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant a fifth continuance requested one week before trial to allow defense counsel an opportunity to examine an unidentified hard fragment found in the lining of the jacket Defendant wore on the day of the shooting; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Defendant's convictions for assault with intent to commit a violent felony against Nicole Rael, Aragon’s daughter, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling; (3) whether defense counsel ineffective because she failed to timely investigate the unidentified hard fragment in the jacket, and because she did not pursue a defense that Defendant was so intoxicated by heroin use that he could not form the specific intent to commit first-degree murder; (4) whether Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a claim he raised for the first time on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for negligent child abuse and his conviction for tampering with evidence, the Court reversed those convictions. Furthermore, the Court reversed his conviction for assault with intent to commit a felony and remanded the case for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed Defendant's remaining convictions.

Defendant Steve Tollardo was convicted by a jury of being an accessory to first-degree murder, being an accessory to kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was acquitted of being an accessory to aggravated arson and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson. The Supreme Court addressed only one of the issues Defendant raised on appeal: whether the district court erred in advising the jury that two other individuals were convicted of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder in connection with the same homicide underlying the charges against Defendant. The Court concluded that the district court did err in mentioning the coconspirators' convictions, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. In reaching this holding, the Court reexamined its harmless error analysis and clarified that a review of the particular circumstances in each case, rather than mechanical application of a multi-factor test, must guide the inquiry into whether a given trial error requires reversal.

Defendant Zirachuen Rivera drove through a DWI checkpoint in Bernalillo County and an officer suspected he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant showed signs of impairment on the standard field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Defendant’s bench trial began in Metropolitan Court where assistant district attorney Rachel Bayless entered an appearance for both herself and Chris Mills, a purported attorney, on behalf of the State. At the conclusion of trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated. Upon leaving the courtroom, defense counsel overheard Mills telling Bayless that he had decided not to take the New Mexico bar exam. Upon learning that Mills was not a licensed New Mexico attorney, Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial and a new trial. Defendant later attached a certificate from the Chief Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court to affirm that Mills was not on the official roll of New Mexico attorneys.In its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court clarified the rules and judicial precedent pertaining to the authorized practice of law in all state courts. The Court held that practice is limited to "duly licensed attorneys who are members of the State Bar or otherwise authorized by this Court’s rules in specific, limited circumstances." Because the Court of Appeals relied on statutory expressions that appeared to permit the unauthorized practice of law in magistrate courts, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals while affirming Defendant's conviction.

Petitioner Timothy Allen appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for habeas relief. He alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel after he was sentenced to death for the 1994 kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of a seventeen-year-old victim. The district court did not consider the merits of Petitioner's claims but instead dismissed the petition as a sanction for his refusal to answer court-ordered deposition questions, which Petitioner claimed violated his privilege against self-incrimination and attorney-client privilege. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that deposing Petitioner was improper, and that communications that were relevant to Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were excepted from the attorney-client privilege. The Court reversed the dismissal of Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus and remanded the case back to the district court to determine the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.