Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two defendants, Matthew Corr and Bryan McDonald, who were convicted of sex offenses in other states and were required to register as sex offenders under the laws of those states. After relocating to New York, they were required to register as level-one risk under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Both defendants requested that the Supreme Court order them registered nunc pro tunc to the date when they registered as sex offenders in the state where they were convicted, effectively giving them credit for the time registered in the foreign jurisdiction against the 20-year registration period.The Supreme Court denied their requests, and the Appellate Division affirmed the decisions. The defendants argued that the phrase "initial date of registration" in SORA refers to the date they initially registered in the state of conviction, not the date of subsequent registration in New York. The People countered that SORA's use of the phrase "initial date of registration" refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA.The Court of Appeals of New York held that the phrase "initial date of registration" refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA, not the date an offender is required to register under the laws of another jurisdiction. The court found that the defendants' interpretation of the statute would award sex offenders credit for time spent registered under the laws of another state, which is not provided for in SORA. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling that the defendants were not entitled to credit for their time registered as sex offenders under the laws of other states. View "People v Corr" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant who was charged with attempted second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and other charges. The defendant threatened his children with a knife and stabbed his pregnant wife multiple times. In 2019, the defendant was indicted, and the prosecution declared readiness for trial. However, on January 1, 2020, amendments to New York's discovery and statutory speedy trial rules went into effect. On the first day of trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds, arguing that the prosecution had become unready for trial when the amendments came into effect and had failed to file a certificate of compliance with the new discovery rules.The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the amendments do not apply to cases arraigned before January 1, 2020. The jury acquitted the defendant of attempted second-degree murder but convicted him of the remaining counts. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the judgment, granted the defendant's motion, and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division held that the prosecution was placed in a state of unreadiness on January 1, 2020, and were required to file a certificate of compliance to become ready thereafter.The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order. The court held that the amendments did not vitiate the prosecution's prior readiness statement. The court found that the amendments specifically tie the certificate of compliance requirement to the prosecution's ability to state ready and be deemed ready. Because the legislature established the certificate of compliance requirement as a condition precedent to declaring ready for trial and did not indicate an intent to undo the prosecution's prior readiness statements, there is no basis to apply that requirement prospectively to a case where the prosecution was in a trial-ready posture when it went into effect. Therefore, the prosecution is not chargeable for any delay after January 1, 2020, and thus remained within the applicable 181-day statutory speedy trial limit. View "People v King" on Justia Law

On March 26, 2017, two men robbed a restaurant in Queens. One of the robbers, a Black man wearing a red hoodie, black jacket, and a bandana over his face, approached the Assistant Manager, Sumintra Ramsahoye, and demanded she open the safe. When she couldn't, she handed over the contents of the cash register drawers. Meanwhile, the other perpetrator stood next to another employee, Jordan Guzman. After the robbers fled, Guzman called the police. Police Officer Bryce Blake and his partner arrived at the restaurant within minutes and observed the defendant, Freddie T. Wright, standing in the parking lot dressed in a black jacket and red hoodie. Wright fled upon seeing the patrol car, but was eventually arrested. Guzman and Ramsahoye were brought to the house where Wright was arrested to identify him.Wright moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing that the identification procedures were unduly suggestive. The court denied the motion, finding that the identifications were not "overly suggestive and improper" because they were made in a "very short spatial and temporal time between the incident and arrest." During jury selection, Wright raised a Batson challenge to the People's use of peremptory strikes on two prospective jurors—C.C. and K.C. The court found that the reasons proffered by the People for their strike of C.C. and K.C. were not pretextual. Wright was ultimately convicted of second-degree robbery and second-degree criminal trespass.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Wright had "failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating, under the third prong of the Batson test, that the facially race-neutral explanation given by the prosecutor was a pretext for racial discrimination." The Court of Appeals granted Wright leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was record support for the determinations that the People had valid, race-neutral reasons for striking the two prospective jurors. The court also found record support for the conclusions of the courts below that the show-up procedure used by police was not unduly suggestive. The court concluded that the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

The defendant, Kevin L. Thomas, was on lifetime parole for prior narcotics offenses. An off-duty police officer, familiar with Thomas, observed him driving outside his county of residence, which was a violation of his parole conditions. The officer contacted an on-duty officer who initiated a traffic stop after observing Thomas commit a traffic infraction. During the stop, Thomas provided inconsistent responses and refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. The police contacted Thomas's parole officer, who arrived at the scene and conducted a warrantless search of Thomas's vehicle, discovering a large quantity of heroin.The County Court denied Thomas's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified and that the police had a founded suspicion of criminality justifying the continued detention of Thomas to contact his parole officer. The court also found that the parole officer's search was rationally and reasonably related to his parole duties. Thomas was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that Thomas was detained beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stating that the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard in analyzing whether the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged. The court held that the proper standard for detaining an individual beyond the time reasonably required to complete a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion. The court found that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, but the courts below evaluated whether the traffic stop was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required for its completion under the founded suspicion standard, a lesser standard than the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong a traffic stop. The case was remitted to the County Court for further proceedings under the correct standard. View "People v Thomas" on Justia Law

