Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with second-degree murder and other offenses. Facing a potential minimum sentence of 15 years to life if convicted at trial, she entered into a plea agreement. Under this agreement, she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for sentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) to 10 years’ incarceration and five years’ post-release supervision (PRS), and she agreed to waive her right to appeal. The Supreme Court determined, based on the record and submissions, that she would have qualified for DVSJA sentencing and imposed the recommended sentence.On appeal, the defendant argued to the Appellate Division, First Department, that the five-year PRS term was illegal because the Penal Law did not authorize PRS for class A felonies sentenced under the DVSJA. She also contended that her sentence was excessive and that her appeal waiver was invalid, allowing review of her excessive sentence claim. The Appellate Division held that the appeal waiver was valid and barred review of the excessive sentence claim, but that the legality of the sentence could still be reviewed. The court concluded that the relevant statutes did not prohibit the imposition of a five-year PRS term for a class A felony under the DVSJA and affirmed the judgment.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that Penal Law §§ 60.12 and 70.45, when read together, require a five-year PRS term for a defendant convicted of a class A felony and sentenced under the DVSJA to a determinate term. The Court also held that the defendant’s waiver of her right to appeal was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and thus barred her excessive sentence claim. View "People v Hernandez" on Justia Law

The defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint and faced a statutory speedy trial deadline under CPL 30.30. The prosecution was required to announce readiness for trial by August 1, 2022. On that date, at 5:03 p.m., the prosecution submitted a certificate of compliance and a statement of readiness through the court’s Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS), after the clerk’s office had closed. The next morning, the clerk’s office marked the statement as filed as of August 1 and notified the prosecution. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the statement of readiness was untimely because it was filed after business hours and not reviewed by the clerk until the following day.The Criminal Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the prosecution’s filing was invalid because it occurred after the court’s close of business and the prosecution must be capable of actually beginning a trial when announcing readiness. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that the prosecution’s readiness and the court’s ability to commence trial are separate issues, and that documents submitted through EDDS can be deemed filed as of the date of electronic submission, even if reviewed later by the clerk.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The Court of Appeals held that electronic submission of a statement of readiness before midnight on the due date satisfies CPL 30.30, regardless of the time of day or whether the clerk’s office is open. The court further held that CPL 30.30 regulates only the prosecution’s submission of the statement of readiness, not the timing of the clerk’s review or acceptance of the filing. Thus, the prosecution’s use of EDDS to deliver the statement at 5:03 p.m. on the last day of the speedy trial period met the statutory requirements. View "People v Licius" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanors following an encounter with a Suffolk County police officer, Danielle Congedo, which led to his arrest. After arraignment, the prosecution filed a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness, disclosing a spreadsheet referencing a federal lawsuit against Congedo. Later, they provided the complaint, amended complaint, docket report, and notice of the lawsuit, which alleged misconduct by Congedo in an unrelated incident. Before a pretrial hearing, the defendant argued that the prosecution had not disclosed an Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) report related to the lawsuit, which he claimed was required under statutory discovery rules. Upon request, the prosecution turned over the IAB report and additional materials, then filed a supplemental COC.The Suffolk County District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the prosecution’s initial COC and statement of readiness were invalid until the IAB report was disclosed, and thus the prosecution had exceeded the statutory speedy trial period. The Appellate Term, Second Department, Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts, reversed this decision, holding that the IAB files did not relate to the subject matter of the case and were not subject to automatic discovery under the applicable statute.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether the prosecution’s COC was valid without prior disclosure of the IAB report. The Court held that, even assuming the statute required disclosure of misconduct allegations from unrelated incidents, the prosecution had disclosed the relevant information before filing its timely COCs. The Court found that the IAB report did not contain additional impeachment material beyond what was already disclosed and did not tend to impeach the credibility of the officer. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, upholding the validity of the prosecution’s COC and statement of readiness. View "People v Fuentes" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was arrested after a physical altercation in Times Square, where he was accused of stealing a bicycle and injuring the victim. Police officers intervened, handcuffed both the defendant and the victim, and questioned them at the scene. During this questioning, while still handcuffed and surrounded by officers, the defendant admitted to punching the victim. The officers did not provide Miranda warnings before obtaining this statement. Surveillance and body camera footage captured the events and the questioning.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement, finding that the police were engaged in investigatory questioning rather than custodial interrogation, and thus Miranda warnings were not required. After a bench trial, the defendant was acquitted of second-degree robbery but convicted of third-degree robbery. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, concluding that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed the police were still gathering information, and any error in admitting the statement was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, making his statement inadmissible. The Court clarified that being handcuffed and questioned by police in these circumstances constituted custody, and the officers’ questions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. However, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of the statement affected the trial’s outcome. View "People v Robinson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of first-degree assault and related offenses after being accused of shooting and injuring two people on a Manhattan street. The prosecution’s case included an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the shooter, several other witnesses who implicated him, and physical evidence such as DNA and surveillance video. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the eyewitness’s in-court identification, arguing that it was tainted by a prior suggestive encounter and a subsequent failure to identify him in a non-suggestive lineup. He also contested his sentencing as a second violent felony offender, specifically objecting to the prosecution’s calculation that his prior incarceration tolled the statutory lookback period for predicate felonies.The Supreme Court, New York County, held an independent source hearing and allowed the eyewitness’s in-court identification. At sentencing, the court accepted defense counsel’s concession regarding the predicate felony status and refused to consider the defendant’s personal objections to the tolling calculation. The defendant was sentenced as a second violent felony offender, which increased his minimum term of incarceration. The Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that, even assuming error in admitting the eyewitness’s identification, any such error was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. However, the Court found that the sentencing court erred by denying the defendant his statutory right under CPL 400.15 to personally controvert the predicate felony allegations. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order by remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings to allow the defendant to challenge the predicate felony statement, and otherwise affirmed the conviction. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

