Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the scheduling and procedural circumstances existent in this case did not constitute an infringement upon Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sex offense with a child and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to calendar his trial date for approximately five years following the issuance of the indictments against him. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that here was no speedy trial violation. The Supreme Court affirmed after weighing the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as they applied to the circumstances of this case, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "State v. Farmer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case for a new trial with respect to the issue of Defendant's guilt of the murder of his grandfather, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court's instruction that the jury was entitled to find that Defendant attempted to murder his mother using a garden hoe as a deadly weapon did not constitute prejudicial error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the attempted first-degree murder of his mother, and the first degree murder of his grandfather on the basis of the felony-murder rule using attempted first-degree murder as the predicate felony. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court did not err by instructing that the jury could find that Defendant's hands and arms constituted a deadly weapon for purposes of the felony-murder provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-17(a); but (2) the trial court's instruction concerning the use of the garden hoe as a deadly weapon during Defendant's alleged attempt to murder his mother constituted prejudicial error necessitating a new trial in the case in which Defendant was convicted of murdering his grandfather. View "State v. Steen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court refusing to accept Defendant's tendered guilty plea, holding that the trial court lacked discretion to reject Defendant's plea pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1023(c).Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court chose to reject Defendant's plea following a colloquy. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court correctly rejected Defendant's tendered guilty plea because the trial court did not find that it was the product of Defendant's informed choice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the guilty plea was based on Defendant's informed choice, a factual basis existed for the plea, and the sentencing was left to the trial court's discretion, the trial court was statutorily required to accept Defendant's guilty plea; and (2) the trial court's error prejudiced Defendant. View "State v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction, holding that the rationale underlying State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1985) applies equally when defense counsel impliedly - rather than expressly - admits the defendant's guilt to a charged offense. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault on a female. The trial court entered judgment on one count of habitual misdemeanor assault and sentenced Defendant to a term of fifteen to twenty-seven months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his defense counsel improperly conceded his guilt to the assault on a female charge during closing arguments. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant was not denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defense counsel impliedly conceded Defendant's guilty on the offense of assault on a female. The Court remanded the case for a hearing for the purpose of determining whether Defendant knowingly consented in advance to his attorney's admission of guilt. View "State v. McAllister" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing a superior court order, holding that Defendant failed to meet the required condition of N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-269(a) that postconviction DNA testing of certain biological evidence was material to his defense, and Defendant further failed to satisfy his lesser burden to show under section 15A-269(c) that DNA testing may be material to his claim of wrongful conviction.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. Defendant later filed a pro se motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to section 15A-269. The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming and that Defendant failed to show how conducting additional DNA testing was material to his defense. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of an order appointing counsel to assist Defendant in which Defendant would attempt to establish the level of materiality required to obtain DNA testing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not satisfy the necessary conditions to obtain the appointment of counsel under section 15A-269(c). View "State v. Byers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, holding that Defendant failed to prove that his appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and being a habitual felon. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for appropriate relief alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, Defendant asserted that appellate counsel's failure to cite State v. Pakulski, 356 S.E.2d 319 (N.C. 1987), amounted to ineffective assistance. After a successful appeal and remand, the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to make arguments under Pakulski. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the precedent established in Pakulski did not govern the instant case and that appellate counsel's failure to rely on Pakulski was objectively reasonable. View "State v. Collington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals remanding this case for a new trial on an assault charge and vacating the judgment convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and remanding for entry of judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to give his proffered jury instructions and that the proper remedy for this prejudicial error was to remand the case for a new trial on all charges.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule with an assault charge as the underlying felony. The court of appeals determined that the trial court committed prejudicial error by not instructing the jury on self-defense with regard to the assault charge and granted a new trial on the assault charge. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the failure to give the proposed instructions prejudiced Defendant and that Defendant should receive a new trial on all charges. View "State v. Greenfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court dismissing Defendant's motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in which Defendant asserted claims under the Racial Justice Act (RJA), holding that the retroactive application of the 2012 amended RJA and the 2013 repeal of the RJA violates the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.The trial court dismissed Defendant's MAR, concluding that it was voided by the repeal of the RJA. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for the reinstatement of Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole, holding (1) the retroactivity provision of the RJA repeal violated the double jeopardy protections of the North Carolina Constitution; (2) the judgment sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was a final judgment, and therefore, double jeopardy barred further review; and (3) the retroactive application of the RJA repeal violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws contained in the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Augustine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the General Assembly did not intend for the means of proof mentioned in the Habitual Felons Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-7.4, to be exclusive, holding that the methods of proof listed in section 14-7.4 are not exclusive.Defendant was indicted on charges of interfering with an electronic monitoring device and attaining the status of habitual felon. Defendant was found guilty of interfering with an electronic monitoring device. During the habitual felon phase of the trial, the court introduced into evidence a computer printout from the Automated Criminal / Infraction System (ACIS) showing that Defendant had been convicted of felonious breaking and entering. The jury found that Defendant had attained the status of a habitual felon. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the ACIS printout as proof of his prior conviction for the purpose of establishing that he was a habitual felon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 14-7.4 is permissive, rather than mandatory, with respect to the issue of how a defendant's prior convictions may be established and that such convictions may be proven by means of any admissible evidence. View "State v. Waycaster" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to show that Defendant possessed the felonious intent necessary to support his convictions.Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, felonious breaking or entering, and discharging a weapon into an occupied property. During trial, Defendant had moved to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and for felonious breaking or entering on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, due to the existence of sufficient evidence regarding felonious intent, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motions to dismiss the charges against him. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law