Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Blue was convicted of five counts of second-degree burglary. He argued that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the trial judge did not inform him of his maximum sentencing exposure. Blue also contended that his indictment should have been dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds, asserting that the time between his indictment and arraignment should not be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.The Supreme Court denied Blue's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the time between his co-defendant's request for an adjournment and Blue's arraignment was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (d). The court also determined that Blue's waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, despite not being informed of the maximum sentencing exposure in years. The Appellate Division affirmed these decisions, concluding that the 57 days between the co-defendant's adjournment request and Blue's arraignment were properly excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order. The court held that a defendant can be joined for trial with a co-defendant at the time of indictment, and the exclusion under CPL 30.30 (4) (d) applies to pre-arraignment time. The court also found that Blue's waiver of counsel was valid, as he was adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation and understood the potential sentencing exposure. The court concluded that the 57-day period was excludable, leaving the speedy-trial clock at 180 days, within the statutory limit. Blue's remaining challenges were deemed unpreserved or meritless. View "People v Blue" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting three minors between 2007 and 2009. The police obtained a search warrant and found child pornography on the defendant's computers, including an encrypted file they could not access. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including sexual conduct against a child and possession of child pornography. He posted bail and was released but was later remanded to jail for allegedly posting a blog that intimidated a witness.The trial court assigned counsel and experts to assist the defendant, who later chose to represent himself. During the trial, the defendant's daughter testified about a recorded conversation in which one of the victims allegedly recanted her accusations. The prosecution used recorded jail phone calls to challenge the daughter's testimony, revealing that the defendant had discussed trial strategies with her. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual conduct against a child and all child pornography counts but deadlocked on other charges. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the deadlocked counts.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The primary issue was whether the defendant's right to present a defense was violated by the prosecution's monitoring of his jail phone calls. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's right to present a defense was not violated. The court noted that the defendant had ample time to prepare his defense while out on bail and had other means to communicate with witnesses. The court also found that the defendant's request to proceed pro se was unequivocal and that the trial court had conducted a proper inquiry into the risks of self-representation. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Dixon" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a defaced firearm and unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm outside of his home or place of business. Before the trial, the prosecution filed a Sandoval application to cross-examine the defendant about his prior convictions and pending cases. The trial court held an in-camera conference on this motion without the defendant present. Later, in the defendant's presence, the court announced its decision on the Sandoval application without hearing arguments on the merits or confirming the defendant's understanding.The case proceeded to a bench trial where the prosecution presented evidence, including testimony from an arresting officer and surveillance footage. The trial court found the defendant guilty on both counts and sentenced him to imprisonment and post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting on the grounds that the defendant was denied his right to be present during the Sandoval application consideration. The dissenting Justice granted the defendant leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant's right to be present during a material stage of his prosecution was violated. The court found that the defendant had a right to be present at the initial in-chambers conference on the Sandoval application and that the subsequent in-court proceeding did not cure this violation. The court emphasized that the defendant's presence is crucial for meaningful participation in such hearings. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and granted the defendant a new trial. View "People v Sharp" on Justia Law

The case involves two defendants, Matthew Corr and Bryan McDonald, who were convicted of sex offenses in other states and were required to register as sex offenders under the laws of those states. After relocating to New York, they were required to register as level-one risk under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Both defendants requested that the Supreme Court order them registered nunc pro tunc to the date when they registered as sex offenders in the state where they were convicted, effectively giving them credit for the time registered in the foreign jurisdiction against the 20-year registration period.The Supreme Court denied their requests, and the Appellate Division affirmed the decisions. The defendants argued that the phrase "initial date of registration" in SORA refers to the date they initially registered in the state of conviction, not the date of subsequent registration in New York. The People countered that SORA's use of the phrase "initial date of registration" refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA.The Court of Appeals of New York held that the phrase "initial date of registration" refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA, not the date an offender is required to register under the laws of another jurisdiction. The court found that the defendants' interpretation of the statute would award sex offenders credit for time spent registered under the laws of another state, which is not provided for in SORA. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling that the defendants were not entitled to credit for their time registered as sex offenders under the laws of other states. View "People v Corr" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant who was charged with attempted second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and other charges. The defendant threatened his children with a knife and stabbed his pregnant wife multiple times. In 2019, the defendant was indicted, and the prosecution declared readiness for trial. However, on January 1, 2020, amendments to New York's discovery and statutory speedy trial rules went into effect. On the first day of trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds, arguing that the prosecution had become unready for trial when the amendments came into effect and had failed to file a certificate of compliance with the new discovery rules.The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the amendments do not apply to cases arraigned before January 1, 2020. The jury acquitted the defendant of attempted second-degree murder but convicted him of the remaining counts. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the judgment, granted the defendant's motion, and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division held that the prosecution was placed in a state of unreadiness on January 1, 2020, and were required to file a certificate of compliance to become ready thereafter.The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order. The court held that the amendments did not vitiate the prosecution's prior readiness statement. The court found that the amendments specifically tie the certificate of compliance requirement to the prosecution's ability to state ready and be deemed ready. Because the legislature established the certificate of compliance requirement as a condition precedent to declaring ready for trial and did not indicate an intent to undo the prosecution's prior readiness statements, there is no basis to apply that requirement prospectively to a case where the prosecution was in a trial-ready posture when it went into effect. Therefore, the prosecution is not chargeable for any delay after January 1, 2020, and thus remained within the applicable 181-day statutory speedy trial limit. View "People v King" on Justia Law

