Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

This personal injury action resulted from a physical altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant. The jury rendered a verdict that Defendant battered Plaintiff by striking him with a bat but that Defendant acted in self-defense. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court judgment and ordered a new trial, concluding that Defendant was the initial aggressor in the physical altercation between the parties. During the retrial ordered by the Appellate Division, Supreme Court indicated that it was constrained by the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Defendant was the initial aggressor and denied Defendant’s request to charge the jury on self-defense. The jury subsequently found that Defendant battered Plaintiff and that Plaintiff did not provoke the battery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that it was not utterly irrational for the jury to find that Defendant was not the initial aggressor and that he acted in self-defense. Remitted to Supreme Court for a new trial. View "Killon v. Parrotta" on Justia Law

Respondent was riding his bicycle against the flow of traffic on a one-way street when officers stopped him. Respondent told the officers he was sixteen years old. The police arrested Respondent and transported him to the precinct, where Respondent told law enforcement that he was only fifteen years old. Thereafter, the officers placed Respondent in a juvenile room and instructed him to remove his belt, shoelaces, and shoes as a protective measure. A revolver was recovered from one of the shoes. The presentment agency filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Respondent with various weapon possession counts. Respondent filed a motion to suppress. Family Court denied the motion, concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest Respondent for disorderly conduct and that the seizure of the gun was legal because the officers were justified in having Respondent remove his shoes as part of protocol to ensure a detainee’s safety. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the search that uncovered the weapon from Respondent’s shoe was unreasonable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the officers’ initial arrest of Respondent was lawful where the officers believed he was sixteen years old at the time; and (2) the subsequent search of Respondent’s shoes was reasonable. View "In re Jamal S." on Justia Law

In 2005, a grand jury charged the perpetrator of a 1998 crime by “DNA indictment.” In 2011, while questioning Defendant concerning an unrelated crime, investigators recovered Defendant’s DNA from a cigarette butt. The People subsequently moved to amend the 2005 indictment to add Defendant’s name to the caption. Defendant was arraigned on the DNA indictment. Defendant filed an omnibus motion seeking an order denying the People’s motion to amend the indictment and dismissing the DNA indictment on the grounds that its prosecution was untimely and violated his speedy trial rights. Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and upheld the indictment's amendment. Defendant then pleaded guilty to each count in the amended indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that his arguments regarding the DNA indictment, amended indictment and statute of limitations were forfeited by his guilty plea and foreclosed by his waiver of the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by pleading guilty, Defendant forfeited his right to challenge the underlying DNA indictment and the amended indictment that named him; and (2) while Defendant’s speedy trial argument survived his guilty plea and appeal waiver, there was no constitutional violation. View "People v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, attempted murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed the part of the judgment convicting Defendant of attempted murder in the second degree, dismissed one burglary count, revised the sentences, and otherwise affirmed, concluding that County Court did not err in determining that Defendant’s statements he made to the police during a brief exchange after he refused to waive his Miranda rights were voluntary and thus admissible for impeachment purposes. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals should adopt a bright-line rule that would preclude the People from utilizing on cross-examination or rebuttal any statement made by the defendant to the police after the defendant refuses to waive his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed after declining Defendant’s invitation to adopt such a rule, holding that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to preclude the People from utilizing the statements Defendant made to police after he had invoked his Miranda rights on cross-examination or rebuttal. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Almost nine months after Defendant’s indictment, the People began a DNA analysis of an object three of their witnesses claimed Defendant possessed. Defendant later moved to dismiss the indictment under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 30.30, arguing that a period in excess of six months had elapsed in violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial and that the period of delay attributable to the DNA testing was without justification. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that a relevant portion of the period at issue was excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(g). Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed, granted Defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, and dismissed the indictment, concluding that the period of delay between when Defendant consented to the DNA swab and when the People produced the DNA results was chargeable to the People for failing to exercise due diligence in obtaining Defendant’s DNA sample. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 161-day period of delay to test the DNA and to produce the DNA report was not excludable from speedy trial computation as an exceptional circumstance. View "People v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree and criminal sexual act in the first degree. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 30.30 to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion after excluding the periods of delay for the DNA testing process as exceptional circumstances under CPL 30.30(4)(g). Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because because counsel’s motion to dismiss the indictment on CPL 30.30 grounds failed to argue that the People should be charged for certain periods of delay due to the testing of the DNA evidence in successive stages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s assumptions as to the protocols for successive DNA testing were beyond review on this appeal. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 30.30, alleging that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion without holding a hearing. The Appellate Division remitted to Supreme Court for a hearing on the motion. Supreme Court thereafter conducted a hearing on Defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion and concluded that the People exceeded their six-month speedy trial period. The Appellate Division agreed and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. On appeal, the People contended that the Appellate Division erred in finding that Defendant’s claim was properly preserved for appellate review. The Court of Appeals affirmed, as Defendant adequately preserved his challenges to the People’s claimed exclusions, and the merits of Defendant’s motion were not challenged on appeal. View "People v. Allard" on Justia Law

The three respondents in these cases had been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and other conditions, diseases, and/or disorders. The State brought Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceedings against each respondent. Respondents argued that the Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. Donald DD warranted the dismissal of the petitions brought against them. In Donald DD, that Court held that, in a trial conducted pursuant to article 10, evidence that a respondent suffers from ASPD cannot be used to support a finding that he has a mental abnormality as defined by Mental Hygiene Law 10.03(i) “when it is not accompanied by any other diagnosis of mental abnormality.” The Court of Appeals rejected Respondents’ arguments, holding that in each of the article 10 proceedings, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts that Respondents suffered from a “mental abnormality” as defined in the Mental Hygiene Law. View "State v. Dennis K." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to incest in the third degree. Prior to Defendant’s release from incarceration, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders recommended that Defendant be classified as risk level three sex offender. The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) court assessed Defendant points under risk factors one, five, and nine and adjudicated Defendant a risk level three sex offender. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the record supported the SORA court’s risk-level classification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People proved facts to support Defendant’s SORA risk-level classification by clear and convincing evidence. View "People v. Sincerbeaux" on Justia Law

In these three consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals considered whether the trial courts abused their discretion in precluding cross-examination into allegations of a law enforcement officer’s prior misconduct made in an unrelated federal lawsuit. The Court of Appeals applied well-established rules governing the use of this type of impeachment material to the specific facts of these cases and affirmed the orders of the Appellate Division in two cases and reversed in the third case, holding that law enforcement witnesses should be treated in the same manner as any other prosecution witness for purposes of cross-examination. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law