Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of imprisonment in 2019 for obtaining property by false pretenses. In June 2020, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming his detention was unlawful due to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety's inability to protect him from COVID-19, which he argued violated the Eighth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court denied his petition.The Superior Court of Wake County summarily denied the petition, citing N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2), which mandates denial of habeas corpus applications when the petitioner is held under a valid final judgment by a competent court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but held that N.C.G.S. § 17-33(2) provided an exception to the rule in § 17-4(2). Despite acknowledging the case was moot due to the petitioner's release, the Court of Appeals applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and proceeded to the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 17-4(2) requires summary denial of habeas corpus applications for those detained by a final judgment of a competent court. The Court found no conflict between §§ 17-4 and 17-33, as the latter applies only to those detained by civil process, not criminal judgments. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, emphasizing that habeas corpus relief is not available under the circumstances presented by the petitioner. View "State v. Daw" on Justia Law

Between December 2012 and March 2015, the defendant met several women, including A.C., H.M., A.B., and M.F., and supplied them with heroin, leading to their addiction. The defendant used heroin to coerce the women into prostitution, which he and his wife arranged through online advertisements on Backpage. The women paid the defendant for heroin and basic needs, often more than the heroin's worth. The defendant withheld drugs, food, sleep, and communication means from the women, occasionally locking them in his basement or hotel rooms. He transported the women across North Carolina and to other states for prostitution.The defendant was indicted and convicted of multiple counts of human trafficking, promoting prostitution, conspiracy to promote prostitution, and attaining habitual felon status. The trial court sentenced him to 240 to 312 years in prison and required him to register as a sex offender. The defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which issued a divided opinion finding no error in the trial court's judgments. The dissenting judge argued that human trafficking is a continuing offense and that the defendant should only be convicted of a single count of human trafficking per victim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the statutory language of N.C.G.S. § 14-43.11 is clear and unambiguous, allowing for multiple counts of human trafficking per victim. Each distinct act of recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a victim constitutes a separate offense. The court also found that the trial court erred in calculating the defendant's prior record level but concluded that this error did not prejudice the defendant, as his federal firearms conviction is substantially similar to a Class G felony in North Carolina. View "State v. Applewhite" on Justia Law

Travis Davenport was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder of Mike Griffin. The evidence showed that Davenport and Griffin had a tumultuous relationship, culminating in a physical altercation. On the night before Griffin's murder, Davenport was seen at Griffin's home, and they exchanged several phone calls. The next morning, Griffin was found dead with multiple stab wounds, and his wallet and phone were missing. Davenport was later arrested, and another inmate testified that Davenport confessed to killing Griffin to steal $10,000 from him.In Superior Court, Martin County, Davenport's motion to dismiss the robbery charge was denied, and he was convicted of both charges. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the State had not presented substantial evidence for the robbery charge and that the admission of evidence regarding Davenport's prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos constituted plain error. The appellate court also found that a hearsay statement, "Dianne to the house," was inadmissible.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the State had presented substantial evidence for each element of the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge and Davenport's identity as the perpetrator. The Court also ruled that the admission of evidence related to Davenport's prior incarceration, gang affiliation, and tattoos did not amount to plain error, as it did not prejudice the jury's decision. Lastly, the Court determined that the statement "Dianne to the house" was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. View "State v. Davenport" on Justia Law

On April 4, 2021, Latoyna Dunlap approached Angela Benita Phillips' home, believing Phillips had complained about her to their landlord. Witnesses provided conflicting accounts of Dunlap's demeanor and the events that followed. A confrontation ensued, during which Phillips either slapped Dunlap or struck her with a gun. Phillips then fired multiple shots at Dunlap, one of which caused severe injuries. Phillips was arrested and indicted for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. At trial, Phillips claimed self-defense and defense of habitation, requesting relevant jury instructions.The Superior Court of Cumberland County, presided over by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr., expressed concerns about the castle doctrine instruction, suggesting it might allow excessive force. The court modified the instruction to include a prohibition on excessive force, despite objections from Phillips' counsel. The jury found Phillips guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and she was sentenced to 25 to 42 months in prison. Phillips appealed the decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided panel, vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, agreeing with Phillips that the trial court's instruction on excessive force was erroneous and confusing. The majority held that under the castle doctrine, excessive force is impossible unless the State rebuts the presumption of reasonable fear. One judge dissented, arguing that the statutory castle doctrine defense aligns with common law defenses, including the prohibition against excessive force.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and clarified the castle doctrine. The court held that the statutory presumption of reasonable fear under the castle doctrine can only be rebutted by specific circumstances listed in the statute. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding of instructional error but vacated its prejudice determination, remanding for proper consideration of whether the error prejudiced Phillips. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joshua Reber, who was convicted for sexually abusing a young child. The child, K.W., testified in detail about the abuse, which began when she was eight years old. Reber admitted to taking K.W. into the woods alone at night without informing anyone but denied any sexual abuse. During his testimony, Reber also discussed his normal sexual relationships with adult women. The prosecutor cross-examined Reber about his text messages with a woman named Danielle, which indicated sexual encounters. Reber did not object to these questions.The jury found Reber guilty, and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 300 to 420 months in prison. Reber appealed, arguing that the admission of his cross-examination testimony and the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were errors. The Court of Appeals reversed Reber’s convictions, holding that the introduction of the challenged evidence on cross-examination amounted to plain error and that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened on its own initiative.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the admission of the cross-examination testimony was not plain error and that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were not so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Reber’s remaining arguments. View "State v. Reber" on Justia Law

