Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer observed McKenzie Willis driving in Manhattan in October 2018. A search of the DMV records revealed Willis's license was suspended at least three times for failing to answer traffic summonses. Willis was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degree and unlicensed driving. Edward Martinez-Fernandez, a taxi driver, was arrested after a traffic accident in the Bronx in July 2016. A search of his DMV records showed his license was suspended at least three times for failing to answer traffic summonses. Martinez-Fernandez was charged with reckless driving, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degree, and unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.Both defendants waived prosecution by information, pleaded guilty to third-degree aggravated unlicensed driving, and were sentenced to a $200 fine and an $88 surcharge. They appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing the misdemeanor complaints were facially insufficient as they did not provide reasonable cause to believe they knew or had reason to know their licenses were suspended. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions, finding the complaints jurisdictionally valid and sufficient for pleading purposes.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the misdemeanor complaints met the reasonable cause standard. The complaints provided sufficient information to notify the defendants of the charges and prevent double jeopardy. The court found that reasonable inferences from the complaints and driving records indicated the defendants likely received the summonses. The court affirmed the Appellate Term's decision, concluding the complaints were facially sufficient. Martinez-Fernandez's challenge to the reckless driving charge was not addressed as he pleaded guilty to the sufficient charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a vehicle in the third degree. View "People v Willis" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of shooting the front-seat passenger and the driver of a vehicle he was in, resulting in the passenger's death and the driver's injury. He was indicted on multiple counts and assigned counsel. Several months into the proceedings, the defendant wrote a letter to the trial court expressing dissatisfaction with his attorney, alleging that the attorney was not working in his best interest, had disrespected him and his wife, and was prolonging the proceedings. He requested a new attorney. The trial court denied this request, explaining that the state was providing an experienced attorney and advising the defendant that he could hire a private attorney if he obtained funds.The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. After sentencing, the defendant, acting pro se, moved to vacate the judgment, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing, noting that the defendant's allegations were unsupported by anything other than his affidavit and were contradicted by the record. The Appellate Division affirmed both the judgment and the order, agreeing that the trial court had properly exercised its discretion in denying the request for new counsel and the CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court was not required to conduct a minimal inquiry into the defendant's complaints about his counsel, as the complaints were not specific or serious enough to warrant such an inquiry. The court also found that the trial court had conducted a minimal inquiry by considering the defendant's letter and counsel's in-court explanation. Additionally, the court concluded that defense counsel's statements did not create an actual conflict of interest requiring substitution of counsel. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

In 2015, the defendant robbed a Manhattan convenience store at gunpoint and assaulted the proprietor. A jury convicted him of the robbery in 2017. Before sentencing, the prosecution filed a predicate felony statement listing two prior violent felony convictions and the relevant dates of incarceration that extended the ten-year period described in Penal Law § 70.04. The first qualifying felony was a 1997 conviction for first-degree robbery and burglary, and the second was a 1990 conviction for second-degree robbery. The defendant argued that the time he spent in presentence incarceration for the 1990 felony should not be excluded from the ten-year lookback period.The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Penal Law § 70.04, the period of presentence incarceration must be excluded, and the relevant lookback period tolled. Consequently, the defendant was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. The court imposed the minimum available sentence of 20 years to life in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the period of presentence incarceration on the 1990 conviction tolled the ten-year lookback period.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the plain text of Penal Law § 70.04 requires that the ten-year lookback period be extended by any period of incarceration between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony, including any period of presentence incarceration for the prior crime. The court found no ambiguity in the statute and rejected the defendant's argument to rewrite the statute's reference to "commission of the previous felony" to read "sentence imposed" for that crime. The court also noted that the defendant's argument regarding the constitutionality of the recidivist sentencing regime was unpreserved. View "People v Hernandez" on Justia Law

While incarcerated for manslaughter, the defendant engaged in a fight with another inmate, resulting in the defendant cutting his finger and the opponent sustaining a face wound. Correction officers found a bloody, sharpened porcelain shard near the defendant. The defendant was convicted of promoting prison contraband in the first degree and sentenced as a second felony offender to 3½ to 7 years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence. The court stated that there were no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the Appellate Division applied an erroneous standard by requiring extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion for a sentence reduction. The Court of Appeals clarified that the intermediate appellate courts have broad, plenary power to reduce a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe without deference to the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals reversed the order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim under the proper standard. View "People v Brisman" on Justia Law

