Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court. View "People v Franklin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Melvin Baez, was convicted of possessing a quantity of cocaine after a nonjury trial. The conviction was based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop when NYPD officers observed Baez using his cell phone while driving. Upon stopping Baez, the officers noticed his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of marijuana in his car. During a search, a clear plastic bag containing a white substance fell from Baez's jacket pocket. The bag was retrieved, placed in a latex glove for safekeeping, and later stored in a narcotics envelope at the police station.The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the cocaine was inadmissible because the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of custody and there were no reasonable assurances that the substance examined at trial was authentic. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion and found him guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the decision, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the chain of custody of the cocaine and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the prosecution had laid a legally sufficient foundation for the admission of the drugs into evidence. The court noted that the prosecution had established a legally adequate chain of custody and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence. The court also noted that the discrepancies in the record regarding the condition, appearance, or handling of the cocaine were not significant enough to render the drugs inadmissible. The court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and the defendant's conviction was upheld. View "People v Baez" on Justia Law

The case involves Harvey Weinstein, a well-known figure in the entertainment industry, who was convicted by a jury for various sexual crimes against three complainants. Weinstein appealed, arguing that he was judged based on irrelevant, prejudicial, and untested allegations of prior bad acts, rather than the conduct for which he was indicted.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the third-degree rape prosecution was timely commenced and that the trial court properly admitted testimonies of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes. The court also concluded that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Weinstein on a broad range of uncharged bad acts should he testify.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes because that testimony served no material non-propensity purpose. The court also held that the trial court erred when it ruled that Weinstein, who had no criminal history, could be cross-examined about those allegations as well as numerous allegations of misconduct that portrayed Weinstein in a highly prejudicial light. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and ordered a new trial. However, the court rejected Weinstein's claim that the third-degree rape prosecution was untimely, holding that the trial court properly discounted the days Weinstein was continuously outside the state and correctly held that the prosecution was not time-barred. View "People v Weinstein" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of when a non-eyewitness can testify to a jury that the defendant is the person depicted in a photo or video. The incident in question occurred on June 10, 2015, when a man was captured on police cameras in Syracuse firing three shots into a van. The defendant, Farod Mosley, was indicted for the shooting in September 2015, but the indictment was dismissed as legally insufficient. In July 2016, an assistant district attorney showed the video of the shooting to Detective Steven Kilburn, who identified Mosley as the shooter in the video. This identification led to a new indictment against Mosley.The trial took place in February 2018, with the key issue being the identification of the shooter in the video. The prosecution relied on Kilburn to provide lay, non-eyewitness identification testimony that he believed Mosley was the shooter in the video. The jury ultimately convicted Mosley of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Mosley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Kilburn's testimony.The Appellate Division rejected Mosley's contention, holding that the People demonstrated Kilburn was more likely than the jury to correctly identify Mosley in the video. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the People failed to establish that Kilburn's testimony would aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the video was Mosley. The court ruled that such testimony may be admitted where the witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant that their testimony would be reliable, and there is reason to believe the jury might require such assistance in making its independent assessment. In this case, there was no showing that the proffered witness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant to render his testimony helpful, or that the jury faced an obstacle to making the identification that the witness's testimony would have overcome. View "People v Mosley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kenneth Fisher, who was convicted of three counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, based on two controlled buy operations. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. During the trial, one of the jurors believed that Fisher had followed her home after the first day of jury selection. She did not immediately inform the court of her concern but waited until the case was submitted to the jury, and then expressed her safety concern to the other jurors during deliberations.The trial court deemed the juror's belief likely unfounded and, despite some assurances that the juror could put aside her concerns, the court decided to retain her. Fisher's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that he did not have a fair and impartial jury, but the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals found that the juror's belief that she had been followed home by Fisher was a prejudicial belief about the defendant that was not based on the evidence at trial. The court noted that the juror's fear was not about witnesses or collateral matters, but about the defendant's character. The court also noted that the juror had violated the court's instructions by failing to inform the court promptly about her beliefs about the defendant and instead introduced those beliefs into jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror was "grossly unqualified" and should have been dismissed, and a mistrial granted. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial. View "People v Fisher" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court. View "People v. Dunton" on Justia Law