In 2022, Walter D. Giese was charged with cyberstalking and making harassing phone calls to Sharon Griffin, the county manager for Onslow County, North Carolina. Giese moved to disqualify District Attorney Ernie Lee and his staff from prosecuting him, arguing that Griffin's role as county manager, which included overseeing the county's facilities and public services and proposing the county budget, created a conflict of interest. Giese contended that the prosecutors had a "self-interest" in appeasing Griffin, which could influence their decision-making in his case. The district court agreed and barred the Fifth Prosecutorial District from handling the case. The State challenged this decision, but the superior court upheld the disqualification order, finding a conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the superior court's order and vacated it, finding that the lower courts had erred in disqualifying the entire Fifth Prosecutorial District without finding an actual conflict of interest. The court clarified that an actual conflict of interest exists when the prosecution, by virtue of a prior attorney-client relationship, obtains confidential information that has been or is likely to be used to the detriment of the defendant. The court found that this was not the case here, as there was no evidence to suggest that anyone in the Fifth Prosecutorial District had ever represented Giese or obtained confidential information that could be used against him. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Giese" on Justia Law

The defendant, Tevin Demetrius Vann, was found guilty of first-degree murder, murder of an unborn child, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The case revolved around the murder of a woman, Ashley Ann McLean, who was found dead in a hotel room. Evidence pointed to the defendant, including text messages between him and the victim, surveillance footage of him entering and leaving the hotel, and his confession to assaulting the victim. However, the defendant later recanted his confession during the trial.The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals after the trial court denied the jury's request to review partial transcripts of testimony from the lead detective, the medical examiner, and the defendant. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, concluding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did exercise its discretion when it denied the jury's request to review the partial transcripts. The court noted that the trial court had granted previous requests from the jury to review evidence and had instructed the jury that it was their duty to recall the testimony. The court concluded that the defendant failed to provide affirmative evidence that the trial court did not understand or properly exercise its discretion. Therefore, the court found no prejudicial error and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Vann" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Mack Washington, who was accused of sexually abusing his 12-year-old stepdaughter, N.M. The abuse was reported by N.M. to her mother, who then reported it to the police. During the investigation, N.M. revealed to a social worker that she had been sexually abused by another individual, a 15-year-old teenager, in the past. Washington was indicted on two counts of sexual offense with a child by an adult and six counts of indecent liberties with a child.Before the trial, Washington sought to admit the portion of N.M.’s interview where she discussed the additional abuser, arguing that it did not fall under Rule 412’s definition of “sexual behavior” because it did not discuss “any specific sex acts.” The trial court denied the motion and excluded the evidence under Rules 401, 402, and 412 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Washington was found guilty of all remaining charges and sentenced to 332 to 478 months imprisonment.On appeal, Washington argued that the trial court erred in excluding the interview because sexual abuse does not fall within the definition of ‘sexual behavior’ under Rule 412. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the plain language of Rule 412 does not speak to a consensual requirement and held that the trial court did not err in excluding the interview.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the language of Rule 412 is clear that all evidence of a complainant’s sexual behavior, other than the sexual act at issue, is irrelevant regardless of whether that sexual behavior was consensual or nonconsensual. Therefore, N.M.’s statements about the additional abuser in her SAFEChild interview constitute evidence of sexual behavior “other than the sexual act” committed by Washington in this case and were properly excluded. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

The defendant, a massage therapist, was accused of sexually assaulting a client during a massage session. The victim reported the incident to the police the day after it occurred, and the defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of second-degree forcible sexual offense and one count of sexual battery. The defendant pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of sexual battery but not guilty of second-degree forcible sexual offense. The defendant was sentenced to sixty days in custody, which was suspended, and placed on twenty-four months of supervised probation. He was also ordered to surrender his massage therapist license and register as a sex offender.The defendant appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual battery charge because the indictment did not include the essential element of the offense being committed "by force." The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, concluding that the indictment was invalid because it only expressly mentioned one of the essential elements of the crime.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that the indictment was valid because it implied the use of force and provided the defendant with adequate notice of the charge against him. The court noted that nonconsensual sexual contact necessarily implies the use of some degree of force. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the indictment was facially valid and sufficiently alleged facts to place the defendant on notice of the charge against him. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Daniel Raymond Jonas was indicted for possession of a controlled substance after officers found methamphetamine in his car during a traffic stop. Jonas filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. Jonas then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, also known as an "open plea." He did not give notice of his intent to appeal before entering his guilty plea, but minutes after sentencing, his counsel gave oral notice of appeal on the record.The Court of Appeals unanimously held that Jonas was not required to give notice of intent to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress prior to entering his guilty plea because he did not plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The Court of Appeals also held that the stop of Jonas's vehicle was unconstitutional, and that the trial court erred when it denied Jonas's motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to extend the rule from State v. Reynolds, which requires a defendant to give notice of intent to appeal before finalizing plea negotiations, to cases where a defendant pleads guilty without a plea agreement. The court declined to do so, holding that when a defendant enters a guilty plea without a plea agreement, the defendant does not waive his or her right of appeal by pleading guilty without prior notice of intent to appeal. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Jonas" on Justia Law