Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Cavagnolo was arrested and charged with making a terroristic threat after repeatedly calling the Hyde Park Police Department emergency line and threatening to commit violent acts against officers, their families, and Police Department property. The County Court set bail pursuant to CPL 510.10 (4) (a), which makes all violent felony offenses listed in Penal Law § 70.02 bailable, except for two specific exceptions. However, CPL 510.10 (4) (g) makes bailable the felony crimes of terrorism defined in Penal Law article 490 but explicitly excludes the crime of making a terroristic threat.The Appellate Division granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered Mr. Cavagnolo's release, holding that the authority to set bail for violent felony offenses under CPL 510.10 (4) (a) does not extend to the crime of making a terroristic threat because it is explicitly excluded under paragraph (g). One Justice dissented, arguing that the "specific trumps the general" canon does not apply because both paragraphs (a) and (g) are specific.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense under CPL 510.10 (4) (a). The Court reasoned that the disjunctive structure of CPL 510.10 (4) indicates that each paragraph sets forth a separate and distinct category of offenses qualifying for monetary bail, and one paragraph does not modify another. The Court found that the legislature did not intend to implicitly import paragraph (g)'s exclusion into paragraph (a). Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the habeas corpus proceeding was converted to a declaratory judgment action, with judgment granted in accordance with the opinion. View "People ex rel. Ellis v Imperati" on Justia Law

A defendant was arrested and charged with several felony offenses, including attempted murder, for which bail was set and posted. While out on bail, the defendant was arrested again on charges of theft, larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property. These new charges were not qualifying offenses for bail on their own, but the prosecution requested bail under CPL 510.10 (4) (t), arguing that the defendant committed the new offenses while released on bail for the prior attempted murder charge. The court set bail, citing the defendant's release on bail for a prior violent felony.Defense counsel argued that CPL 510.10 (4) (t) only applies to defendants released on recognizance or non-monetary conditions, not those released on bail. The court rejected this interpretation and denied subsequent bail applications. Defense counsel then sought habeas relief from the Appellate Division, arguing that the statute did not apply to defendants released on bail. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ, holding that "released under conditions" includes bail.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that CPL 510.10 (4) (t) applies to defendants released on any condition, including bail. The court found that the statutory language did not limit its application to non-monetary conditions and that the legislature intended to create a mechanism for assigning bail to repeat offenders. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the habeas corpus proceeding was converted into a declaratory judgment action, and it was declared that a defendant arrested on new charges after being released on bail on a prior charge is "released under conditions" within the meaning of CPL 510.10 (4) (t). View "People ex rel. Welch v Maginley-Liddie" on Justia Law

In 2020, Brenda WW, a domestic violence survivor incarcerated for killing her partner, applied for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). Brenda had been convicted of manslaughter, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon, and was serving a 20-year sentence. The County Court denied her application, finding that she did not meet the criteria for resentencing under the DVSJA. The Appellate Division, however, found that Brenda satisfied the statutory criteria and reduced her sentences, noting that she had already served more time than the DVSJA maximum for her convictions. The court also stated that the excess time should be credited toward her postrelease supervision term, effectively leaving her with no postrelease supervision to serve.The County Court initially denied Brenda's application for resentencing, concluding that the abuse she suffered was neither substantial nor a significant contributing factor to her offense, and that her sentence was not unduly harsh. Brenda appealed this decision. The Appellate Division reversed the County Court's decision, granted Brenda's application for resentencing, and reduced her sentences. The Appellate Division imposed maximum periods of postrelease supervision but credited Brenda's excess time served toward this supervision, effectively eliminating it.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and addressed two main issues. First, the court held that the Appellate Division has plenary review power and can make its own factual findings, rejecting the People's argument that the Appellate Division should have reviewed the County Court's decision for abuse of discretion. Second, the court found that the Appellate Division erred in crediting Brenda's excess time served toward her postrelease supervision term. The DVSJA requires resentencing courts to impose a term of postrelease supervision, and excess time spent incarcerated cannot be credited toward that term. The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine the appropriate period of postrelease supervision. View "People v Brenda WW" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend during a violent altercation. She claimed that she acted in self-defense, citing a history of severe physical abuse by the victim, including multiple incidents of strangulation and a recent sexual assault immediately preceding the stabbing. Several witnesses