In December 2016, an undercover police officer purchased heroin through an intermediary during a buy-and-bust operation in Manhattan. The officer did not meet the seller face-to-face but followed several feet behind the intermediary and the seller. The officer was far enough away that he could not hear their conversation. After the transaction, the officer reported to his team that the dealer was wearing specific clothing. Minutes later, the police arrested the defendant nearby, and the undercover officer identified him as the seller. The defendant filed a motion arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the court should suppress the undercover officer's identification, the prerecorded buy money, and the defendant's cell phone.The Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The undercover officer testified about his observations during the operation and his subsequent identification of the defendant. After the hearing, the court ruled that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppressed the undercover officer's identification and the physical evidence recovered from the defendant. The defendant then moved for an independent source hearing to determine whether the undercover officer would be allowed to identify him at trial. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the undercover's testimony at the probable cause hearing provided clear and convincing evidence for an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the court had exercised its discretion appropriately in denying the defendant's request for a separate independent source hearing. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer's in-court identification without a hearing record sufficient to support an independent source determination for the identification. The court found that the testimony at the probable cause hearing did not provide enough evidence to support an independent source determination. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an independent source hearing, as requested. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law

Patrick Labate was charged with a class A misdemeanor, for which he was legally entitled to a trial within 90 days of his indictment. The court's record, however, showed that Labate had not been tried 420 days after his indictment. This delay was primarily due to multiple instances where the prosecution declared they were not ready for trial, without providing an explanation, causing the trial to be adjourned.In the case in question, the main issue was the 43-day period between September 5, 2018, and October 18, 2018. The Court of Appeals ruled that this entire period must be charged to the prosecution. The court found that when the prosecution declares readiness for trial, any subsequent delay caused by their own inaction is charged to them. In this case, the prosecution had declared readiness, yet were not ready to proceed on the first scheduled trial date and provided no explanation for their unreadiness. This meant that the delay was attributable to the prosecution's inaction and affected their ability to proceed to trial.The court emphasized that the prosecution has an obligation to maintain readiness and must provide an explanation for any changes in their readiness status. In this case, the prosecution had failed to do so, leading to the court's decision to dismiss the indictment against Labate. The court affirmed the Appellate Term's order to dismiss the indictment but provided different reasoning for its decision.This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of providing an explanation for any changes in trial readiness status and maintaining trial readiness to ensure the prompt administration of justice. View "People v Labate" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jason Bohn, was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of a woman with whom he had an abusive relationship. He appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain, which is a requirement under the first-degree murder statute. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction.The court applied the standard that a verdict is legally sufficient when "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court found sufficient proof for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant derived pleasure from inflicting extreme pain.In reaching this conclusion, the court considered evidence of the defendant's threats and abusive conduct towards the victim before the murder, a voicemail that inadvertently recorded the crime, and the testimony of the medical examiner about the nature and extent of the victim's injuries. The court found that this evidence, particularly the recording of the attack and the medical testimony, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme pain.The court rejected the defendant's argument that his actions were driven by anger or a desire to extract information from the victim. The court clarified that having mixed motives does not preclude a finding that the defendant took pleasure in inflicting extreme pain, as long as this was a substantial motivation. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that taking pleasure in inflicting extreme pain was a substantial motivation for the defendant's actions. View "People v Bohn" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal from the Appellate Division by the prosecution, contesting the vacation of a defendant's conviction of first-degree murder on the grounds that two elements of the crime were not proven by legally sufficient evidence. The defendant was a member of a gang who, along with his accomplices, mistook a 15-year-old boy (Junior) for a member of a rival gang and murdered him. The murder was captured on surveillance video.The Appellate Division had vacated the defendant's first-degree murder conviction on the grounds that two necessary elements were not satisfied by legally sufficient evidence. The first element was a "course of conduct" involving the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain, and the second was that the defendant "relished" or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain.The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the second element was not proven but disagreed with them on the first. It held that the evidence, including testimony from the medical examiner and surveillance video, provided a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant and his accomplices' actions prior to and during the murder caused extreme physical pain to Junior before his death.However, with regard to the second element, the court concurred with the Appellate Division that the evidence did not establish that the defendant took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. It stated that the evidence demonstrated, at most, that the defendant took pride in having killed Junior, not that he took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. The court stated that the statute requires that the defendant inflicted extreme physical pain and took pleasure in doing so before killing the victim.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division that vacated the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder. View "People v Estrella" on Justia Law