Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was treated at Hospital for a gunshot wounds. Hospital reported the shooting to the police. By the time Defendant spoke to an officer, Defendant was wearing hospital clothing. The officer subsequently seized the bag containing the clothing that Defendant wore when he came to Hospital. After the officer inspected the garments, authorities came to believe the Defendant had accidentally shot himself with a gun he carried in his waistband. Defendant was charged with, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant sought to suppress the clothes based on the “unlawful warrantless seizure of those items.” Supreme Court denied suppression. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure was illegal and that the items seized were improperly admitted into evidence at trial. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Supreme Court imposed two concurrent six-month terms of imprisonment and a $300 mandatory surcharge pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 60.35. Defendant asked the sentencing court to defer the surcharge, but the court refused to consider the request on the grounds that it did not have the authority to do so. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant could seek relief from the surcharge only by way of a motion to resentence pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 420.10(5). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a person subject to a mandatory surcharge may seek to defer payment by way of a motion to resentence; and (2) persons sentenced to confinement of sixty days or less may present information in support of a request to defer on the appearance date set forth on a summons issued pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 60.35(8). View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. In handing down its verdict, Supreme Court indicated that the presumption set forth in N.Y. Penal Law 220.25(2), commonly known as the drug factory presumption, applied in this case. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the drug factory presumption applied and that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the drug factory presumption was properly considered by the court; and (2) defense counsel’s decision that Defendant would not testify before the grand jury did not, per se, amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Hogan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting rebuttal testimony intended to provide evidence of Defendant’s sole witness’s bias or motive to fabricate, that the trial court erred in several of its other evidentiary rulings, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Division did not exceed its authority under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 470.15(1) or violate previous holdings of the Court of Appeals by basing its decision that the People’s rebuttal witness testimony was admissible on a ground different from that of the trial court; (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of trial court error were without merit; and (3) no errors in counsel’s representation established the level of ineffectiveness warranting reversal of Defendant’s conviction. View "People v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a Chinese immigrant, was found guilty of murder, burglary and attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his confession to law enforcement officers was an involuntary product of untoward psychological pressure and fatigue, and (2) due to his limited English language proficiency, he did not understand the import of the Miranda warnings given to him, and therefore, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances did not establish that Defendant’s will was so overborne as to make his confession involuntary; and (2) there was record support for the lower courts’ determinations that Defendant understood the import of his Miranda rights. View "People v. Jin Cheng Lin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to oppose the admission and use of prior consistent statements of the child victim, which bolstered her credibility, and (2) failing to consult or present testimony from a qualified independent medical expert to support his argument that no sexual abuse occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record clearly indicated that Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in this case. View "People v. Gross" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest. Robert Fisher, an attorney employed by New York County Defender Services (NYCDS), was assigned to represent defendant. It was later revealed that a different attorney from NYCDS had represented another person, Toi Stephens, who was involved in the incident forming the basis of Defendant’s charges. Based on a potential conflict of interest, the court relieved Fisher as Defendant’s attorney and assigned a new attorney, who represented Defendant at trial. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in relieving Fisher because Fisher did not represent Stephens, and the relationship between NYCDS and Stephens did not constitute a conflict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by relieving Defendant’s assigned counsel and appointing conflict-free counsel to represent him. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was convicted of two counts of the class B violent felony of robbery in the first degree. The People recommended that the court treat Defendant as a second violent felony offender based on a 1994 conviction of assault in the first degree. Defendant was originally sentenced to probation with respect to the 1994 conviction, but after violating that probation, Defendant was resentenced in 1995 to a prison term with respect to that crime. At issue in this case was whether the date of the original sentence, rather than the date of the resentence, determined whether the prior conviction came within the ten-year look-back period in the second violent felony offender statute for the purpose of imposing sentence on the 2010 conviction. Supreme Court concluded that the date of the resentence was the controlling date for the calculation of the look-back period and sentenced Defendant as a second violent offender. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the original sentence controls for the purposes of determining eligibility under the look-back period in N.Y. Penal Law 70.04; and (2) Defendant in this case should not have been resentenced as a second violent felony offender. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The primary issue in these three consolidated appeals was whether Defendants entered knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas when the trial courts failed to mention the constitutional rights Defendants were waiving, including the right to a trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s accusers. The Court of Appeals concluded that two of the three defendants intelligently and understandingly waived their constitutional rights, holding (1) a court’s failure to recite the Boykin rights does not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary and intelligent plea, and where the record affirmatively shows that the defendant intentionally relinquished those rights, the plea will be upheld; (2) the records in two of the three cases contained such a showing, and therefore, Defendants’ pleas were valid; and (3) the third defendant’s plea must be vacated because the record failed to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. View "People v. Conceicao" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Later that year, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts each of robbery in the first degree and of endangering the welfare of a child. In 2009, Defendant was released to parole supervision, but his parole was revoked both in 2010 and in 2011. Defendant pleaded guilty to a parole violation and was sentenced to an eighteen-month parole hold. In 2012, Defendant moved to be resentenced on his 2004 conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to Supreme Court, holding that the courts below erred in deciding Defendant’s resentencing motion without giving him an opportunity to be heard. View "People v. Golo" on Justia Law