Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to obstructing governmental administration in the second degree by preventing a police officer from patrolling the neighborhood. Defendant appealed, arguing that he did not waive prosecution by information, and consequently, the information was subject to the legal standards applicable to a misdemeanor information. Thus, Defendant argued, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective because the charge was supported only by conclusory statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant waived prosecution by information, and the accusatory instrument met the factual sufficiency requirements of a misdemeanor complaint. View "People v. Dumay" on Justia Law

Defendant was prosecuted for driving while intoxicated (DWI). During trial, a defense expert opined that Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time she was stopped was between .03% and .04%, which was below the statutory threshold. Defendant requested an instruction that the expert’s opinion that her BAC was below the statutory threshold was “prima facie evidence” that Defendant was not intoxicated. The jury acquitted Defendant of per se DWI but convicted of her common law DWI. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to the “prima facie” evidence instruction but only to an instruction that that if the jury found Defendant’s BAC was as the expert testified, “it may find” Defendant was not intoxicated. View "People v. Fratangelo" on Justia Law

Defendant, the son of a Dead Sea Scrolls scholar, launched an internet campaign to attack the integrity and harm the reputation of other Dead Sea Scrolls academics and scholars. To accomplish his goal of discrediting and harming these individuals, Defendant used pseudonyms and impersonated real academics and scholars in communicating with academics, museum administrators, and reporters. A jury convicted Defendant on thirty counts, including several counts of identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, and aggravated harassment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions for nine counts of criminal impersonation in the second degree and all the convictions for forgery and vacated the remainder of the convictions, holding (1) the mere creation of email accounts in others’ names, which accounts are not used, does not constitute criminal conduct; (2) the aggravated harassment statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) the People did not sustain their burden of proof that Defendant was guilty of unauthorized use of university computers; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions of identity theft in the second degree. View "People v. Golb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trespass and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for trespass because the officer knew that Defendant had been invited to be on the premises. The County Court reversed the trespass convictions, determining that Defendant could not be a trespasser because he was the invited guest of a resident of the property, but affirmed the resisting arrest conviction, concluding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) where a defendant unsuccessfully argues before trial that the facts alleged by the People did not constitute the crime charged, and the trial court rejects the argument, the defendant need not specifically repeat the argument in a trial motion to dismiss in order to preserve the issue for appeal; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, there was insufficient evidence that Defendant committed the crime of resisting arrest. View "People v. Finch" on Justia Law

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

In 1968, Respondent pleaded guilty to rape and robbery. A federal court later vacated Respondent’s convictions. In 1978, Respondent was convicted of rape in the first degree. After Respondent was released on parole, he pleaded guilty in 1996 to rape in the first degree. Prior to Respondent’s release from custody, the State filed a petition under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Respondent moved to preclude expert testimony relating to both the 1968 charges and an uncharged rape Respondent allegedly committed in 1978. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under article 10. Supreme Court subsequently ordered Respondent committed to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) basis hearsay related to Respondent’s 1968 indictments for rape and robbery met minimum due process requirements and was properly admitted at trial; and (2) basis hearsay about Respondent’s uncharged rape was unreliable and should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless error. View "State v. John S." on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to several violent sex offenses. As Respondent’s release date approached, the State commenced a N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 proceeding seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Prior to trial, Respondent moved to preclude the State’s expert witness from presenting hearsay basis testimony about a rape he was never charged with committing. Supreme Court denied the motion. The State’s expert witness testified at trial, briefly describing the uncharged crime. The jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality. Following a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court determined that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement and committed him to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the expert witness to testify about the uncharged rape, but the error was harmless under the circumstances. View "State v. Charada T." on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Defendants, the president and CEO of a leading materials testing company and the company’s vice-president, with engaging in a pattern of criminal activity while intentionally conducting and participating in the affairs of a criminal enterprise. The indictment alleged that Defendants committed or allowed certain of the company’s employees to engage in illegal acts involving the falsification of test results, improper inspections of construction projects, and double-billing of clients. After a jury trial, both defendants were convicted of enterprise corruption and several non-enterprise corruption offenses. The Appellate Division modified by vacating the enterprise corruption convictions on the basis that the convictions lacked sufficient proof and were against the weight of the evidence. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the Appellate Division did not apply the proper legal standards when it reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Defendants’ convictions for enterprise corruption and that the People’s evidence was legally sufficient to support the enterprise corruption convictions. Remanded. View "People v. Kancharla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated litigation to recover wrongfully diverted and concealed proceeds of a loan agreement, asserting that Defendants conspired to avoid repayment by denying their ownership and control over entities used to conceal converted funds. Before the conclusion of discovery in New York, federal authorities arrested Defendants, charging them with tax evasion and alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud on the New York court by forging documents and suborning perjury. A jury convicted Defendants of tax evasion, and the district court concluded that Defendants had perpetrated fraud on Supreme Court in New York. After Defendants’ sentencing, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants’ pleadings and for a default judgment. Supreme Court determined that Defendants had perpetrated a fraud on the court and granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding (1) where a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, conduct that constitutes fraud on the court, the court may impose sanctions including striking pleadings and entering default judgment against the offending parties; and (2) with one exception, the record supported such sanctions against Defendants. View "CDR Creances S.A.S. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Defendant struck and killed a pedestrian while driving an automobile and was subsequently transported to police headquarters. While Defendant’s attorney was pursuing telephone contact with law enforcement personnel, the police obtained Defendant’s consent to administer a breathalyzer test. After Defendant took the test, she was indicted for second-degree manslaughter, second-degree vehicular manslaughter, and two counts of driving while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test on the grounds that it had been administered in violation of her right to counsel. Supreme Court granted the motion and suppressed the chemical tests. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the police violated Defendant’s constitutional right to counsel because Defendant was not alerted to the lawyer’s communication before the breath test occurred and because the People did not demonstrate that a notification of this nature would have been unreasonable under the circumstances. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law