Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the issue of when a non-eyewitness can testify to a jury that the defendant is the person depicted in a photo or video. The incident in question occurred on June 10, 2015, when a man was captured on police cameras in Syracuse firing three shots into a van. The defendant, Farod Mosley, was indicted for the shooting in September 2015, but the indictment was dismissed as legally insufficient. In July 2016, an assistant district attorney showed the video of the shooting to Detective Steven Kilburn, who identified Mosley as the shooter in the video. This identification led to a new indictment against Mosley.The trial took place in February 2018, with the key issue being the identification of the shooter in the video. The prosecution relied on Kilburn to provide lay, non-eyewitness identification testimony that he believed Mosley was the shooter in the video. The jury ultimately convicted Mosley of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Mosley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Kilburn's testimony.The Appellate Division rejected Mosley's contention, holding that the People demonstrated Kilburn was more likely than the jury to correctly identify Mosley in the video. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the People failed to establish that Kilburn's testimony would aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the video was Mosley. The court ruled that such testimony may be admitted where the witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant that their testimony would be reliable, and there is reason to believe the jury might require such assistance in making its independent assessment. In this case, there was no showing that the proffered witness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant to render his testimony helpful, or that the jury faced an obstacle to making the identification that the witness's testimony would have overcome. View "People v Mosley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kenneth Fisher, who was convicted of three counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, based on two controlled buy operations. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. During the trial, one of the jurors believed that Fisher had followed her home after the first day of jury selection. She did not immediately inform the court of her concern but waited until the case was submitted to the jury, and then expressed her safety concern to the other jurors during deliberations.The trial court deemed the juror's belief likely unfounded and, despite some assurances that the juror could put aside her concerns, the court decided to retain her. Fisher's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that he did not have a fair and impartial jury, but the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals found that the juror's belief that she had been followed home by Fisher was a prejudicial belief about the defendant that was not based on the evidence at trial. The court noted that the juror's fear was not about witnesses or collateral matters, but about the defendant's character. The court also noted that the juror had violated the court's instructions by failing to inform the court promptly about her beliefs about the defendant and instead introduced those beliefs into jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror was "grossly unqualified" and should have been dismissed, and a mistrial granted. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial. View "People v Fisher" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court. View "People v. Dunton" on Justia Law

In December 2016, an undercover police officer purchased heroin through an intermediary during a buy-and-bust operation in Manhattan. The officer did not meet the seller face-to-face but followed several feet behind the intermediary and the seller. The officer was far enough away that he could not hear their conversation. After the transaction, the officer reported to his team that the dealer was wearing specific clothing. Minutes later, the police arrested the defendant nearby, and the undercover officer identified him as the seller. The defendant filed a motion arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the court should suppress the undercover officer's identification, the prerecorded buy money, and the defendant's cell phone.The Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The undercover officer testified about his observations during the operation and his subsequent identification of the defendant. After the hearing, the court ruled that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppressed the undercover officer's identification and the physical evidence recovered from the defendant. The defendant then moved for an independent source hearing to determine whether the undercover officer would be allowed to identify him at trial. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the undercover's testimony at the probable cause hearing provided clear and convincing evidence for an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the court had exercised its discretion appropriately in denying the defendant's request for a separate independent source hearing. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer's in-court identification without a hearing record sufficient to support an independent source determination for the identification. The court found that the testimony at the probable cause hearing did not provide enough evidence to support an independent source determination. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an independent source hearing, as requested. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law

