Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Joshua Reber, who was convicted for sexually abusing a young child. The child, K.W., testified in detail about the abuse, which began when she was eight years old. Reber admitted to taking K.W. into the woods alone at night without informing anyone but denied any sexual abuse. During his testimony, Reber also discussed his normal sexual relationships with adult women. The prosecutor cross-examined Reber about his text messages with a woman named Danielle, which indicated sexual encounters. Reber did not object to these questions.The jury found Reber guilty, and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 300 to 420 months in prison. Reber appealed, arguing that the admission of his cross-examination testimony and the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were errors. The Court of Appeals reversed Reber’s convictions, holding that the introduction of the challenged evidence on cross-examination amounted to plain error and that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened on its own initiative.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the admission of the cross-examination testimony was not plain error and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were not so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Reber’s remaining arguments. View "State v. Reber" on Justia Law

In 2022, Walter D. Giese was charged with cyberstalking and making harassing phone calls to Sharon Griffin, the county manager for Onslow County, North Carolina. Giese moved to disqualify District Attorney Ernie Lee and his staff from prosecuting him, arguing that Griffin's role as county manager, which included overseeing the county's facilities and public services and proposing the county budget, created a conflict of interest. Giese contended that the prosecutors had a "self-interest" in appeasing Griffin, which could influence their decision-making in his case. The district court agreed and barred the Fifth Prosecutorial District from handling the case. The State challenged this decision, but the superior court upheld the disqualification order, finding a conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the superior court's order and vacated it, finding that the lower courts had erred in disqualifying the entire Fifth Prosecutorial District without finding an actual conflict of interest. The court clarified that an actual conflict of interest exists when the prosecution, by virtue of a prior attorney-client relationship, obtains confidential information that has been or is likely to be used to the detriment of the defendant. The court found that this was not the case here, as there was no evidence to suggest that anyone in the Fifth Prosecutorial District had ever represented Giese or obtained confidential information that could be used against him. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Giese" on Justia Law

The defendant, Tevin Demetrius Vann, was found guilty of first-degree murder, murder of an unborn child, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The case revolved around the murder of a woman, Ashley Ann McLean, who was found dead in a hotel room. Evidence pointed to the defendant, including text messages between him and the victim, surveillance footage of him entering and leaving the hotel, and his confession to assaulting the victim. However, the defendant later recanted his confession during the trial.The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals after the trial court denied the jury's request to review partial transcripts of testimony from the lead detective, the medical examiner, and the defendant. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, concluding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts. The court noted that the trial court had granted previous requests from the jury to review evidence and had instructed the jury that it was their duty to recall the testimony. The court concluded that the defendant failed to provide affirmative evidence that the trial court did not understand or properly exercise its discretion. Therefore, the court found no prejudicial error and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Vann" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Mack Washington, who was accused of sexually abusing his 12-year-old stepdaughter, N.M. The abuse was reported by N.M. to her mother, who then reported it to the police. During the investigation, N.M. revealed to a social worker that she had been sexually abused by another individual, a 15-year-old teenager, in the past. Washington was indicted on two counts of sexual offense with a child by an adult and six counts of indecent liberties with a child.Before the trial, Washington sought to admit the portion of N.M.’s interview where she discussed the additional abuser, arguing that it did not fall under Rule 412’s definition of “sexual behavior” because it did not discuss “any specific sex acts.” The trial court denied the motion and excluded the evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 412 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Washington was found guilty of all remaining charges and sentenced to 332 to 478 months imprisonment.On appeal, Washington argued that the trial court erred in excluding the interview because sexual abuse does not fall within the definition of ‘sexual behavior’ under Rule 412. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the plain language of Rule 412 does not speak to a consensual requirement and held that the trial court did not err in excluding the interview.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the language of Rule 412 is clear that all evidence of a complainant’s sexual behavior, other than the sexual act at issue, is irrelevant regardless of whether that sexual behavior was consensual or nonconsensual. Therefore, N.M.’s statements about the additional abuser in her SAFEChild interview constitute evidence of sexual behavior “other than the sexual act” committed by Washington in this case and were properly excluded. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

