Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with attempted murder and other crimes. During voir dire, a number of bench conferences were at held at which prospective jurors’ qualifications were discussed. Defendant did not attend, or ask to attend, any of these conferences. Defendant was convicted, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant validly his right under People v. Antommarchi to be present during bench conferences at which prospective jurors are questioned on voir dire. Specifically, Defendant waived his Antommarchi right, both implicitly and explicitly, when (1) after hearing the trial judge say Defendant was “welcome to attend” the bench conferences, Defendant chose not do to so, and (2) Defendant's lawyer stated that Defendant waived his Antommarchi right. View "People v. Flinn" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on suspicion of murder. At a second grand jury proceeding, Defendant vigorously urged the grand jury to have the People call a particular witness, Jane Doe, to testify. The grand jurors rejected Defendant’s request for the witness’s testimony and, thereafter, indicted Defendant on various charges, including second-degree murder. Defendant was subsequently tried and convicted of second-degree murder by a jury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutors’ commentary to the grand jury on his request to call Jane Doe compelled the grand jury to surrender all independent discretion in the matter and thus impaired the integrity of the proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, although the prosecutors should have shown greater sensitivity to Defendant’s request and the grand jurors’ concerns, in light of the totality of the circumstances that arose in the second grand jury proceeding, the prosecutors’ actions did not impair the integrity of that proceeding or warrant dismissal of Defendant’s conviction. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder for murdering his infant son. The Appellate Division affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and directed a new trial, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant, with depraved indifference to human life, recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of serious physical injury to the four-month-old, thereby causing the child’s death; but (2) Defendant’s previously denied motion to suppress inculpating statements he made to interrogators was in error because the statements were not demonstrably voluntary, and Defendant’s confession should not have been placed before the jury. View "People v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of attempted robbery. On appeal, Defendants argued that the trial judge abused his discretion when he declined to deliver an adverse inference charge regarding the loss of a handwritten complaint report prepared by a police officer who responded to a 911 call reporting the robbery that led to Defendant’s conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding (1) Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that they were prejudiced by the loss of the report, and therefore, no sanction was warranted; and (2) Defendants’ respective robbery convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried on two counts of burglary. At his jury trial, Defendant asked to proceed pro se. Ultimately, the trial court granted Defendant’s request to represent himself. Defendant was convicted of the two counts of burglary. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the trial court failed sua sponte to inquire into his mental capacity to represent himself prior to granting his application to proceed pro se. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to undertake a particularized assessment of Defendant’s mental capacity when resolving his request to proceed pro se; (2) there was no basis to disturb the conviction on Faretta grounds; and (3) Defendant’s argument that the trial court should have ordered a N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 730.30 examination to assess whether Defendant possessed the baseline mental competency to stand trial was without merit. View "People v. Stone" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful surveillance in the second degree for standing outside the front door of his neighbor’s townhouse and filming the complainant while she was naked in her second floor bathroom. Defendant appealed, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the evidence established that Defendant had surreptitiously recorded the complainant for his own amusement at a time and place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that each element of the offense of unlawful surveillance in the second degree was established beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Schreier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree robbery as an accessory and one count of second-degree murder as an accessory. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence of a robbery in the course of which the killing occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, and the men he aided, stole $40,000 from the victim before attacking the victim, and therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the judgment of conviction. View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 250.10, which requires a defendant to provide notice of intent to offer evidence in connection with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. During trial, Defendant requested that the jury be instructed on EED. The trial court ruled that it would submit an EED charge to the jury on the condition that the People be given the opportunity to present testimony concerning Defendant’s mental state. Consequently, Defendant withdrew his request. Defendant later moved to set aside the verdict, arguing in part that the trial court erred by failing to give the EED charge when the People’s evidence supported that charge. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s request for an EED charge served as section 250.10 notice that Defendant intended to proffer psychiatric evidence that supported an EED defense, and thus, the People were entitled to offer testimony to rebut that defense. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 250.10 does not apply where a defendant offers no evidence at trial but requests an EED jury charge based solely upon evidence presented by the People. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-three years incarceration. After Defendant’s incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. In 2009, Defendant filed a pro se motion claiming that her plea was defective and her sentence illegal because she was not informed before she was incarcerated that she would be required to serve an additional term of PRS. Defendant was resentenced to the original sentence of twenty-three years without a term of PRS. Defendant appealed the resentence. Defendant’s counsel filed a motion under People v. Crawford asking to be relieved as counsel because there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing, inter alia, that the sentence was illegal. The appellate division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence without addressing Defendant’s pro se contentions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the appellate division erred in granting the Crawford motion, and therefore, remittal for a de novo appeal was warranted. View "People v. Beaty" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery. During trial, a video recording was admitted into evidence that showed the crime victim being robbed by two men. The victim identified Defendant as one of the robbers and testified to a description he had given the police the night of the crime. Although the victim's description generally fit Defendant, the victim alleged that Defendant was wearing a white shirt the night of the crime, while the man in the video alleged to be Defendant was wearing a blueish-gray shirt. Also during trial, two police officers testified that the victim had given a description on the night of the crime. The officers proceeded to give the accounts of the victim's description. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officers' testimony had improperly bolstered that of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument failed on the merits because a police officer's testimony to a victim's description, where it does not tend to mislead the jury, may be admissible under the rule set forth in People v. Huertas, which establishes that a crime victim can testify to his own description of his attacker given to the police shortly after the crime. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law