corroborated the defendant’s account of ongoing abuse, and an order of protection had previously been issued against the victim.The case was tried in Supreme Court, Erie County, where the defendant’s counsel pursued a justification defense under Penal Law § 35.15. During summation, the prosecutor misrepresented the defendant’s testimony by stating that she had never claimed to fear for her life, despite clear testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor also repeatedly accused the defendant of lying, using the term “lies” numerous times. Defense counsel did not object to these remarks. The jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue was unpreserved and that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance. However, the Appellate Division did grant sentencing relief under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was denied meaningful representation due to her counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper summation remarks. The Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence and repeated personal attacks on the defendant’s credibility exceeded permissible advocacy and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Court concluded that, in the absence of any strategic justification for counsel’s silence, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and a new trial was ordered. View "People v T.P." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of a 20-year-old in August 2007, when he was 16 years old. The prosecution presented police-arranged single photo identifications made the day after the crime. The defendant moved to suppress these identifications, arguing they were conducted in a suggestive manner. The Supreme Court ordered a Rodriguez/Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identifications, but the hearing was never held. During the trial, the prosecution called an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, despite earlier stating they would not call this witness. The defense counsel did not object to the witness being called or request a Rodriguez/Wade hearing.The Supreme Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the missing transcript of jury deliberation proceedings constituted a mode of proceedings error and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion for a reconstruction hearing. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the defendant's sentence but affirmed the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion, rejecting the defendant's claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and rejected the defendant's mode of proceedings claim, holding that a missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to vacatur of their conviction. The court stated that the proper remedy for a missing transcript is a reconstruction hearing, provided the defendant's conduct shows a good faith effort to obtain prompt and effective reconstruction. The court also held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved without resolving questions of fact. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing on the CPL 440.10 motion. View "People v Salas" on Justia Law

Ali Tuckett sought damages from the State of New York under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, claiming unjust conviction and imprisonment. Tuckett's 2011 conviction for sexually abusing his minor cousin, N.M., was vacated after N.M. recanted his testimony in 2013, admitting he had lied. Tuckett then filed a claim for damages, asserting his innocence and that he did not cause his conviction.The Court of Claims dismissed Tuckett's claim, concluding he did not prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The court excluded polygraph evidence Tuckett wanted to present and found N.M.'s recantation not credible, relying on testimony from the original investigation and trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that any reliance on hearsay was harmless and that the court's findings were supported by the record. Two justices dissented, believing the court improperly relied on evidence outside the record and hearsay.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court found that any potential hearsay error was harmless given the substantial non-hearsay evidence supporting the Court of Claims' decision. The court also determined that the findings of fact were supported by the record and that the Court of Claims did not improperly rely on evidence outside the record. Additionally, the court rejected Tuckett's argument that the Court of Claims applied an incorrect presumption regarding the reliability of recantation testimony, noting that the court provided specific reasons for finding N.M.'s recantation not credible.The Court of Appeals held that Tuckett failed to prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence and affirmed the dismissal of his claim. View "Tuckett v State of New York" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested after his sister-in-law reported to the police that he had raped her while her young child watched. The victim testified that she lived in an upstairs apartment with her family, while the defendant lived downstairs. On May 25, 2017, the defendant entered the victim's room under the pretense of delivering mail and propositioned her for sex, and when she refused, he became aggressive, eventually raping her. The victim's child sought help, leading to the defendant's arrest.The defendant was charged with first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-degree rape. Before the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had previously attempted to rape two other sisters-in-law. The trial court allowed this evidence, instructing the jury that it could be considered for purposes other than proving the defendant's propensity to commit the crime. The defendant argued that the sexual encounter was consensual, suggesting an affair and rough consensual sex. