Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree robbery as an accessory and one count of second-degree murder as an accessory. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence of a robbery in the course of which the killing occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, and the men he aided, stole $40,000 from the victim before attacking the victim, and therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the judgment of conviction. View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 250.10, which requires a defendant to provide notice of intent to offer evidence in connection with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. During trial, Defendant requested that the jury be instructed on EED. The trial court ruled that it would submit an EED charge to the jury on the condition that the People be given the opportunity to present testimony concerning Defendant’s mental state. Consequently, Defendant withdrew his request. Defendant later moved to set aside the verdict, arguing in part that the trial court erred by failing to give the EED charge when the People’s evidence supported that charge. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s request for an EED charge served as section 250.10 notice that Defendant intended to proffer psychiatric evidence that supported an EED defense, and thus, the People were entitled to offer testimony to rebut that defense. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 250.10 does not apply where a defendant offers no evidence at trial but requests an EED jury charge based solely upon evidence presented by the People. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-three years incarceration. After Defendant’s incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. In 2009, Defendant filed a pro se motion claiming that her plea was defective and her sentence illegal because she was not informed before she was incarcerated that she would be required to serve an additional term of PRS. Defendant was resentenced to the original sentence of twenty-three years without a term of PRS. Defendant appealed the resentence. Defendant’s counsel filed a motion under People v. Crawford asking to be relieved as counsel because there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing, inter alia, that the sentence was illegal. The appellate division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence without addressing Defendant’s pro se contentions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the appellate division erred in granting the Crawford motion, and therefore, remittal for a de novo appeal was warranted. View "People v. Beaty" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery. During trial, a video recording was admitted into evidence that showed the crime victim being robbed by two men. The victim identified Defendant as one of the robbers and testified to a description he had given the police the night of the crime. Although the victim's description generally fit Defendant, the victim alleged that Defendant was wearing a white shirt the night of the crime, while the man in the video alleged to be Defendant was wearing a blueish-gray shirt. Also during trial, two police officers testified that the victim had given a description on the night of the crime. The officers proceeded to give the accounts of the victim's description. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officers' testimony had improperly bolstered that of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument failed on the merits because a police officer's testimony to a victim's description, where it does not tend to mislead the jury, may be admissible under the rule set forth in People v. Huertas, which establishes that a crime victim can testify to his own description of his attacker given to the police shortly after the crime. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the first case involved in this appeal, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marihuana. Defendant appealed, asserting that his plea was invalid because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate the waiver of his Boykin rights. The Appellate Term affirmed. In the second case, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of marihuana. Defendant appealed, arguing, as in the first case, that the waiver of his Boykin rights was nonexistent. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the records in both cases were silent as to Defendant's waiver of his Boykin rights, the pleas must be vacated. View "People v. Tyrell" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the first degree. The trial court orally sentenced Defendant to a fifteen-year determinate sentence of incarceration without pronouncing the term of postrelease supervision (PRS) required under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45. In 2008, the Legislature enacted N.Y. Penal Law 70.85, which makes an exception to section 70.45 by allowing a determinate sentence without a term of PRS to stand as a legal sentence. In 2010, the People moved to resentence Defendant under N.Y. Penal Law 70.85, and Supreme Court resentenced Defendant under section 70.85 to a determinate term of fifteen years without PRS. Defendant appealed, claiming that section 70.85 was unconstitutional because he denied him the right to vacate his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 70.85 is a constitutionally permissible legislative remedy for the defectiveness of a plea. View "People v. Pignataro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for causing the death of a man by holding him in a headlock. Defendant appealed, arguing that several of the trial court's rulings in admitting and excluding evidence related to the issue of the duration of the headlock were in error. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant as to one of the trial court's contested rulings, reversed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court's refusal to permit Defendant to refresh his witness's recollection with a statement the witness had previously given was was reversible error. View "People v. Oddone" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five-year and five-year terms of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Defendant moved to vacate the judgment of conviction and set aside his sentence on the ground that the five-year sentence was illegal. In support of his motion, Defendant enclosed a letter from a prison official indicating that Defendant's minimum legal sentence for this count of first-degree robbery was ten years. The county court denied the motion. The Appellate Division vacated Defendant's sentence and remitted the matter. Defendant was subsequently resentenced to concurrent determinate prison terms of twenty-five years and ten years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the county court could not legally resentence him to ten years in prison for robbery in the first degree because he originally pleaded guilty to this crime in exchange for a five-year incarceratory term. The Appellate Division disagreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judge's modification of Defendant's sentence was proper. View "People v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first and second degree robbery and other crimes. The first degree robbery charge was based on the alleged display of a firearm. The jury at Defendant's first trial acquitted Defendant of first degree robbery and convicted him of second degree robbery. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial on the second degree robbery charge. At Defendant's second trial, Defendant filed a motion to preclude the People from introducing evidence that a gun was used in the robbery. The trial court denied the motion and Defendant was again convicted of second degree robbery. The Appellate Division again reversed, holding that the People were collaterally estopped by the earlier verdict from presenting evidence of the gun. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, pursuant to People v. Acevedo, the issue of the display of the gun, which was an issue of evidentiary fact resolved in Defendant's favor by a jury, the People were barred at Defendant's second trial from presenting evidence that contradicted the first jury's finding. View "People v. O'Toole" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with multiple counts of murder and other offenses arising from a mass shooting at a screening of "Batman" at a movie theater in Colorado. The Colorado state court presiding over the criminal charges issued an order limiting pretrial publicity in the case by either side, including the police. Law subsequently took possession of a notebook that Petitioner had mailed to a psychiatrist before the shootings. Respondent, a New York-based reporter, published an article describing the contents of the notebook. Petitioner filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that law enforcement had violated the pretrial publicity orders by communicating with Respondent. Thereafter, Petitioner successfully sought in the Colorado court a certificate to compel Winter to testify or otherwise provide evidence regarding the identity of the sources that supplied Respondent with the information about Petitioner's notebook. The New York Supreme Court then granted Petitioner's request for the issuance of a subpoena compelling Respondent to testify in Colorado. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, based on the New York Constitution, the Shield Law, and existing case law, a New York court could not compel Respondent to reveal the identity of the sources. View "Holmes v. Winter" on Justia Law