Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested after striking a marked New York City police vehicle. After he was arrested, Defendant consented to a breathalyzer test, which resulted in a reading below the 0.08 minimum required for a per se violation. Defendant was not given a physical coordination test on the basis of a language barrier. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving while impaired and driving while intoxicated. Criminal Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the New York Police Department (NYPD) violated Defendant’s constitutional rights by failing to offer a physical coordination test on the basis of a language barrier. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the NYPD policy withstands rational basis review, Defendant’s equal protection claim must be rejected; and (2) given the substantial State interests involved, Defendant’s due process claim must be rejected. View "People v. Aviles" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted robbery and one count of robbery, among other offenses. The trial court directed the sentence for each attempted robbery count was to run consecutively to the remaining sentences. Defendant subsequently entered an Alford plea to first-degree murder. The Appellate Division modified the judgment of conviction by directing the sentences imposed on the counts of attempted robbery to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence imposed on the completed robbery, and otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery, as modified by the Appellate Division, were lawful; (2) Defendant received effective assistance of counsel; and (3) Defendant’s Alford plea to attempted murder was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. View "People v. Couser" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and one count each of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree. The Appellate Division modified by reversing Defendant’s convictions for murder in the second degree, concluding that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant’s act of unlawfully entering the victim’s apartment and assaulting him would cause the victim’s death by cardiovascular disease. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the victim’s heart failure, induced by the extreme stress and trauma of Defendant’s violent assault, was a directly foreseeable consequence of Defendant’s conduct. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of charges relating to his sexual abuse of two minor girls. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the People to elicit evidence of Defendant’s use of crack cocaine while engaging in sexual acts with consenting adult women, which corroborated the testimony of the two minor victims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the distinctive manner in which Defendant’s engaged in sexual acts with consenting adult women. View "People v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple criminal accounts stemming from the deaths of two people after Defendant drove the wrong way on an interstate while operating his car under the influence. The court found Defendant guilty of two counts of manslaughter in the second degree and vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, among other offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion seeking to vacate the judgment of the conviction on the ground that his attorney provided ineffective assistance because counsel mistakenly believed that Defendant’s potential sentences on each count were statutorily required to run consecutively and that no plea offer was conveyed to him as a result of his counsel’s erroneous advice. County Court denied Defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s attorney incorrectly advised Defendant that he was subject to mandatory consecutive sentences, but there was no possibility that a reduced plea would have been offered to Defendant; and (2) as to Defendant’s direct appeal, his claim that defense counsel should have put on a different expert to testify as to Defendant’s mental health was without merit. View "People v. Bank" on Justia Law

Prior to Defendant’s criminal trial, he moved to suppress a spontaneous postdetention statement to the police. The trial court denied the motion. After Defendant’s direct testimony, the court granted the prosecutor’s application to impeach Defendant on cross-examination with the omissions from his initial statement to the police. The jury ultimately convicted Defendant of robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, it was not error to allow the People to use Defendant’s selective silence, while making his spontaneous postdetention statement, to impeach his trial testimony. View "People v. Chery" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one course of sexual conduct in the first degree for acts committed when he sexually assaulted AM, the seven-year-old daughter of his former lover. Defendant was charged after AM disclosed the abuse to police when she was twenty-one years old. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as time-barred. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the indictment was not time-barred because N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 30.10(3)(f) tolled the statute of limitations for Defendant’s crime until the victim reached the age of eighteen. Defendant appealed, arguing that the applicable five-year limitations period set forth under former CPL 30.10(3)(e) expired before the filing of the felony complaint and that the statute of limitations was not subject to tolling under CPL 30.10(3)(f). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s prosecution is not time-barred because application of CPL 30.10(3)(f) to crimes described in CPL 30.10(3)(e) conforms with the statutory text and furthers the legislative goal of the statutes by tolling the limitations period. View "People v. Pabon" on Justia Law

In People v. Catu, the Court of Appeals held that a court accepting a guilty plea from a defendant must ensure that a defendant is aware of the postrelease supervision (PRS) component of his sentence. In these two consolidated appeals, neither defendant was apprised by the trial court of the PRS component relative to the sentence imposed on their guilty pleas. Defendants brought postconviction motions to challenge their pleas and convictions, which were later utilized to enhance sentences for subsequent crimes. In essence, Defendants sought retroactive application of Catu to disqualify their predicate offenses. The Court of Appeals reversed the orders of the Appellate Division in each appeal, holding that Catu does not apply retroactively in enhanced sentence proceedings. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of criminal possession of a weapon in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1). Defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument, which alleged that a police officer observed Defendant with a “rubber gripped, metal, extendable baton (billy club)” in his rear pants pocket, as facially insufficient. Criminal Court granted the motion, concluding that the allegations describing the object possessed by Defendant was insufficient to charge him with possessing a billy within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1). The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the accusatory instrument was sufficient to charge Defendant with possessing a “billy” under N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1) so as to provide sufficient notice for Defendant to prepare a defense and to protect him from multiple prosecutions. View "People v. Ocasio" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1), which lists a number of per se weapons, the mere possession of which renders a defendant guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Metal knuckles is included in the list. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the accusatory instrument, which stated that the police officer who stopped Defendant “recovered one set of brass metal knuckles” from Defendant’s pocket, was facially insufficient because it asserted an ultimate conclusion without any supporting evidence for it. Criminal Court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant then agreed to plead guilty to disorderly conduct, waiving prosecution by information and formal allocution. Defendant appealed, arguing again that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient. View "People v. Aragon" on Justia Law