Patrick Labate was charged with a class A misdemeanor, for which he was legally entitled to a trial within 90 days of his indictment. The court's record, however, showed that Labate had not been tried 420 days after his indictment. This delay was primarily due to multiple instances where the prosecution declared they were not ready for trial, without providing an explanation, causing the trial to be adjourned.In the case in question, the main issue was the 43-day period between September 5, 2018, and October 18, 2018. The Court of Appeals ruled that this entire period must be charged to the prosecution. The court found that when the prosecution declares readiness for trial, any subsequent delay caused by their own inaction is charged to them. In this case, the prosecution had declared readiness, yet were not ready to proceed on the first scheduled trial date and provided no explanation for their unreadiness. This meant that the delay was attributable to the prosecution's inaction and affected their ability to proceed to trial.The court emphasized that the prosecution has an obligation to maintain readiness and must provide an explanation for any changes in their readiness status. In this case, the prosecution had failed to do so, leading to the court's decision to dismiss the indictment against Labate. The court affirmed the Appellate Term's order to dismiss the indictment but provided different reasoning for its decision.This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of providing an explanation for any changes in trial readiness status and maintaining trial readiness to ensure the prompt administration of justice. View "People v Labate" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jason Bohn, was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of a woman with whom he had an abusive relationship. He appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain, which is a requirement under the first-degree murder statute. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction.The court applied the standard that a verdict is legally sufficient when "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court found sufficient proof for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant derived pleasure from inflicting extreme pain.In reaching this conclusion, the court considered evidence of the defendant's threats and abusive conduct towards the victim before the murder, a voicemail that inadvertently recorded the crime, and the testimony of the medical examiner about the nature and extent of the victim's injuries. The court found that this evidence, particularly the recording of the attack and the medical testimony, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme pain.The court rejected the defendant's argument that his actions were driven by anger or a desire to extract information from the victim. The court clarified that having mixed motives does not preclude a finding that the defendant took pleasure in inflicting extreme pain, as long as this was a substantial motivation. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that taking pleasure in inflicting extreme pain was a substantial motivation for the defendant's actions. View "People v Bohn" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal from the Appellate Division by the prosecution, contesting the vacation of a defendant's conviction of first-degree murder on the grounds that two elements of the crime were not proven by legally sufficient evidence. The defendant was a member of a gang who, along with his accomplices, mistook a 15-year-old boy (Junior) for a member of a rival gang and murdered him. The murder was captured on surveillance video.The Appellate Division had vacated the defendant's first-degree murder conviction on the grounds that two necessary elements were not satisfied by legally sufficient evidence. The first element was a "course of conduct" involving the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain, and the second was that the defendant "relished" or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain.The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the second element was not proven but disagreed with them on the first. It held that the evidence, including testimony from the medical examiner and surveillance video, provided a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant and his accomplices' actions prior to and during the murder caused extreme physical pain to Junior before his death.However, with regard to the second element, the court concurred with the Appellate Division that the evidence did not establish that the defendant took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. It stated that the evidence demonstrated, at most, that the defendant took pride in having killed Junior, not that he took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. The court stated that the statute requires that the defendant inflicted extreme physical pain and took pleasure in doing so before killing the victim.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division that vacated the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder. View "People v Estrella" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with burglary in the second degree as a sexually motivated felony, which required the prosecution to prove both that the defendant committed the burglary and that his motivation was his own sexual gratification. The trial court also charged second-degree burglary as a lesser included offense. The defendant was acquitted of the sexually motivated felony but convicted of second-degree burglary. The Appellate Division reversed the burglary conviction, stating that the prosecution had so limited their theory of the case to the sexually motivated felony that the defendant did not have adequate notice to defend against the lesser offense. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the Appellate Division's decision.According to the Court of Appeals, the lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary was properly submitted to the jury. The court held that the prosecution had not abandoned their pursuit of a conviction for second-degree burglary, nor had they so restricted their theory of the crime that the defendant was deprived of notice. The court also stated that the indictment charging the defendant with second-degree burglary as a sexually motivated felony provided sufficient notice of the lesser included offense. As such, the defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree and sentence were reinstated, and the case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim regarding that conviction. View "People v Seignious" on Justia Law

In two cases, People v Boone and People v Cotto, the Court of Appeals of New York State ruled on a central question related to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The question was whether the 30-day deadline for conducting a risk level classification hearing should be measured from the date an offender is released from the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), even if proceedings to civilly commit the offender under the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) are pending or contemplated. The court ruled that the deadline should indeed be measured from the offender's release by DOCCS upon the completion of a prison sentence, irrespective of whether the state is considering instituting, or has already instituted, proceedings under SOMTA. The court also ruled that offenders are not denied due process by having a SORA hearing at a time when they may be civilly committed under SOMTA.In both cases, the defendants had been convicted of sex offenses against minors and were sentenced to prison terms. Prior to their release dates, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders classified both as level three (highest risk) offenders. Before the SORA hearings were held, the Attorney General filed petitions to civilly commit both defendants. The defendants argued that the SORA hearings were premature and violated their right to due process because they were not permitted to challenge their SORA risk assessment at a meaningful time—i.e., when they would actually be released into the community. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, concluding that the hearings were not premature and did not deny the defendants due process. View "People v Boone" on Justia Law

In the case of a sex offender diagnosed with severe schizophrenia and psychosis, the New York Court of Appeals held that due process does not require a competency examination before a sex offender's risk level can be determined under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The defendant, who was found not mentally fit to stand trial, argued that his risk classification hearing should have been adjourned until he was deemed competent to understand the proceedings. The court disagreed, stating the numerous safeguards already provided under SORA, including the rights to notice, counsel, disclosure of relevant information, and an opportunity to object and present evidence at a hearing, adequately balance the interests involved. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the classification hearing was premature under SORA itself, holding that SORA authorizes risk-level determinations "[30] calendar days prior" to a registrant's release from incarceration, regardless of pending civil commitment proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to designate the defendant as a level two (moderate risk) sex offender. View "People v Watts" on Justia Law