Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found Defendant Graciela Guerra guilty of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of her daughter-in-law, Brenda Guerra, in an Alamogordo motel room. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear her direct appeal. The Court addressed Defendant’s arguments that the district court: (1) erred by denying Defendant’s self-defense instruction; (2) abused its discretion when it excluded, for lack of notice under Rule 5-602(F) NMRA, expert testimony about Defendant’s incapacity to form specific intent; (3) abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony related to whether the victim’s wounds would have been fatal if treated; (4) abused its discretion when it excluded letters Defendant wrote while in prison; (5) and abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant also made a claim of cumulative error. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Angel Arrendondo testified during his trial that he shot and killed Alfego "Ace" Aragon in self-defense. Defendant claimed that Aragon shot at him numerous times, wounding him once in the shoulder. Witnesses testified that Aragon did not own a gun and was not armed. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling. Defendant raised several issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant a fifth continuance requested one week before trial to allow defense counsel an opportunity to examine an unidentified hard fragment found in the lining of the jacket Defendant wore on the day of the shooting; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Defendant's convictions for assault with intent to commit a violent felony against Nicole Rael, Aragon’s daughter, negligent child abuse, tampering with evidence, and shooting at a dwelling; (3) whether defense counsel ineffective because she failed to timely investigate the unidentified hard fragment in the jacket, and because she did not pursue a defense that Defendant was so intoxicated by heroin use that he could not form the specific intent to commit first-degree murder; (4) whether Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a claim he raised for the first time on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for negligent child abuse and his conviction for tampering with evidence, the Court reversed those convictions. Furthermore, the Court reversed his conviction for assault with intent to commit a felony and remanded the case for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed Defendant's remaining convictions.

Defendant Steve Tollardo was convicted by a jury of being an accessory to first-degree murder, being an accessory to kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was acquitted of being an accessory to aggravated arson and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson. The Supreme Court addressed only one of the issues Defendant raised on appeal: whether the district court erred in advising the jury that two other individuals were convicted of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder in connection with the same homicide underlying the charges against Defendant. The Court concluded that the district court did err in mentioning the coconspirators' convictions, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. In reaching this holding, the Court reexamined its harmless error analysis and clarified that a review of the particular circumstances in each case, rather than mechanical application of a multi-factor test, must guide the inquiry into whether a given trial error requires reversal.

Defendant Zirachuen Rivera drove through a DWI checkpoint in Bernalillo County and an officer suspected he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant showed signs of impairment on the standard field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Defendant’s bench trial began in Metropolitan Court where assistant district attorney Rachel Bayless entered an appearance for both herself and Chris Mills, a purported attorney, on behalf of the State. At the conclusion of trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated. Upon leaving the courtroom, defense counsel overheard Mills telling Bayless that he had decided not to take the New Mexico bar exam. Upon learning that Mills was not a licensed New Mexico attorney, Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial and a new trial. Defendant later attached a certificate from the Chief Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court to affirm that Mills was not on the official roll of New Mexico attorneys.In its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court clarified the rules and judicial precedent pertaining to the authorized practice of law in all state courts. The Court held that practice is limited to "duly licensed attorneys who are members of the State Bar or otherwise authorized by this Court’s rules in specific, limited circumstances." Because the Court of Appeals relied on statutory expressions that appeared to permit the unauthorized practice of law in magistrate courts, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals while affirming Defendant's conviction.

