Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ali Tuckett sought damages from the State of New York under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, claiming unjust conviction and imprisonment. Tuckett's 2011 conviction for sexually abusing his minor cousin, N.M., was vacated after N.M. recanted his testimony in 2013, admitting he had lied. Tuckett then filed a claim for damages, asserting his innocence and that he did not cause his conviction.The Court of Claims dismissed Tuckett's claim, concluding he did not prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The court excluded polygraph evidence Tuckett wanted to present and found N.M.'s recantation not credible, relying on testimony from the original investigation and trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that any reliance on hearsay was harmless and that the court's findings were supported by the record. Two justices dissented, believing the court improperly relied on evidence outside the record and hearsay.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court found that any potential hearsay error was harmless given the substantial non-hearsay evidence supporting the Court of Claims' decision. The court also determined that the findings of fact were supported by the record and that the Court of Claims did not improperly rely on evidence outside the record. Additionally, the court rejected Tuckett's argument that the Court of Claims applied an incorrect presumption regarding the reliability of recantation testimony, noting that the court provided specific reasons for finding N.M.'s recantation not credible.The Court of Appeals held that Tuckett failed to prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence and affirmed the dismissal of his claim. View "Tuckett v State of New York" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested after his sister-in-law reported to the police that he had raped her while her young child watched. The victim testified that she lived in an upstairs apartment with her family, while the defendant lived downstairs. On May 25, 2017, the defendant entered the victim's room under the pretense of delivering mail and propositioned her for sex, and when she refused, he became aggressive, eventually raping her. The victim's child sought help, leading to the defendant's arrest.The defendant was charged with first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-degree rape. Before the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had previously attempted to rape two other sisters-in-law. The trial court allowed this evidence, instructing the jury that it could be considered for purposes other than proving the defendant's propensity to commit the crime. The defendant argued that the sexual encounter was consensual, suggesting an affair and rough consensual sex. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting, stating that the evidence was relevant to establish the defendant's use of force and provide background information on the family dynamics.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of prior assaults. The Court explained that the evidence was relevant to refute the defendant's claim of consensual sex and to establish his intent to rape the victim. The Court also found that the evidence provided necessary background information on the family dynamics and the defendant's relationship with the victim. The Court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential prejudice and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v. Sin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Laquawn Lewis, was charged with attempted murder, robbery, assault, and obstruction of governmental administration. Leading up to his trial, Lewis expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel and filed various pro se motions. He eventually requested to represent himself, stating his intention to proceed pro se. The court denied his request without conducting the required inquiry into whether his decision was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.At trial, Lewis reiterated his desire to represent himself, but the court again denied his request and proceeded with jury selection. Lewis later pleaded guilty to avoid a potential life sentence based on an incorrect assumption about his status as a persistent felony offender. After realizing the error, defense counsel moved to withdraw the guilty plea, which the court granted. Lewis renewed his request to represent himself, but the court deferred the decision until the trial date and ultimately denied it again. Lewis was convicted of all charges except attempted murder and sentenced to 25 years' incarceration and 5 years' post-release supervision.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that Lewis's requests to proceed pro se were not unequivocal and that his legal sufficiency argument was unpreserved and without merit. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Lewis leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court violated Lewis's constitutional right to self-representation by denying his unequivocal request to proceed pro se without the requisite inquiry. The court held that Lewis's request was clear and timely, and the trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry warranted a new trial. The court also found that Lewis's legal sufficiency argument was unpreserved. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and granted Lewis a new trial. View "People v Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after abandoning a plastic bag containing crack cocaine while being pursued by police. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that the pursuit was unlawful. At the suppression hearing, Officer Kyle Eisenhauer of the Rochester Police Department testified that he and his partner observed the defendant exit a sedan and aggressively approach a woman who had thrown a bottle at the car. The officers instructed the defendant to stop, but he fled, digging into his waistband and leaving his car in the middle of the street. The officers pursued him, and during the chase, the defendant discarded a plastic bag containing a white substance, later identified as crack cocaine.The Supreme Court largely credited Eisenhauer's account, determined that the pursuit was lawful, and denied the defendant's suppression motion. The defendant proceeded to a jury trial and was found guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the stop and subsequent pursuit were supported by reasonable suspicion. One Justice dissented, arguing that the reasonable suspicion ceased once the defendant stopped approaching the woman.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that police may pursue a suspect who flees during a lawful level three stop founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court rejected the notion that a suspect can legally flee a level three stop if their flight dissipates the initial reasonable suspicion. The court found support in the record for the determination that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v Cleveland" on Justia Law

An investigator from the Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals found a dog named Mogley in distress in Kingston. The dog was unable to stand or walk properly and was later euthanized due to its deteriorated condition. The investigator filed a sworn accusatory instrument charging Christopher Farrell with failure to provide necessary sustenance to Mogley, citing the dog's chronic pain, flea infestation, and lack of veterinary care.Kingston City Court dismissed the charge, finding the accusatory instrument facially insufficient. The prosecution appealed, and Ulster County Court reversed the dismissal, reinstating the charge. The County Court held that the instrument contained sufficient factual allegations of animal cruelty and that the statute was not void for vagueness, as a person of ordinary intelligence could understand that denying necessary care to a suffering animal constitutes cruelty.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the accusatory instrument facially insufficient. The court noted that the instrument lacked nonhearsay allegations to support the charge that Farrell deprived Mogley of necessary veterinary care. The court emphasized that the instrument did not provide sufficient details on how the investigator knew about Mogley's medical conditions or whether these conditions were visible. The court concluded that the remaining allegations, such as the flea infestation, were inadequate to establish the charge. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the County Court's order and reinstated the City Court's dismissal of the accusatory instrument. View "People v Farrell" on Justia Law

