Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm found in the vehicle he was driving, holding that the People sustained their burden of demonstrating that the inventory search protocol in this case met "the constitutional minimum."Two New York Police Department officers observed Defendant commit multiple traffic infractions while driving, stopped him, and arrested him for carrying a gravity knife in his pocket. At the precinct, the officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and recovered a firearm from the truck. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the NYPD's inventory search protocol was unconstitutional. The motion was denied, and Defendant pled guilty to criminal possession of a firearm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to overcome the People's proof establishing a valid inventory search protocol. View "People v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations. View "Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court applying New York's Rape Shield Law, N.Y. C.P.L. 60.42, to exclude forensic evidence proffered by Defendant to demonstrate that that the evidence the prosecution was seeking to attribute to him was consistent with masturbation or sexual contact with a third-party, holding that the trial court erred in applying the Rape Shield Law in this case, depriving Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse arising from allegations that he digitally penetrated his minor relative's vagina and fondled her breasts. The jury convicted Defendant of the sexual abuse charge related to the alleged digital penetration of the complainant's vagina. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly excluded the forensic evidence under CPL 60.42. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of the forensic evidence at issue deprived Defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. View "People v. Cerda" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate court reversing a county court order designating Defendant a level three sex offender and remitting the matter for consideration of whether an upward departure was warranted, holding that, under the circumstances, the appellate division had the authority to remit for consideration of an upward departure.Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the first degree. After Defendant's probation was revoked and prior to his subsequent release, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders deemed Defendant a level three sex offender. County Court adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division reversed based on Defendant's risk factor point assessment and remitted the case for further proceedings. On remittal, County Court again adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division had power to remit for consideration of a departure request after it reversed the order determining Defendant's risk level. View "People v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's conclusion that the application of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) to Petitioner violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution when applied to offenders whose crimes predated the 2005 amendments to the Act, holding that the effect of SARA's school grounds condition, as codified in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), was not punitive.In 1986, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree and other crimes. Petitioner was unable to locate SARA-compliant housing before his open release date and therefore remained in custody until he could locate suitable housing under SARA's school grounds condition prohibiting him from living within 1,000 feet of a school. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that SARA's residency restriction violated ex post facto principles. Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application and ordered his release. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the condition does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the conclusion of the appellate division that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) court acted within its discretion by upwardly departing to level three in determining Defendant's risk level classification, holding that the SORA court deprived Defendant of basic due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard.Defendant's convictions required him to register under SORA. At the SORA hearing, the court noted that Defendant would normally be required to register as a level two sex offender but upwardly departed to level three due to Defendant's "extensive prior disciplinary history." The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proceeding failed to comport with due process because Defendant was provided no notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard in response to the District Attorney's request for an upward departure. View "People v. Worley" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court denying Petitioner's N.Y. C.P.L.R. 70 habeas corpus petition and dismissing the proceeding, holding that the Sexual Assault Reform Act's (SARA) mandatory restriction prohibiting a person who is serving a sentence for an enumerated offense against a minor victim and is released on parole from coming within 1,000 feet of school grounds applies to youthful offenders.Petitioner was eighteen years old at the time he pleaded guilty to the attempted second-degree rape of a thirteen-year-old victim and was adjudicated a youthful offender. The Board of Parole granted Petitioner an open date for release subject to numerous conditions, including SARA's school grounds condition. Unable to obtain suitable housing and still imprisoned, Petitioner brought this proceeding alleging that, as a youthful offender, he was not subject to the school grounds condition. Supreme Court denied the petition, but the appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the legislature did not mean to exclude youthful offenders from SARA's school grounds condition. View "People ex rel. E.S. v. Superintendent, Livingston Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, holding that members of the public were excluded from the courtroom at a time when they should have had access, and that error violated Defendant's right to a public trial.The judge overseeing Defendant's criminal trial delegated to court officers the implementation of the judge's general policy of prohibiting the public from entering or exiting the courtroom while a witness testified. The appellate division affirmed, concluding that Defendant's right to a public trial was not violated because the exclusion was caused by factors outside of the court's knowledge and control. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the judge bore responsibility for the proper implementation of his policy, and the misapplication of the judge's policy violated Defendant's right to a public trial because it led to an unjustified exclusion of the public. View "People v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession, holding that Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated in this case and that Defendant was entitled to a new trial.For the last four days of Defendant's eight-day jury trial, which included the testimony of several witnesses, summations, and the jury's verdict, the trial court ordered the courtroom closed to the public and all interested spectators. At the conclusion of trial the jury found Defendant guilty. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the record did not demonstrate that "unusual circumstances" necessitated closure of the courtroom, and therefore, the trial court improperly abridged Defendant's constitutional right to a public trial. View "People v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a stop and frisk, holding that the circumstances of this case did not warrant a level three stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976).Defendant, who was stopped and frisked after he existed a parked car and walked down the street, filed a motion to suppress drugs found on his person as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and directed that the indictment be dismissed, holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk of Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the minimum standard required to justify a stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976), was not met in this case. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law