Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident without reporting, holding that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence without proper notice a recording of a call that law enforcement officials intercepted originating from a county jail.While monitoring a wiretap in an unrelated investigation, police officials intercepted the call at issue, which Defendant joined and during which he made statements suggesting his involvement in a fatal hit-and-run accident. Local police obtained a recording of the call from the jail, and Defendant was charged in connection with the evidence. During trial, the trial court entered the jail recording into evidence without providing Defendant notice within fifteen days of arraignment pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 700.70. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the wiretap was an "intercepted communication" within the meaning of CPL 700.05; and (2) the People's failure timely to furnish Defendant with a copy of the eavesdropping warrant and underlying application precluded the admission of the jail recording into evidence at trial. View "People v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in accordance with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law. (CPL) 730, when a defendant is not in custody, a court has only the authority to either order a competency examination on an out-patient basis or to direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital pending completion of the examination upon proper medical recommendation that such confinement is necessary.Relator filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Wei Li requesting his release after the trial court ordered a CPL article 730 competency examination and remanding Wei Li to the custody of Respondent until completion of the examination. Relator argued that the remand order was unlawful where Wei Li had not been charged with a bail-eligible offense. Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that CPL article 730 provided criminal court authority to hold Wei Li. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals modified the order by converting the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and granting judgment declaring judgment in accordance with this opinion, holding that the law does not permit remanding a defendant otherwise entitled to release under the law solely because a CPL article 730 competency examination has been ordered. View "People ex rel. Molinaro v. Warden, Rikers Island" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming the conclusion of County Court that N.Y. Corr. Law 168-a(3)(b) required it to designate Defendant a sexually violent offender because he was convicted in Michigan of a felony that required him to register as a sex offender in that state, holding that County Court did not err.Under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), N.Y. Corr. Law 168 et seq., a person convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction must register as a sex offender if the offense satisfies an "essential elements" test or if the offense falls within SORA's foreign registration requirements. At issue was whether section 168-a(3)(b) requires a person subject to SORA's foreign registration requirements to be designated a sexually violent offender regardless of whether the offense in another jurisdiction is violent in nature. The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative, holding that County Court properly determined that it was required by law to designate Defendant a sexually violent offender because he was convicted of a felony in another jurisdiction that required him to register as a sex offender. View "People v. Talluto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate term holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to the victim that her children "were going to get a bullet in their heads" and that he was going to firebomb her home and kill her and her family were serious and unequivocal threats of physical harm. The appellate term concluded that Defendant's speech did not constitute a violation of the second-degree harassment statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendant threatened the victim with physical contact of a serious nature, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm her. View "People v. Lagano" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court dismissing the indictment against Defendant under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 210.35(5), holding that the prosecutor was not obligated to instruct the grand jury on the "choice of evils" defense under N.Y. Penal Law 35.05(2).Defendant was charged with second-degree criminal mischief and other offenses for striking and severely injuring a small dog. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury proceeding was defective because the prosecutor failed to instruct the jury on exculpatory defenses under CPL 210.35(5). Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the indictment based on the prosecutor's failure to instruct on justification under section 35.05(2). The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor did not err in not charging the grand jury on justification under section 35.05(2), the "choice of evils" defense. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction for second-degree rape in satisfaction of the indictment against him, holding that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the test in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 422, (1975), for deciding whether pretrial delays rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.Defendant's convictions stemmed from the sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old girl. The time between the crime and Defendant's indictment was almost eight years. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the delay in prosecution deprived him of his state and federal constitutional right to due process. County Court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant pled guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the Tranovich framework and that remand was required for a factual and legal review made under the proper framework. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed, as modified in accordance with this opinion, the order of the appellate division vacating Defendant's conviction of promoting prostitution in the second degree and otherwise affirming his convictions, holding that Defendant did not make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.Defendant was indicted on several sex trafficking and related counts. Defendant represented himself, with varying levels of assistance from his legal advisors, through pretrial motion practice and during a pretrial suppression hearing. The appellate division vacated Defendant's conviction of second-degree promoting prostitution and otherwise affirmed, thus rejecting Defendant's argument that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was allowed to proceed pro se at pretrial hearings. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and (2) Defendant was entitled to remittal to Supreme Court for an opportunity to make whatever pretrial motions were, or could have been, made during that period. View "People v. Baines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the appellate decision affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree, holding that the trial judge erred in replacing a trial juror with an alternate following that discharge from service.Prior to the start of deliberations at trial, the court discharged the alternate jurors. Thereafter, a trial juror was removed for alleged misconduct. The trial court decided to recall and seat one of the discharged alternates, after which Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) once the court has clearly stated on the record that an alternate juror has no further responsibilities in the case, the alternate juror is discharged; (2) where the alternate jurors have been discharged, the court's sole remedy is to declare a mistrial; and (3) the alternate jurors were discharged in this case, and therefore, the trial judge erred in reseating the alternate juror. View "People v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Tern affirming Defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument, holding that the accusatory instrument failed to give Defendant sufficient notice of the charged crime.Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree for possessing an illegal synthetic cannabinoid. On appeal, Defendant argued that the misdemeanor complaint was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to allege that he possessed one of the synthetic cannabinoid substances listed in N.Y. Public Health Law 3306 (g). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the misdemeanor to which Defendant pleaded guilty failed to allege a sufficient factual basis to conclude that the substance Defendant possessed was illegal; and (2) dismissal of the remaining count was appropriate. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Term insofar as appealed from in this criminal case, holding that the court mistakenly relied on amended language in granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument.Defendant was charged in a single accusatory instrument with three misdemeanor counts and three traffic infractions. Defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds under N.Y. Crim. Proc. (CPL) 30.30. The court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Defendant. During the pendency of Defendant's appeal, the legislature amended CPL 30.30 to add 30.30(1)(e), which states that the term "offense" includes traffic infractions for the purpose of section 30.30(1). The Appellate Term granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CPL 30.30(1)(e) had no application to Defendant's direct appeal from his judgment of conviction because the legislature did not mandate retroactive application of the newly-worded CPL 30.30. View "People v. Galindo" on Justia Law