Petitioner Timothy Allen appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for habeas relief. He alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel after he was sentenced to death for the 1994 kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of a seventeen-year-old victim. The district court did not consider the merits of Petitioner's claims but instead dismissed the petition as a sanction for his refusal to answer court-ordered deposition questions, which Petitioner claimed violated his privilege against self-incrimination and attorney-client privilege. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that deposing Petitioner was improper, and that communications that were relevant to Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were excepted from the attorney-client privilege. The Court reversed the dismissal of Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus and remanded the case back to the district court to determine the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Defendant Curtis Harper was indicted on fifteen counts of criminal sexual penetration of a child under the age of thirteen. During a docket call, the district court learned for the first time that not all witness interviews had been conducted, including those of the alleged victim and the doctor who examined her. The district court rescheduled the trial and verbally instructed the attorneys to complete the witness interviews. During a subsequent hearing, because neither the victim nor the doctor were interviewed before the court-imposed deadline, the district court prohibited the State from calling either of them as witnesses. The State agreed with Defendant that it could not make a prima facie case against him if these two witnesses were not allowed to testify. The State appealed the district court's exclusion of the two witnesses. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the district court regarding the victim, concluding that the State made efforts to comply with the district court's request and Defendant was not prejudiced by the State's failure to make the victim available for an interview within the time frame established by the district court. Because exclusion of witnesses requires an intentional violation of a court order, prejudice to the opposing party, and consideration of less severe sanctions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with respect to the victim and reversed with respect to the doctor. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s order precluding the victim and the doctor from testifying at trial and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Debbie Cruz was convicted of issuing payroll checks with insufficient funds to cover them.  Defendant was charged with four counts of issuing worthless checks, pursuant to the "Worthless Check Act."  Convicted on each count, Defendant argued on appeal, among other issues, the lack of sufficient evidence to prove that she had issued a check "in exchange for anything of value." Because the worthless checks were issued a week after the last day of the pay period, the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, relying on previous opinions of the Supreme Court to conclude that the Act applied only to a "contemporaneous exchange" and not to pre-existing or antecedent debts.  Upon its review, the Supreme Court rejected that distinction as inconsistent with the clear legislative intent and purpose of the Act.  Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Defendant Ramon Lopez was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes, including first-degree felony murder. The Supreme Court addressed two of the issues Defendant raised on appeal:  whether Defendant's right to confront witnesses who testified against him was violated by the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness, and whether the district court erred in allowing the State to impeach its own witness with otherwise inadmissible hearsay.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the district court committed reversible error by allowing hearsay to be admitted under the auspices of the State's impeachment of the preliminary hearing testimony of the unavailable witness. The Court did not reach Defendantâs remaining issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

This case came before the Supreme Court on a petition invoking its emergency original jurisdiction to review the indefinite detention of thirty-two courtroom spectators (Petitioners) who had all been summarily ordered to jail for contempt of court by Respondent Judge Sam Sanchez after a contentious hearing evolved into a courtroom disruption created by some, but not all, of the Petitioners. The events that took place immediately after Respondent recessed the court were preserved in a digital audio recording. The noise level in the courtroom increased as the voices of the defendant and some of the spectators became louder.  Thirty-nine seconds after the bailiff first told the crowd to rise and while audible statements were still being made, Respondent yelled, "That's enough! I'll hold every one of you in contempt and jail you all!" Upon review of the trial record, the Court found that the record reflects that whoever had been acting in any disruptive or disobedient manner had ceased doing so immediately upon Respondent's oral pronouncement that he was sending everyone to jail. "Petitioners clearly were jailed for the past behavior of one or more of them and not as a coercive measure to stop any continuing disorderly or disobedient behavior. Respondent lawfully could have initiated indirect contempt proceedings against those individuals whom he had reason to believe were participating in disruptive or defiant conduct, but he was required to honor the procedures of the law and the limits of constitutional due process."  In this case, the Court concluded he "utterly" failed to do so. The Court held that Respondent's convictions and jail sentences of Petitioners were an unlawful abuse of judicial power requiring the Court's order that Petitioners be released from jail and that their criminal contempt convictions be vacated. 

Carol Sloan, a New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) Commissioner, was convicted and subsequently sentenced for aggravated battery and burglary. That same day, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto asking the Supreme Court remove Ms. Sloan from office because of her felony convictions. Although Ms. Sloan did not dispute that she was convicted and sentenced for two felony offenses, she nonetheless maintained that those convictions did not disqualify her from continuing to hold public office until the expiration of the term for which she was elected. Ultimately the Court found that because Ms. Sloan was a convicted felon, forfeiture of her office was automatic.