Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Edward Mero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The first murder involved his roommate, who was found dead in their apartment after a fire in 2013. The second murder involved a woman he hired for a date in December 2014, whose body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. Mero was arrested in 2017 and charged with both murders and related tampering charges.The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment and denied Mero's motion to sever them, reasoning that the distinct evidence for each murder would allow the jury to consider each charge separately. During the trial, a juror was dismissed after overhearing derogatory comments made by defense counsel. Mero later moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the potential conflict did not affect the defense.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the severance motion and the motion to vacate. The court found that the evidence for each murder was distinct enough for the jury to consider separately and that the potential conflict of interest did not impact the defense. Two Justices dissented, arguing that the proof for the second murder was significantly stronger and that the jury would likely be prejudiced by the joinder.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, as the jury was capable of considering the evidence for each charge separately. The court also found that the potential conflict of interest did not operate on the defense, and Mero's other claims were either without merit or unreviewable. View "People v Mero" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) after being stopped by state troopers for crossing the fog line three times within a short distance. The defendant argued that the stop was unlawful and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. During the suppression hearing, the troopers testified that they observed the defendant's vehicle crossing the fog line multiple times, and upon stopping him, noted signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. The defendant failed several sobriety tests and admitted to drinking.The suppression court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the vehicle based on the observed traffic violation. At the bench trial, the troopers' testimonies were consistent with their earlier statements, and the court admitted the police report of the defendant's refusal to take a chemical test. The court found the defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and sentenced him accordingly.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle for violating VTL § 1128 (a) by crossing the fog line multiple times. The majority rejected the defendant's claims, while the dissenting justices argued that there was no evidence of unsafe driving. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the troopers had probable cause for the stop and that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that the weight of the evidence claim was unreviewable. View "People v Rufus" on Justia Law

Two men entered a Brooklyn warehouse on May 9, 2016, one displaying a badge and the other remaining outside an office door. The man with the badge, a Black man, drew a firearm and forced an Asian victim to surrender $3,000. The robbers fled, and the victims called 911 and pursued them. Surveillance footage captured the robbery, but the robbers' facial features were unclear. Four days later, the first victim identified the defendant, who was wearing the same clothes as during the robbery. The defendant was arrested, and his sweatshirt, which was later destroyed by mold, was vouchered as evidence.The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree and proceeded to a jury trial. After jury selection and opening statements, the defense counsel indicated an intention to call an expert on cross-race effect. Later, the defense sought to expand the expert testimony to include other factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The trial court requested case law to support the additional factors but received none. The court allowed expert testimony only on cross-race effect, citing the late application and potential trial delay. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 20 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, noting sufficient corroborating evidence.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert testimony to cross-race effect. The court emphasized that the trial court properly weighed the probative value of the testimony against potential trial delay and other factors. The court clarified that corroborating evidence should not be the sole basis for admissibility decisions and affirmed the Appellate Division's order. View "People v Vaughn" on Justia Law