A police officer observed McKenzie Willis driving in Manhattan in October 2018. A search of the DMV records revealed Willis's license was suspended at least three times for failing to answer traffic summonses. Willis was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degree and unlicensed driving. Edward Martinez-Fernandez, a taxi driver, was arrested after a traffic accident in the Bronx in July 2016. A search of his DMV records showed his license was suspended at least three times for failing to answer traffic summonses. Martinez-Fernandez was charged with reckless driving, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degree, and unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.Both defendants waived prosecution by information, pleaded guilty to third-degree aggravated unlicensed driving, and were sentenced to a $200 fine and an $88 surcharge. They appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing the misdemeanor complaints were facially insufficient as they did not provide reasonable cause to believe they knew or had reason to know their licenses were suspended. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions, finding the complaints jurisdictionally valid and sufficient for pleading purposes.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the misdemeanor complaints met the reasonable cause standard. The complaints provided sufficient information to notify the defendants of the charges and prevent double jeopardy. The court found that reasonable inferences from the complaints and driving records indicated the defendants likely received the summonses. The court affirmed the Appellate Term's decision, concluding the complaints were facially sufficient. Martinez-Fernandez's challenge to the reckless driving charge was not addressed as he pleaded guilty to the sufficient charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a vehicle in the third degree. View "People v Willis" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of shooting the front-seat passenger and the driver of a vehicle he was in, resulting in the passenger's death and the driver's injury. He was indicted on multiple counts and assigned counsel. Several months into the proceedings, the defendant wrote a letter to the trial court expressing dissatisfaction with his attorney, alleging that the attorney was not working in his best interest, had disrespected him and his wife, and was prolonging the proceedings. He requested a new attorney. The trial court denied this request, explaining that the state was providing an experienced attorney and advising the defendant that he could hire a private attorney if he obtained funds.The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. After sentencing, the defendant, acting pro se, moved to vacate the judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing, noting that the defendant's allegations were unsupported by anything other than his affidavit and were contradicted by the record. The Appellate Division affirmed both the judgment and the order, agreeing that the trial court had properly exercised its discretion in denying the request for new counsel and the CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court was not required to conduct a minimal inquiry into the defendant's complaints about his counsel, as the complaints were not specific or serious enough to warrant such an inquiry. The court also found that the trial court had conducted a minimal inquiry by considering the defendant's letter and counsel's in-court explanation. Additionally, the court concluded that defense counsel's statements did not create an actual conflict of interest requiring substitution of counsel. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

In 2015, the defendant robbed a Manhattan convenience store at gunpoint and assaulted the proprietor. A jury convicted him of the robbery in 2017. Before sentencing, the prosecution filed a predicate felony statement listing two prior violent felony convictions and the relevant dates of incarceration that extended the ten-year period described in Penal Law § 70.04. The first qualifying felony was a 1997 conviction for first-degree robbery and burglary, and the second was a 1990 conviction for second-degree robbery. The defendant argued that the time he spent in presentence incarceration for the 1990 felony should not be excluded from the ten-year lookback period.The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Penal Law § 70.04, the period of presentence incarceration must be excluded, and the relevant lookback period tolled. Consequently, the defendant was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. The court imposed the minimum available sentence of 20 years to life in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the period of presentence incarceration on the 1990 conviction tolled the ten-year lookback period.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the plain text of Penal Law § 70.04 requires that the ten-year lookback period be extended by any period of incarceration between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony, including any period of presentence incarceration for the prior crime. The court found no ambiguity in the statute and rejected the defendant's argument to rewrite the statute's reference to "commission of the previous felony" to read "sentence imposed" for that crime. The court also noted that the defendant's argument regarding the constitutionality of the recidivist sentencing regime was unpreserved. View "People v Hernandez" on Justia Law

While incarcerated for manslaughter, the defendant engaged in a fight with another inmate, resulting in the defendant cutting his finger and the opponent sustaining a face wound. Correction officers found a bloody, sharpened porcelain shard near the defendant. The defendant was convicted of promoting prison contraband in the first degree and sentenced as a second felony offender to 3½ to 7 years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence. The court stated that there were no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the Appellate Division applied an erroneous standard by requiring extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion for a sentence reduction. The Court of Appeals clarified that the intermediate appellate courts have broad, plenary power to reduce a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe without deference to the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals reversed the order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim under the proper standard. View "People v Brisman" on Justia Law

Edward Mero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The first murder involved his roommate, who was found dead in their apartment after a fire in 2013. The second murder involved a woman he hired for a date in December 2014, whose body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. Mero was arrested in 2017 and charged with both murders and related tampering charges.The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment and denied Mero's motion to sever them, reasoning that the distinct evidence for each murder would allow the jury to consider each charge separately. During the trial, a juror was dismissed after overhearing derogatory comments made by defense counsel. Mero later moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the potential conflict did not affect the defense.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the severance motion and the motion to vacate. The court found that the evidence for each murder was distinct enough for the jury to consider separately and that the potential conflict of interest did not impact the defense. Two Justices dissented, arguing that the proof for the second murder was significantly stronger and that the jury would likely be prejudiced by the joinder.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, as the jury was capable of considering the evidence for each charge separately. The court also found that the potential conflict of interest did not operate on the defense, and Mero's other claims were either without merit or unreviewable. View "People v Mero" on Justia Law