A defendant was arrested in 2017 on charges related to promoting and possessing a sexual performance by a child. Bail was initially set, but the defendant was unable to post it and remained in custody. He was convicted at trial and sentenced to prison. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding ineffective assistance of counsel, though the conviction was otherwise supported by sufficient evidence. The People’s appeal of that reversal is still pending. After the conviction was reversed, the defendant applied for a new securing order under the amended bail law, which now requires courts to make an individualized determination of flight risk and to explain the basis for their decision and choice of securing order.At the new bail hearing, the defendant argued he was not a flight risk, citing his lack of prior convictions, his desire to clear his name, and his intent to return to work. The prosecution argued for continued remand, referencing the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood of prevailing on appeal. The Supreme Court ordered continued remand but did not explicitly find the defendant to be a flight risk or explain its reasoning, merely stating it had considered statutory factors and that remand was the least restrictive means to assure the defendant’s return.The defendant’s counsel filed a habeas petition in the Appellate Division, arguing that the remand order violated statutory requirements. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ, finding no violation of constitutional or statutory standards. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by failing to make the required individualized flight risk determination and to explain its reasoning as mandated by CPL 510.10. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded for issuance of a new securing order in compliance with the statute. View "People ex rel. Kon v. Maginley-Liddie" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in Orleans County with multiple counts of larceny, stemming from allegations that he sold a vehicle entrusted to him for repairs and kept the proceeds. The Orleans County District Attorney sought to be disqualified due to a personal relationship with the alleged victim. The County Court granted the disqualification and appointed a special district attorney under County Law § 701(1)(a). However, the appointed special district attorney neither resided in nor had an office in Orleans County or any adjoining county, as required by the statute.After conviction, the defendant raised the issue of the special district attorney’s ineligibility for the first time on direct appeal. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, found that the County Court exceeded its authority by appointing a special district attorney who did not meet the residency requirement and dismissed the indictment on that basis. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that the residency requirement in County Law § 701(1)(a) is a non-waivable jurisdictional prerequisite. The court reasoned that strict adherence to the statute is necessary due to the separation of powers concerns involved when the judiciary appoints a substitute for an elected district attorney. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving assistant district attorneys appointed by a sitting district attorney, where residency requirements may be waivable. Because the County Court lacked authority to appoint a special district attorney who did not satisfy the statutory residency requirement, the indictment must be dismissed. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Callara" on Justia Law

