Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and second degree murder. The principal issues on appeal where whether courtroom seating arrangements wherein court officers stationed themselves directly behind defendant during the course of his trial deprived him of his constitutional right to communicate confidentially with his attorney and prejudicially conveyed to the jury that he was dangerous, whether Supreme Court abused its discretion when it permitted the People under Molineux to introduce certain evidence of defendant's uncharged crimes, and whether the People's evidence elicited at trial exceeded the scope of such ruling. The court concluded that the positioning of the court officers in the case did not infringe upon defendant's constitutional right to counsel or deprive him of a fair trial and defendant's claim as to this issue was without merit. The court also held that Supreme Court exercised its sound discretion in permitting testimony about limited incidents of defendant's uncharged crimes leading to the shootings and the People adhered to the scope of the trial court's Molineux ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his convictions for health care fraud in the fourth degree and grand larceny in the third degree. The primary issue on appeal was the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence where defendant knowingly and willfully provided materially false information to Medicaid. The court also held that defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In 2007, defendant was indicted for charges related to the sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, Jane. When Jane was 19 years old, she informed police that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant on three occasions in 2002. When Jane was 14 years old, she underwent a medical examination that revealed she was 12 weeks pregnant, which she eventually claimed was a result of consensual, unprotected intercourse with a 14 year old boy in August 2002. At issue was whether the information that Jane disclosed to the police in 2002 was a "report" to the authorities that was sufficient to bar the availability of the tolling provision in CPL 30.10(3)(f) in connection with the indictment against defendant. The court held that the information Jane shared with the police in 2002 did not activate the statutes of limitations under CPL 30.10(3)(f) because she neither identified defendant as the perpetrator nor reported or revealed any of the sex offenses charged in the indictment. Under these facts, the statutes of limitations for the indicted sex crimes did not begin to run until Jane reached 18 years of age in January 2006. Therefore, the charged offenses were not time barred.

The common question in these appeals was whether the courts fulfilled their responsibility to make a "searching inquiry" before allowing defendants to give up the right to a lawyer and conduct their defenses pro se. The court held that, in both cases, the inquiries were deficient because defendants were not adequately advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

Following a nonjury trial, the County Court acquitted defendant of intentional assault in the first degree, but convicted her of second-degree reckless assault and endangering the welfare of a child. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction for reckless assault. The court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by reducing defendant's conviction for reckless assault in the second degree to criminally negligent assault in the third degree, and by remitting to the Appellate Division for further proceedings.

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. At issue was whether the County Court's error in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's question of defendant was harmless. The court held that the Appellate Division properly found that the County Court erred when it denied defendant an opportunity to explain fully the statements he made while in police custody since defendant's statements were both pertinent and probative. The court held, however, that the error was not harmless. The court held that defendant's remaining contentions lacked merit. The order was reversed and a new trial ordered.

Benito Acevedo was convicted of criminal sale of controlled substance in the third degree and possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and sentenced as a predicate felony offender with a prior violent felony to a prison term of six years and three years of post-release supervision. Dionis Collado was convicted of two counts of second degree robbery and was then adjudged a second violent felony offender and sentenced to concurrent eight-year prison terms. At issue was whether a resentencing sought by a defendant to correct an illegally lenient sentence was effective to temporally resituate the sentence and thus alter the underlying conviction's utility as a predicate for enhanced sentence. The court held that the decisive feature in these cases was that the sentencing errors defendants sought to correct by resentencing were errors in their favor. The court also held that resentence was not a device appropriately employed simply to alter a sentencing date and thereby affect the utility of a conviction as a predicate for the imposition of enhanced punishment. Therefore, the Sparber relief defendants obtained was not effective to avoid the penal consequences of reoffending. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed and the order of the Supreme Court reinstated.

This case stemmed from a dispute over the status of a negotiated settlement agreement pertaining to New York City's duty to provide mental health services to certain inmates in its jails. At issue was whether the terms of the agreement expired before plaintiffs filed a motion in Supreme Court seeking to extend the City's obligations. Applying the state's traditional principles of contract interpretation, the court held that plaintiffs sought relief prior to termination of the settlement agreement and their motion was therefore timely filed.

Defendant was convicted for a 2003 drug transaction and sentenced to prison. On November 25, 2009 defendant filed an application for resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), CPL 440.46. On December 3, 2009, before the application had been ruled on, she was released on parole. At issue was whether defendant was eligible for resentencing because she was not presently in custody. The court held that a prisoner who applied for resentencing before being paroled was not barred from obtaining resentencing after her release where the statute's plain language only stated that an offender must be in custody when he or she applied for resentencing but did not require that custody continue until the application was decided.

Defendants committed class B felonies involving narcotics and were sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. All defendants were subsequently paroled, violated their parole, and were sent back to prison. After the enactment of the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), CPL 440.46, defendants applied for resentencing. At issue was whether the DLRA provided relief to reincarcerated parole violators. The court held that prisoners who have been paroled, and then reincarcerated for violating their parole, were not for that reason barred from seeking relief under the statute where the statute's plain language stated no such exception.