On March 26, 2017, two men robbed a restaurant in Queens. One of the robbers, a Black man wearing a red hoodie, black jacket, and a bandana over his face, approached the Assistant Manager, Sumintra Ramsahoye, and demanded she open the safe. When she couldn't, she handed over the contents of the cash register drawers. Meanwhile, the other perpetrator stood next to another employee, Jordan Guzman. After the robbers fled, Guzman called the police. Police Officer Bryce Blake and his partner arrived at the restaurant within minutes and observed the defendant, Freddie T. Wright, standing in the parking lot dressed in a black jacket and red hoodie. Wright fled upon seeing the patrol car, but was eventually arrested. Guzman and Ramsahoye were brought to the house where Wright was arrested to identify him.Wright moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing that the identification procedures were unduly suggestive. The court denied the motion, finding that the identifications were not "overly suggestive and improper" because they were made in a "very short spatial and temporal time between the incident and arrest." During jury selection, Wright raised a Batson challenge to the People's use of peremptory strikes on two prospective jurors—C.C. and K.C. The court found that the reasons proffered by the People for their strike of C.C. and K.C. were not pretextual. Wright was ultimately convicted of second-degree robbery and second-degree criminal trespass.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Wright had "failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating, under the third prong of the Batson test, that the facially race-neutral explanation given by the prosecutor was a pretext for racial discrimination." The Court of Appeals granted Wright leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was record support for the determinations that the People had valid, race-neutral reasons for striking the two prospective jurors. The court also found record support for the conclusions of the courts below that the show-up procedure used by police was not unduly suggestive. The court concluded that the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

The defendant, Kevin L. Thomas, was on lifetime parole for prior narcotics offenses. An off-duty police officer, familiar with Thomas, observed him driving outside his county of residence, which was a violation of his parole conditions. The officer contacted an on-duty officer who initiated a traffic stop after observing Thomas commit a traffic infraction. During the stop, Thomas provided inconsistent responses and refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. The police contacted Thomas's parole officer, who arrived at the scene and conducted a warrantless search of Thomas's vehicle, discovering a large quantity of heroin.The County Court denied Thomas's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified and that the police had a founded suspicion of criminality justifying the continued detention of Thomas to contact his parole officer. The court also found that the parole officer's search was rationally and reasonably related to his parole duties. Thomas was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that Thomas was detained beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stating that the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard in analyzing whether the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged. The court held that the proper standard for detaining an individual beyond the time reasonably required to complete a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion. The court found that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, but the courts below evaluated whether the traffic stop was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required for its completion under the founded suspicion standard, a lesser standard than the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong a traffic stop. The case was remitted to the County Court for further proceedings under the correct standard. View "People v Thomas" on Justia Law

In October 2016, 65-year-old David Pena was assaulted by a stranger on the street. Pena, who did not see his attacker's face during the assault, later identified Mark Watkins as the assailant. Watkins was subsequently convicted of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The only identification evidence presented at trial was Pena's testimony, who identified Watkins as his attacker and the person depicted in surveillance footage of the attack. The surveillance video, however, was too blurry to clearly depict the assailant's face.Watkins appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cross-racial identification instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Watkins' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was unreviewable on direct appeal because it involved matters not fully explained by the record. The panel also concluded that Watkins received effective assistance under the state and federal standards because he had not shown that it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to refrain from requesting a jury charge on cross-racial identification.The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that at the time of Watkins' trial in July 2017, there was no clear entitlement to a cross-racial identification charge. The court noted that while a cross-racial identification charge had been recommended by both the American Bar Association and the New York State Justice Task Force, the court's precedent had long vested the trial court with discretion over the content of an eyewitness identification charge. Therefore, the court concluded that the decision to forgo a request for the cross-racial identification charge was not the kind of "egregious" single error that rises to the level of ineffective assistance. View "People v Watkins" on Justia Law

The defendant, Dwane Estwick, was convicted of first-degree and second-degree robbery following a jury trial and was sentenced to 12 years in prison, followed by five years of post-release supervision. The defendant claimed that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of a prospective juror, K.S., an African-American female. The defendant argued that this failure constituted a violation of the Batson framework, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection, and thus, he was entitled to a new trial.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (208 AD3d 799 [2d Dept 2022]). A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal (39 NY3d 1078 [2023]). The defendant reiterated his claim that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of K.S., thus violating the Batson framework.The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the defendant. It found that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination regarding the prosecution's peremptory challenge against K.S. The burden then shifted to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral basis for its peremptory strike, which it failed to do. Instead, the trial court stepped in to provide an explanation, speculating that the prosecution had gotten a "bad vibe" from K.S. The court ruled that the prosecution had "given a legitimate race-neutral reason" for the strike. The Court of Appeals held that this was a serious departure from the Batson framework and constituted an error of the highest order. The court's speculation as to the prosecution's basis for the strike was irrelevant and deprived the defendant of any meaningful way to demonstrate pretext in the face of the prosecution's silence. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial. View "People v Estwick" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a parolee, Eugene L. Lively, who was searched by parole officers during a home visit in February 2021. The officers were looking for a parole absconder they believed might be at Lively's residence. During the search, an officer found a small case used for headphones in Lively's pocket, which contained heroin. Lively was subsequently charged with one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.Lively moved to suppress the physical evidence obtained from him. The suppression court denied his motion, ruling that the search was lawful as the parole officers were performing their duties. Lively was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance after a bench trial. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in a split decision. The majority held that the search was substantially related to the parole officers' duties. Two dissenting justices argued that the search was unlawful as there was no evidence that it was related to Lively's status as a parolee or that he had violated his parole conditions.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the People failed to establish at the suppression hearing that the search of Lively's pocket was substantially related to the parole officers' duties. The court found that the People did not provide evidence that Lively was aware of the absconder's parole status, that he was harboring an absconder, or that he was violating his parole conditions. The court concluded that the search of Lively's pocket was not substantially related to the parole officers' duties under the circumstances, and thus, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. The court ordered the reversal of the Appellate Division's order and the dismissal of the indictment. View "People v Lively" on Justia Law