In October 2016, 65-year-old David Pena was assaulted by a stranger on the street. Pena, who did not see his attacker's face during the assault, later identified Mark Watkins as the assailant. Watkins was subsequently convicted of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The only identification evidence presented at trial was Pena's testimony, who identified Watkins as his attacker and the person depicted in surveillance footage of the attack. The surveillance video, however, was too blurry to clearly depict the assailant's face.Watkins appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cross-racial identification instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Watkins' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was unreviewable on direct appeal because it involved matters not fully explained by the record. The panel also concluded that Watkins received effective assistance under the state and federal standards because he had not shown that it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to refrain from requesting a jury charge on cross-racial identification.The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that at the time of Watkins' trial in July 2017, there was no clear entitlement to a cross-racial identification charge. The court noted that while a cross-racial identification charge had been recommended by both the American Bar Association and the New York State Justice Task Force, the court's precedent had long vested the trial court with discretion over the content of an eyewitness identification charge. Therefore, the court concluded that the decision to forgo a request for the cross-racial identification charge was not the kind of "egregious" single error that rises to the level of ineffective assistance. View "People v Watkins" on Justia Law

The defendant, Dwane Estwick, was convicted of first-degree and second-degree robbery following a jury trial and was sentenced to 12 years in prison, followed by five years of post-release supervision. The defendant claimed that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of a prospective juror, K.S., an African-American female. The defendant argued that this failure constituted a violation of the Batson framework, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection, and thus, he was entitled to a new trial.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (208 AD3d 799 [2d Dept 2022]). A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal (39 NY3d 1078 [2023]). The defendant reiterated his claim that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of K.S., thus violating the Batson framework.The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the defendant. It found that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination regarding the prosecution's peremptory challenge against K.S. The burden then shifted to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral basis for its peremptory strike, which it failed to do. Instead, the trial court stepped in to provide an explanation, speculating that the prosecution had gotten a "bad vibe" from K.S. The court ruled that the prosecution had "given a legitimate race-neutral reason" for the strike. The Court of Appeals held that this was a serious departure from the Batson framework and constituted an error of the highest order. The court's speculation as to the prosecution's basis for the strike was irrelevant and deprived the defendant of any meaningful way to demonstrate pretext in the face of the prosecution's silence. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial. View "People v Estwick" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a parolee, Eugene L. Lively, who was searched by parole officers during a home visit in February 2021. The officers were looking for a parole absconder they believed might be at Lively's residence. During the search, an officer found a small case used for headphones in Lively's pocket, which contained heroin. Lively was subsequently charged with one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.Lively moved to suppress the physical evidence obtained from him. The suppression court denied his motion, ruling that the search was lawful as the parole officers were performing their duties. Lively was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance after a bench trial. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in a split decision. The majority held that the search was substantially related to the parole officers' duties. Two dissenting justices argued that the search was unlawful as there was no evidence that it was related to Lively's status as a parolee or that he had violated his parole conditions.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the People failed to establish at the suppression hearing that the search of Lively's pocket was substantially related to the parole officers' duties. The court found that the People did not provide evidence that Lively was aware of the absconder's parole status, that he was harboring an absconder, or that he was violating his parole conditions. The court concluded that the search of Lively's pocket was not substantially related to the parole officers' duties under the circumstances, and thus, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. The court ordered the reversal of the Appellate Division's order and the dismissal of the indictment. View "People v Lively" on Justia Law

In May 2017, police officers stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant, Jason Brown. The officers claimed they stopped the vehicle because they observed the passenger side door open and close quickly while the car was in motion, leading them to believe someone inside might need assistance. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers smelled marijuana and subsequently discovered ecstasy in the defendant's possession. The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.The defendant moved to suppress his statement and the physical evidence recovered, arguing that the stop was unlawful. The suppression court disagreed, concluding that the officers' concern for the safety of the passenger justified the stop, despite the absence of a traffic infraction or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Appellate Term affirmed the judgment, holding that the stop was justified based on considerations of public safety.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court recognized a "community caretaking" function, which allows police to stop a moving vehicle under certain circumstances. However, the court held that the police may only stop a vehicle under this function if they can point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that an occupant of the vehicle is in need of assistance, and the police intrusion must be narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance. In this case, the court found that the officers' observation of the car door opening and closing once while the vehicle was in motion did not meet this standard. Therefore, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was unlawful, and the order of the Appellate Term was reversed. View "People v Brown" on Justia Law

The defendant, Samual Nektalov, was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by NYPD Detective Gregory Fortunato due to "excessively tinted windows." Upon approaching the vehicle, the detective observed marijuana in plain view and subsequently arrested and searched Nektalov, finding two bags of cocaine. Nektalov moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle based on a traffic violation.The Criminal Court denied Nektalov's motion to suppress the drugs, ruling that the vehicle was properly stopped due to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for having excessively tinted windows. Nektalov pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. The Appellate Term affirmed the decision, with one Justice dissenting, holding that the detective's testimony sufficiently established probable cause to lawfully stop the vehicle due to an apparent violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.The Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court noted that the Vehicle and Traffic Law generally prohibits operating a vehicle with windows that have a light transmittance of less than 70%. The court found that the detective's testimony that the windows were "excessively tinted" was effectively a legal conclusion that the tint violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. However, the prosecution failed to elicit any factual basis for this conclusion. The detective did not testify that the windows were so dark that he could not see into the vehicle, that he had training and experience in identifying illegally tinted windows, or that he measured the tint after stopping the vehicle and the results confirmed that the tint level violated the law. As a result, the court concluded that the Criminal Court should have granted Nektalov's motion to suppress. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Term and dismissed the accusatory instrument. View "People v Nektalov" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court. View "People v Franklin" on Justia Law