Edward Mero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The first murder involved his roommate, who was found dead in their apartment after a fire in 2013. The second murder involved a woman he hired for a date in December 2014, whose body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. Mero was arrested in 2017 and charged with both murders and related tampering charges.The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment and denied Mero's motion to sever them, reasoning that the distinct evidence for each murder would allow the jury to consider each charge separately. During the trial, a juror was dismissed after overhearing derogatory comments made by defense counsel. Mero later moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the potential conflict did not affect the defense.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the severance motion and the motion to vacate. The court found that the evidence for each murder was distinct enough for the jury to consider separately and that the potential conflict of interest did not impact the defense. Two Justices dissented, arguing that the proof for the second murder was significantly stronger and that the jury would likely be prejudiced by the joinder.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, as the jury was capable of considering the evidence for each charge separately. The court also found that the potential conflict of interest did not operate on the defense, and Mero's other claims were either without merit or unreviewable. View "People v Mero" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) after being stopped by state troopers for crossing the fog line three times within a short distance. The defendant argued that the stop was unlawful and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. During the suppression hearing, the troopers testified that they observed the defendant's vehicle crossing the fog line multiple times, and upon stopping him, noted signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. The defendant failed several sobriety tests and admitted to drinking.The suppression court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the vehicle based on the observed traffic violation. At the bench trial, the troopers' testimonies were consistent with their earlier statements, and the court admitted the police report of the defendant's refusal to take a chemical test. The court found the defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and sentenced him accordingly.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle for violating VTL § 1128 (a) by crossing the fog line multiple times. The majority rejected the defendant's claims, while the dissenting justices argued that there was no evidence of unsafe driving. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the troopers had probable cause for the stop and that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that the weight of the evidence claim was unreviewable. View "People v Rufus" on Justia Law

Two men entered a Brooklyn warehouse on May 9, 2016, one displaying a badge and the other remaining outside an office door. The man with the badge, a Black man, drew a firearm and forced an Asian victim to surrender $3,000. The robbers fled, and the victims called 911 and pursued them. Surveillance footage captured the robbery, but the robbers' facial features were unclear. Four days later, the first victim identified the defendant, who was wearing the same clothes as during the robbery. The defendant was arrested, and his sweatshirt, which was later destroyed by mold, was vouchered as evidence.The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree and proceeded to a jury trial. After jury selection and opening statements, the defense counsel indicated an intention to call an expert on cross-race effect. Later, the defense sought to expand the expert testimony to include other factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The trial court requested case law to support the additional factors but received none. The court allowed expert testimony only on cross-race effect, citing the late application and potential trial delay. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 20 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, noting sufficient corroborating evidence.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert testimony to cross-race effect. The court emphasized that the trial court properly weighed the probative value of the testimony against potential trial delay and other factors. The court clarified that corroborating evidence should not be the sole basis for admissibility decisions and affirmed the Appellate Division's order. View "People v Vaughn" on Justia Law

In 1977, the defendant, then 19 years old, committed a series of serious sexual offenses, including rape and sodomy, after breaking into a stranger's home. He had a history of sexual misconduct dating back to 1968, including incidents of sexual abuse and attempted rape. He was convicted of multiple charges, including rape in the first degree, and sentenced to 8⅓ to 30 years in prison. After serving 21 years, he was released on parole in 1998 and classified as a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).The defendant petitioned the County Court in 2021 to modify his risk level classification from level three to level one, citing his rehabilitation, stable employment, and supportive family relationships. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders did not oppose the modification to level one. However, the People opposed any modification, emphasizing the seriousness of his past crimes. The County Court partially granted the petition, reducing his classification to level two but denying the request for level one, citing the seriousness of his 1977 crimes and his criminal history, including a 2003 misdemeanor conviction.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the County Court's decision. The Court held that the County Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the defendant's classification to level two but denying further modification to level one. The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the defendant's past crimes and his criminal history were relevant factors in assessing his risk of reoffense. The Court concluded that the defendant had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he was so unlikely to reoffend as to warrant a level one classification. View "People v Shader" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon after police recovered a handgun from him following a report of shots fired. Before being read his Miranda rights, the defendant made an incriminating statement to the police. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress both the handgun and his statement. Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, and the defendant accepted a plea deal. During the plea colloquy, the defendant, representing himself, expressed his desire to appeal the suppression ruling. The court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, agreed that the defendant's statement should have been suppressed but deemed the error harmless, concluding that the gun's admissibility at trial meant there was no reasonable possibility the error influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the erroneous suppression ruling could have contributed to the defendant's decision to plead guilty. The court emphasized that harmless error analysis in the context of guilty pleas is challenging and requires evaluating whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the plea decision. The court found the record ambiguous regarding the defendant's motivation for pleading guilty and noted the defendant's concern about appealing the suppression ruling. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, vacated the defendant's guilty plea, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment. View "People v Robles" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting that occurred during a dispute over a drug transaction at a barbershop in the Bronx. The barbershop owner and the victim had several confrontations, including a fistfight and threats from the victim. The victim returned to the shop, and the owner called the defendant, a friend. When the defendant arrived, the victim confronted him with a razor blade, and the defendant shot and killed the victim. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree criminal weapon possession. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of justification.During the trial, the court heard testimony from an eyewitness and the medical examiner. The trial court denied the defendant's request for a justification charge, concluding it was not appropriate based on the evidence. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the defendant was not justified in firing additional shots into the victim's back after stepping back and not being cut by the victim.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in not providing a justification instruction for the second-degree murder charge. The court found that there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant was justified in his actions, given the rapid unfolding of events and the imminent threat posed by the victim. The court also noted that the failure to provide the justification instruction could have affected the jury's verdict on the possession count, as the jury might have concluded that the defendant lacked the intent to use the weapon unlawfully if they found the shooting justified. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and ordered a new trial. View "People v. Castillo" on Justia Law