Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant, a Chinese immigrant, was found guilty of murder, burglary and attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his confession to law enforcement officers was an involuntary product of untoward psychological pressure and fatigue, and (2) due to his limited English language proficiency, he did not understand the import of the Miranda warnings given to him, and therefore, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances did not establish that Defendant’s will was so overborne as to make his confession involuntary; and (2) there was record support for the lower courts’ determinations that Defendant understood the import of his Miranda rights. View "People v. Jin Cheng Lin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to oppose the admission and use of prior consistent statements of the child victim, which bolstered her credibility, and (2) failing to consult or present testimony from a qualified independent medical expert to support his argument that no sexual abuse occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record clearly indicated that Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in this case. View "People v. Gross" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest. Robert Fisher, an attorney employed by New York County Defender Services (NYCDS), was assigned to represent defendant. It was later revealed that a different attorney from NYCDS had represented another person, Toi Stephens, who was involved in the incident forming the basis of Defendant’s charges. Based on a potential conflict of interest, the court relieved Fisher as Defendant’s attorney and assigned a new attorney, who represented Defendant at trial. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in relieving Fisher because Fisher did not represent Stephens, and the relationship between NYCDS and Stephens did not constitute a conflict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by relieving Defendant’s assigned counsel and appointing conflict-free counsel to represent him. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was convicted of two counts of the class B violent felony of robbery in the first degree. The People recommended that the court treat Defendant as a second violent felony offender based on a 1994 conviction of assault in the first degree. Defendant was originally sentenced to probation with respect to the 1994 conviction, but after violating that probation, Defendant was resentenced in 1995 to a prison term with respect to that crime. At issue in this case was whether the date of the original sentence, rather than the date of the resentence, determined whether the prior conviction came within the ten-year look-back period in the second violent felony offender statute for the purpose of imposing sentence on the 2010 conviction. Supreme Court concluded that the date of the resentence was the controlling date for the calculation of the look-back period and sentenced Defendant as a second violent offender. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the original sentence controls for the purposes of determining eligibility under the look-back period in N.Y. Penal Law 70.04; and (2) Defendant in this case should not have been resentenced as a second violent felony offender. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The primary issue in these three consolidated appeals was whether Defendants entered knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas when the trial courts failed to mention the constitutional rights Defendants were waiving, including the right to a trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s accusers. The Court of Appeals concluded that two of the three defendants intelligently and understandingly waived their constitutional rights, holding (1) a court’s failure to recite the Boykin rights does not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary and intelligent plea, and where the record affirmatively shows that the defendant intentionally relinquished those rights, the plea will be upheld; (2) the records in two of the three cases contained such a showing, and therefore, Defendants’ pleas were valid; and (3) the third defendant’s plea must be vacated because the record failed to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. View "People v. Conceicao" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Later that year, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts each of robbery in the first degree and of endangering the welfare of a child. In 2009, Defendant was released to parole supervision, but his parole was revoked both in 2010 and in 2011. Defendant pleaded guilty to a parole violation and was sentenced to an eighteen-month parole hold. In 2012, Defendant moved to be resentenced on his 2004 conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to Supreme Court, holding that the courts below erred in deciding Defendant’s resentencing motion without giving him an opportunity to be heard. View "People v. Golo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment of conviction under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law ("CPL") 440.10, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the People failed to disclose evidence that would have supported a third-party culpability defense. Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granted Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion and ordered a new trial, holding that there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the information supporting the third-party culpability defense had been disclosed, and therefore, Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial. View "People v. Negron" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed legal error by failing to issue an adverse inference instruction based on the police’s failure to generate an electronic recording of his interrogation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion or commit legal error by declining to issue an adverse inference instruction against the People at trial based solely on the police’s failure to electronically record the custodial interrogation of a defendant; and (2) the Appellate Division properly determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law or commit legal error by declining to deliver the adverse inference instruction requested by Defendant. View "People v. Durant" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, rape in the second degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to seek the dismissal of time-barred charges against him and by failing to object to certain statements by the prosecutor during her summation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) given the presence of a plausible and reasonable strategy that could explain counsel’s action, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the time-barred charges; and (2) Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to certain statements made during the prosecutor’s summation. View "People v. Ambers" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. The burglary charge was timely interposed but the petit larceny charge was not, as the applicable statutory period ran approximately one and one-half years before the filing of the accusatory instrument. Defendant’s counsel never obtained the time-barred count’s dismissal, and Defendant was convicted of both indicted offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by vacating Defendant’s conviction on the charge of petit larceny and dismissing that charge in the indictment, holding that the failure of Defendant’s counsel to have the time-barred petit larceny count dismissed constituted ineffective assistance. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law