Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant-attorney was criminally prosecuted along with Judge Doe on violations of the campaign finance law. The criminal proceeding was eventually terminated, and the records were sealed. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct subsequently began an investigation into possible judicial misconduct by Judge Doe in the underlying criminal proceeding. Supreme Court granted the Commission’s motion to release the sealed records from the underlying criminal proceeding for use in the investigation. Appellant filed an application to vacate the release order, which Supreme Court denied. Appellant appealed. Meanwhile, the Commission censured Judge Doe for misconduct arising from her judicial election campaign. The Appellate Division dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot and ordered that the records be resealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order dismissing the appeal as moot and upheld the Commission’s authority to request and receive Appellant’s sealed records, holding that the Commission is authorized to request and receive records sealed under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 160.50 for its use in investigations. View "State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed and granted Defendant a new trial, holding that the court’s colloquy with a single juror in the presence of the attorneys but not in the presence of Defendant, during which the court repeated to the juror a substantive instruction previously given to the entire jury, constituted a mode of proceedings error. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a mode of proceedings error occurred in this case, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Both Defendants in this case were required to register as a sex offenders pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). At issue in these cases was the SORA risk assessment guidelines promulgated by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders. The Court of Appeals held (1) guidelines factor 3, which is based on the number of victims involved in an offender’s crime, permits the scoring of points based on the number of different children depicted in the child pornography files possessed by a child pornography offender; (2) a position statement issued by the Board on the evaluation of child pornography cases under SORA does not prohibit a SORA court from assigning points to an offender under factor 3 and factor 7 (which accounts for the increased risk of sexual recidivism posed by an offender whose crime is directed at a stranger); and (3) where an offender requests a downward departure in a SORA case the offender must prove the facts supporting a downward departure by a preponderance of the evidence. View "People v. Gillotti" on Justia Law

The Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for the New York City Courts entered an order relieving a district attorney from an investigation and appointing a special district attorney to conduct the investigation in Donovan’s place. After the special prosecutor issued a grand jury subpoena to Petitioner, Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to vacate the special prosecutor's appointment. The Appellate Division denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, concluding that relief by prohibition was not the appropriate remedy. The Court of Appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) relief by prohibition was a appropriate in this case; but (2) the special prosecutor was validly appointed. View "Matter of Working Families Party v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to obstructing governmental administration in the second degree by preventing a police officer from patrolling the neighborhood. Defendant appealed, arguing that he did not waive prosecution by information, and consequently, the information was subject to the legal standards applicable to a misdemeanor information. Thus, Defendant argued, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective because the charge was supported only by conclusory statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant waived prosecution by information, and the accusatory instrument met the factual sufficiency requirements of a misdemeanor complaint. View "People v. Dumay" on Justia Law

Defendant was prosecuted for driving while intoxicated (DWI). During trial, a defense expert opined that Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time she was stopped was between .03% and .04%, which was below the statutory threshold. Defendant requested an instruction that the expert’s opinion that her BAC was below the statutory threshold was “prima facie evidence” that Defendant was not intoxicated. The jury acquitted Defendant of per se DWI but convicted of her common law DWI. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to the “prima facie” evidence instruction but only to an instruction that that if the jury found Defendant’s BAC was as the expert testified, “it may find” Defendant was not intoxicated. View "People v. Fratangelo" on Justia Law

Defendant, the son of a Dead Sea Scrolls scholar, launched an internet campaign to attack the integrity and harm the reputation of other Dead Sea Scrolls academics and scholars. To accomplish his goal of discrediting and harming these individuals, Defendant used pseudonyms and impersonated real academics and scholars in communicating with academics, museum administrators, and reporters. A jury convicted Defendant on thirty counts, including several counts of identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, and aggravated harassment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions for nine counts of criminal impersonation in the second degree and all the convictions for forgery and vacated the remainder of the convictions, holding (1) the mere creation of email accounts in others’ names, which accounts are not used, does not constitute criminal conduct; (2) the aggravated harassment statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) the People did not sustain their burden of proof that Defendant was guilty of unauthorized use of university computers; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions of identity theft in the second degree. View "People v. Golb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trespass and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for trespass because the officer knew that Defendant had been invited to be on the premises. The County Court reversed the trespass convictions, determining that Defendant could not be a trespasser because he was the invited guest of a resident of the property, but affirmed the resisting arrest conviction, concluding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) where a defendant unsuccessfully argues before trial that the facts alleged by the People did not constitute the crime charged, and the trial court rejects the argument, the defendant need not specifically repeat the argument in a trial motion to dismiss in order to preserve the issue for appeal; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, there was insufficient evidence that Defendant committed the crime of resisting arrest. View "People v. Finch" on Justia Law

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

In 1968, Respondent pleaded guilty to rape and robbery. A federal court later vacated Respondent’s convictions. In 1978, Respondent was convicted of rape in the first degree. After Respondent was released on parole, he pleaded guilty in 1996 to rape in the first degree. Prior to Respondent’s release from custody, the State filed a petition under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Respondent moved to preclude expert testimony relating to both the 1968 charges and an uncharged rape Respondent allegedly committed in 1978. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under article 10. Supreme Court subsequently ordered Respondent committed to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) basis hearsay related to Respondent’s 1968 indictments for rape and robbery met minimum due process requirements and was properly admitted at trial; and (2) basis hearsay about Respondent’s uncharged rape was unreliable and should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless error. View "State v. John S." on Justia Law