In July 2019, the defendant, his codefendant, and a third individual drove to a park, where both the defendant and codefendant fired guns from a vehicle into a crowd, resulting in the death of a victim. The shooting was allegedly in retaliation for a prior incident in which the codefendant had been shot. Both were charged under a single indictment with second-degree murder and four counts of criminal possession of a weapon, based on an acting-in-concert theory. At trial, a witness implicated both as shooters, and the defendant’s former girlfriend testified about his possession of guns and a statement he made about the killing. Surveillance footage and ballistics evidence supported the prosecution’s case, but the actual shooting was not captured on video.Before trial, the defendant moved for severance, arguing that the codefendant’s counsel intended to blame him for the shooting, which would be irreconcilable with his own defense. The Erie County Court denied the motion, finding the argument speculative and noting it would address any conflict if it arose during trial. During summation, the codefendant’s counsel argued that the evidence pointed to the defendant as one of the shooters. The defendant’s counsel renewed the severance motion, claiming the codefendant’s closing argument unfairly prejudiced the defendant. The court denied the renewed motion, emphasizing its instructions to the jury that attorneys’ arguments were not evidence and that the evidence should be considered separately for each defendant. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting the claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, finding no undue prejudice from the codefendant’s summation and that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Everson" on Justia Law

Michael Cavagnolo was arrested and charged with making a terroristic threat after repeatedly calling the Hyde Park Police Department emergency line and threatening to commit violent acts against officers, their families, and Police Department property. The County Court set bail pursuant to CPL 510.10 (4) (a), which makes all violent felony offenses listed in Penal Law § 70.02 bailable, except for two specific exceptions. However, CPL 510.10 (4) (g) makes bailable the felony crimes of terrorism defined in Penal Law article 490 but explicitly excludes the crime of making a terroristic threat.The Appellate Division granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered Mr. Cavagnolo's release, holding that the authority to set bail for violent felony offenses under CPL 510.10 (4) (a) does not extend to the crime of making a terroristic threat because it is explicitly excluded under paragraph (g). One Justice dissented, arguing that the "specific trumps the general" canon does not apply because both paragraphs (a) and (g) are specific.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense under CPL 510.10 (4) (a). The Court reasoned that the disjunctive structure of CPL 510.10 (4) indicates that each paragraph sets forth a separate and distinct category of offenses qualifying for monetary bail, and one paragraph does not modify another. The Court found that the legislature did not intend to implicitly import paragraph (g)'s exclusion into paragraph (a). Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the habeas corpus proceeding was converted to a declaratory judgment action, with judgment granted in accordance with the opinion. View "People ex rel. Ellis v Imperati" on Justia Law

A defendant was arrested and charged with several felony offenses, including attempted murder, for which bail was set and posted. While out on bail, the defendant was arrested again on charges of theft, larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property. These new charges were not qualifying offenses for bail on their own, but the prosecution requested bail under CPL 510.10 (4) (t), arguing that the defendant committed the new offenses while released on bail for the prior attempted murder charge. The court set bail, citing the defendant's release on bail for a prior violent felony.Defense counsel argued that CPL 510.10 (4) (t) only applies to defendants released on recognizance or non-monetary conditions, not those released on bail. The court rejected this interpretation and denied subsequent bail applications. Defense counsel then sought habeas relief from the Appellate Division, arguing that the statute did not apply to defendants released on bail. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ, holding that "released under conditions" includes bail.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that CPL 510.10 (4) (t) applies to defendants released on any condition, including bail. The court found that the statutory language did not limit its application to non-monetary conditions and that the legislature intended to create a mechanism for assigning bail to repeat offenders. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the habeas corpus proceeding was converted into a declaratory judgment action, and it was declared that a defendant arrested on new charges after being released on bail on a prior charge is "released under conditions" within the meaning of CPL 510.10 (4) (t). View "People ex rel. Welch v Maginley-Liddie" on Justia Law