Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his initial statement made to a police detective, as well as a statement he made after a forty-five-minute break, on the grounds that the detective failed to issue a complete set of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview. The hearing court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division reversed and denied the suppression motion, concluding that Defendant’s second statement had been attenuated from the first. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of murder in the second degree. Defendant moved to vacate the judgment, alleging that defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to reopen the suppression hearing based on the detective’s trial account of the statement made by Defendant prior to the issuance of the Miranda warnings. Supreme Court denied Defendant’s post-judgment motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance claim. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and related charges. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, a witness that had been unavailable at the first trial testified for the prosecution. When asked if he was at the scene of the shooting, the witness invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant appealed, arguing that the witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege added “critical weight” to the People’s case, that the witness’s testimony deprived him of a fair trial, and that the trial court erred in allowing the People to impeach the witness with his prior inconsistent statements. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the prosecution did not exploit the witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and therefore, the witness was properly called; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the People to introduce the witness’s prior statement for the limited purpose of impeaching him; and (3) the trial court did not err in precluding Defendant's identification expert from testifying about the effect of stress on the accuracy of an identification. View "People v. Berry" on Justia Law

After a joint trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the second degree, petit larceny, menacing in the second degree, and possession or use of an imitation pistol or revolver. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting a non-testifying codefendant’s grand jury testimony under Bruton v. United States because the statements were facially incriminating as to Defendant. The Appellate Division agreed with Defendant and reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s admission of the codefendant’s statements, which were incriminating as to Defendant in the constitutional sense, was error, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree gang assault and fourth-degree weapons possession and sentenced to an aggregate term of sixteen years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s redacted statement to law enforcement officers violated Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the redacted statement was facially incriminating, the admission of the statement violated Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, as discussed in Bruton v. United States, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Cedeno" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and rape in the first degree. On one of Defendant’s N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10 motions, the Appellate Division vacated the judgment of conviction and remitted the matter for a new trial, concluding that Defendant had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney had operated under a conflict of interest. After a retrial, the jury found Defendant guilty of felony murder and rape in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from introducing evidence of third-party culpability during his retrial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in curtailing Defendant’s ability to present a complete defense through the introduction of third-party culpability evidence; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "People v. DiPippo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit a mode of proceedings error when it allowed prospective jurors to opt out of serving on the jury due to hardship; (2) the trial court did not err in precluding third-party culpability evidence proferred by the defense; and (3) Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to object to certain inflammatory statements made by the prosecutor during summation. View "People v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant was treated at Hospital for a gunshot wounds. Hospital reported the shooting to the police. By the time Defendant spoke to an officer, Defendant was wearing hospital clothing. The officer subsequently seized the bag containing the clothing that Defendant wore when he came to Hospital. After the officer inspected the garments, authorities came to believe the Defendant had accidentally shot himself with a gun he carried in his waistband. Defendant was charged with, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant sought to suppress the clothes based on the “unlawful warrantless seizure of those items.” Supreme Court denied suppression. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure was illegal and that the items seized were improperly admitted into evidence at trial. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Supreme Court imposed two concurrent six-month terms of imprisonment and a $300 mandatory surcharge pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 60.35. Defendant asked the sentencing court to defer the surcharge, but the court refused to consider the request on the grounds that it did not have the authority to do so. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant could seek relief from the surcharge only by way of a motion to resentence pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 420.10(5). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a person subject to a mandatory surcharge may seek to defer payment by way of a motion to resentence; and (2) persons sentenced to confinement of sixty days or less may present information in support of a request to defer on the appearance date set forth on a summons issued pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 60.35(8). View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. In handing down its verdict, Supreme Court indicated that the presumption set forth in N.Y. Penal Law 220.25(2), commonly known as the drug factory presumption, applied in this case. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the drug factory presumption applied and that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the drug factory presumption was properly considered by the court; and (2) defense counsel’s decision that Defendant would not testify before the grand jury did not, per se, amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Hogan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting rebuttal testimony intended to provide evidence of Defendant’s sole witness’s bias or motive to fabricate, that the trial court erred in several of its other evidentiary rulings, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Division did not exceed its authority under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 470.15(1) or violate previous holdings of the Court of Appeals by basing its decision that the People’s rebuttal witness testimony was admissible on a ground different from that of the trial court; (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of trial court error were without merit; and (3) no errors in counsel’s representation established the level of ineffectiveness warranting reversal of Defendant’s conviction. View "People v. Nicholson" on Justia Law