In 1977, the defendant, then 19 years old, committed a series of serious sexual offenses, including rape and sodomy, after breaking into a stranger's home. He had a history of sexual misconduct dating back to 1968, including incidents of sexual abuse and attempted rape. He was convicted of multiple charges, including rape in the first degree, and sentenced to 8⅓ to 30 years in prison. After serving 21 years, he was released on parole in 1998 and classified as a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).The defendant petitioned the County Court in 2021 to modify his risk level classification from level three to level one, citing his rehabilitation, stable employment, and supportive family relationships. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders did not oppose the modification to level one. However, the People opposed any modification, emphasizing the seriousness of his past crimes. The County Court partially granted the petition, reducing his classification to level two but denying the request for level one, citing the seriousness of his 1977 crimes and his criminal history, including a 2003 misdemeanor conviction.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the County Court's decision. The Court held that the County Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the defendant's classification to level two but denying further modification to level one. The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the defendant's past crimes and his criminal history were relevant factors in assessing his risk of reoffense. The Court concluded that the defendant had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he was so unlikely to reoffend as to warrant a level one classification. View "People v Shader" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon after police recovered a handgun from him following a report of shots fired. Before being read his Miranda rights, the defendant made an incriminating statement to the police. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress both the handgun and his statement. Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, and the defendant accepted a plea deal. During the plea colloquy, the defendant, representing himself, expressed his desire to appeal the suppression ruling. The court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, agreed that the defendant's statement should have been suppressed but deemed the error harmless, concluding that the gun's admissibility at trial meant there was no reasonable possibility the error influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the erroneous suppression ruling could have contributed to the defendant's decision to plead guilty. The court emphasized that harmless error analysis in the context of guilty pleas is challenging and requires evaluating whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the plea decision. The court found the record ambiguous regarding the defendant's motivation for pleading guilty and noted the defendant's concern about appealing the suppression ruling. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, vacated the defendant's guilty plea, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment. View "People v Robles" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting that occurred during a dispute over a drug transaction at a barbershop in the Bronx. The barbershop owner and the victim had several confrontations, including a fistfight and threats from the victim. The victim returned to the shop, and the owner called the defendant, a friend. When the defendant arrived, the victim confronted him with a razor blade, and the defendant shot and killed the victim. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree criminal weapon possession. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of justification.During the trial, the court heard testimony from an eyewitness and the medical examiner. The trial court denied the defendant's request for a justification charge, concluding it was not appropriate based on the evidence. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the defendant was not justified in firing additional shots into the victim's back after stepping back and not being cut by the victim.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in not providing a justification instruction for the second-degree murder charge. The court found that there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant was justified in his actions, given the rapid unfolding of events and the imminent threat posed by the victim. The court also noted that the failure to provide the justification instruction could have affected the jury's verdict on the possession count, as the jury might have concluded that the defendant lacked the intent to use the weapon unlawfully if they found the shooting justified. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and ordered a new trial. View "People v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Jorge Baque's five-month-old daughter was found unresponsive in her crib on July 30, 2016, and was later declared dead. An autopsy revealed injuries consistent with abusive head trauma and violent shaking. Baque was charged with manslaughter in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. At trial, the prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence, including testimony that Baque was the last person with the victim and that the injuries would have caused death within minutes. The jury was instructed on circumstantial evidence and convicted Baque of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of a child.Baque appealed, arguing that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, referencing weight of the evidence precedent and concluding that the jury's inference of guilt was reasonable. A Judge of the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Appellate Division properly conducted a weight of the evidence review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, noting that the lower court had applied the correct legal principles. The Court emphasized that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the jury must ensure that the inference of guilt is the only reasonable conclusion and that all other hypotheses of innocence are excluded beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found no basis for reversal, as the Appellate Division had appropriately considered the circumstantial evidence and the jury's inferences. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v. Baque" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to sell and possession of cocaine after police recovered drugs and paraphernalia during a search of an apartment where he and others were arrested. Defense counsel sought to suppress the seized items, arguing the warrant was inaccurate and unreliable but did not claim the warrant was executed without notice, violating CPL 690.50 (1). Defendant argued on appeal that this omission constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.The Appellate Division, Third Department, reviewed the case and rejected the ineffective assistance claim, noting that the record did not conclusively show a knock-and-announce violation. The court found that the defendant's argument was speculative and unsupported by the record, which was silent on whether the officers announced themselves before entry. The Appellate Division concluded that the defendant failed to establish a no-knock violation.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that defense counsel's failure to raise the knock-and-announce issue did not constitute ineffective assistance because the argument was not so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense attorney would have failed to assert it. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan, which held that a knock-and-announce violation does not require the exclusion of evidence, had not been contradicted by any New York appellate decision. Therefore, the issue was not sufficiently clear to mandate its assertion by defense counsel. The court also found that the defendant's legal sufficiency contention was unpreserved for appellate review and upheld the trial court's admission of evidence regarding an uncharged drug sale. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Hayward" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of third-degree larceny and second-degree forgery after a jury trial. The case involved a scheme where the defendant falsely represented himself as Joe Basil Jr. to steal tires from Exxpress Tire Delivery Company. The defendant instructed the delivery driver to bring the tires to a location adjacent to the Basil Ford Truck Center, where he falsely signed an invoice as Joe Basil Jr. The real Joe Basil Jr. testified that he did not authorize the purchase and that the signature was not his.The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 3½ to 7 years for the larceny and forgery convictions, explaining that the crimes were separate and distinct acts. The court noted that the forgery occurred during the larceny but constituted a successive act. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that consecutive sentences were permissible because the larceny and forgery were not committed through a single act or omission, nor was one offense a material element of the other. The court explained that the larceny was completed when the tires were loaded onto the defendant's trailer, which occurred before the forgery of the invoice. Additionally, the statutory definitions of the crimes did not overlap in a way that would require concurrent sentences under Penal Law § 70.25 (2). Therefore, the consecutive sentences were lawful. View "People v McGovern" on Justia Law

In 2006, an individual was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and later subjected to civil management under New York's Mental Hygiene Law due to a "mental abnormality." Initially confined, he was released to a strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) program in 2016. In 2019, he violated SIST conditions by tampering with an alcohol monitoring bracelet, leading to his temporary confinement based on a psychologist's evaluation and a probable cause finding by the court.The Supreme Court initially found probable cause to believe he was a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement" and ordered his detention pending a final hearing. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory scheme violated procedural due process by not providing an opportunity to be heard at the probable cause stage. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, ultimately declaring the statute constitutional.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court held that the statutory scheme under Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) appropriately balances individual and state interests. It concluded that the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards, including a prompt judicial probable cause determination and a full hearing within 30 days, to mitigate the risk of erroneous confinement. The court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to him. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed without costs. View "People ex rel. Neville v Toulon" on Justia Law