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting, stating that the evidence was relevant to establish the defendant's use of force and provide background information on the family dynamics.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of prior assaults. The Court explained that the evidence was relevant to refute the defendant's claim of consensual sex and to establish his intent to rape the victim. The Court also found that the evidence provided necessary background information on the family dynamics and the defendant's relationship with the victim. The Court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential prejudice and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v. Sin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Laquawn Lewis, was charged with attempted murder, robbery, assault, and obstruction of governmental administration. Leading up to his trial, Lewis expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel and filed various pro se motions. He eventually requested to represent himself, stating his intention to proceed pro se. The court denied his request without conducting the required inquiry into whether his decision was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.At trial, Lewis reiterated his desire to represent himself, but the court again denied his request and proceeded with jury selection. Lewis later pleaded guilty to avoid a potential life sentence based on an incorrect assumption about his status as a persistent felony offender. After realizing the error, defense counsel moved to withdraw the guilty plea, which the court granted. Lewis renewed his request to represent himself, but the court deferred the decision until the trial date and ultimately denied it again. Lewis was convicted of all charges except attempted murder and sentenced to 25 years' incarceration and 5 years' post-release supervision.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that Lewis's requests to proceed pro se were not unequivocal and that his legal sufficiency argument was unpreserved and without merit. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Lewis leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court violated Lewis's constitutional right to self-representation by denying his unequivocal request to proceed pro se without the requisite inquiry. The court held that Lewis's request was clear and timely, and the trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry warranted a new trial. The court also found that Lewis's legal sufficiency argument was unpreserved. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and granted Lewis a new trial. View "People v Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after abandoning a plastic bag containing crack cocaine while being pursued by police. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that the pursuit was unlawful. At the suppression hearing, Officer Kyle Eisenhauer of the Rochester Police Department testified that he and his partner observed the defendant exit a sedan and aggressively approach a woman who had thrown a bottle at the car. The officers instructed the defendant to stop, but he fled, digging into his waistband and leaving his car in the middle of the street. The officers pursued him, and during the chase, the defendant discarded a plastic bag containing a white substance, later identified as crack cocaine.The Supreme Court largely credited Eisenhauer's account, determined that the pursuit was lawful, and denied the defendant's suppression motion. The defendant proceeded to a jury trial and was found guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the stop and subsequent pursuit were supported by reasonable suspicion. One Justice dissented, arguing that the reasonable suspicion ceased once the defendant stopped approaching the woman.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that police may pursue a suspect who flees during a lawful level three stop founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court rejected the notion that a suspect can legally flee a level three stop if their flight dissipates the initial reasonable suspicion. The court found support in the record for the determination that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v Cleveland" on Justia Law

An investigator from the Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals found a dog named Mogley in distress in Kingston. The dog was unable to stand or walk properly and was later euthanized due to its deteriorated condition. The investigator filed a sworn accusatory instrument charging Christopher Farrell with failure to provide necessary sustenance to Mogley, citing the dog's chronic pain, flea infestation, and lack of veterinary care.Kingston City Court dismissed the charge, finding the accusatory instrument facially insufficient. The prosecution appealed, and Ulster County Court reversed the dismissal, reinstating the charge. The County Court held that the instrument contained sufficient factual allegations of animal cruelty and that the statute was not void for vagueness, as a person of ordinary intelligence could understand that denying necessary care to a suffering animal constitutes cruelty.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the accusatory instrument facially insufficient. The court noted that the instrument lacked nonhearsay allegations to support the charge that Farrell deprived Mogley of necessary veterinary care. The court emphasized that the instrument did not provide sufficient details on how the investigator knew about Mogley's medical conditions or whether these conditions were visible. The court concluded that the remaining allegations, such as the flea infestation, were inadequate to establish the charge. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the County Court's order and reinstated the City Court's dismissal of the accusatory instrument. View "People v Farrell" on Justia Law