The defendant, a massage therapist, was accused of sexually assaulting a client during a massage session. The victim reported the incident to the police the day after it occurred, and the defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of second-degree forcible sexual offense and one count of sexual battery. The defendant pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of sexual battery but not guilty of second-degree forcible sexual offense. The defendant was sentenced to sixty days in custody, which was suspended, and placed on twenty-four months of supervised probation. He was also ordered to surrender his massage therapist license and register as a sex offender.The defendant appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual battery charge because the indictment did not include the essential element of the offense being committed "by force." The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that the indictment was invalid because it only expressly mentioned one of the essential elements of the crime.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that the indictment was valid because it implied the use of force and provided the defendant with adequate notice of the charge against him. The court noted that nonconsensual sexual contact necessarily implies the use of some degree of force. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the indictment was facially valid and sufficiently alleged facts to place the defendant on notice of the charge against him. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Daniel Raymond Jonas was indicted for possession of a controlled substance after officers found methamphetamine in his car during a traffic stop. Jonas filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. Jonas then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, also known as an "open plea." He did not give notice of his intent to appeal before entering his guilty plea, but minutes after sentencing, his counsel gave oral notice of appeal on the record.The Court of Appeals unanimously held that Jonas was not required to give notice of intent to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress prior to entering his guilty plea because he did not plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The Court of Appeals also held that the stop of Jonas's vehicle was unconstitutional, and that the trial court erred when it denied Jonas's motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to extend the rule from State v. Reynolds, which requires a defendant to give notice of intent to appeal before finalizing plea negotiations, to cases where a defendant pleads guilty without a plea agreement. The court declined to do so, holding that when a defendant enters a guilty plea without a plea agreement, the defendant does not waive his or her right of appeal by pleading guilty without prior notice of intent to appeal. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Jonas" on Justia Law

In August 2016, Chad Cameron Copley shot and killed Kourey Thomas as he crossed Copley's front yard. Copley was charged with first-degree murder and claimed self-defense and defense of habitation. The jury rejected these defenses and convicted him. Copley appealed, arguing that the prosecutor improperly mentioned race during closing arguments. The Supreme Court of North Carolina found no prejudicial error in the prosecutor’s remarks and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider Copley’s remaining claims.On remand, the Court of Appeals examined Copley’s three outstanding arguments. It rejected each, finding no gross impropriety in the prosecutor’s closing statements on the defense of habitation, no reviewable error in the trial court’s jury instruction on the aggressor doctrine and habitation defense, and no error in the jury instruction on first-degree murder by lying in wait. Copley challenged each of these rulings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina found no gross impropriety in the prosecutor’s closing arguments and only invited error in the trial court’s instruction on the habitation defense. The court also found no prejudicial error in the instruction on first-degree murder by lying in wait. Therefore, the court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and upheld Copley’s conviction. View "State v. Copley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals that had vacated a conviction for second-degree rape due to a perceived deficiency in the indictment. The defendant, Charles Singleton, had been convicted of second-degree forcible rape, first-degree kidnapping, and felonious restraint. On appeal, Singleton argued that the indictment failed to allege that he knew or should have known that the victim was physically helpless, an essential element of the crime. The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the rape conviction.The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an indictment is sufficient to invoke a court's jurisdiction as long as it charges a defendant with violating the laws of the state. The court found that the indictment in this case clearly alleged a crime and was not required to allege actual or constructive knowledge of the victim's physical helplessness. The court also noted that the legislature has consistently acted to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleadings that impede justice. The court concluded that a mere pleading deficiency in an indictment does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction. The court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Singleton's conviction. View "State v. Singleton" on Justia Law

During an investigation of a stolen car, law enforcement officers followed a suspect into a nearby home where they discovered an illegal drug operation. One of the participants in the operation, the defendant, did not live at the residence and denied any ownership or control over the premises or the objects within, including a safe containing illegal items. The homeowner, who was also the defendant's uncle, consented to the search of the home. After the defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses, he appealed, arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed because the police entered the home without a warrant.The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with deciding if the defendant had standing to challenge the warrantless entry into the home, given that he had declared he did not live there. The Court of Appeals had previously reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, stating that the trial record did not support any finding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing could support findings that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. The court, however, noted that the trial court failed to make these findings despite the presence of materially conflicting evidence in the trial record. The case was remanded to the trial court for findings of fact based on the trial record. Depending on those findings, the trial court could again deny the motion to suppress, or it may grant the motion to suppress in whole or in part and order a new trial. View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals related to a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Over two decades later, the defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), arguing that his trial counsel did not inform him of his right to testify and prevented him from testifying. He also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective because they filed an Anders brief.The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly disposed of the defendant's claims. The record demonstrated that the defendant was aware of his right to testify, and there was no evidence to support his claim that his trial counsel prevented him from testifying. Furthermore, the defendant's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge limitations on an expert witness’s testimony was without merit because the trial court had appropriately restricted the expert from using legal terminology. Therefore, the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were deemed baseless.The Supreme Court also held that the standard of review set forth in a previous case, State v. Allen, which involved reviewing MARs in the light most favorable to defendants, was a departure from the court's longstanding standard of review. Thus, the court returned to the previous standard of review, which involves a statutory review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(c). View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law