Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgments of the trial courts allowing Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the trial courts' findings of fact failed to support their legal conclusion that the investigating officer lacked the probable cause needed to place Defendant under arrest for impaired driving.Defendant was charged with driving while subject to an impairing substance. In granting the motion to suppress, the trial courts concluded that the investigating officer lacked probable cause to place Defendant under arrest for driving while impaired. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facts supported a conclusion that the officer had probable cause to stop and cite Defendant for driving while impaired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the undisputed facts supported the officer's decision to place Defendant under arrest for impaired driving. View "State v. Parisi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when the State voluntarily dismissed Defendant's charge after his first trial ended in a hung jury mistrial and when Defendant was retried six years later when new evidence emerged, holding that Defendant's second prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause and that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment on double jeopardy grounds.Specifically, the Court held (1) jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and continues following a mistrial until a terminating event occurs; (2) when the State enters a voluntary dismissal after jeopardy has attached, jeopardy is terminated in the defendant's favor, and the State cannot retry the case without violating a defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy; and (3) because Defendant's jeopardy remained attached following the mistrial declaration in his first trial and was terminated when the State subsequently entered a dismissal of the charge under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-931, Defendant's second prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. Courtney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals granting Defendant a new trial on his abduction of a child and statutory rape charges on the grounds that Defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to allow his affidavit of indigence to be admitted to prove his age, holding that the admission of the affidavit was erroneous, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.After Defendant was indicted Defendant completed and signed an affidavit of indigence so that a court-appointed attorney could be assigned to his case. During trial, the trial court allowed into evidence a copy of the affidavit to prove Defendant's age, which was an element of the charges. The court of appeals granted Defendant a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit in violation of Defendant's right against self-incrimination to prove an element of charges against him. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court committed constitutional error by allowing Defendant's affidavit of indigence to be admitted into evidence; and (2) there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of Defendant's affidavit of indigence might have contributed to the conviction. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, holding that the trial court did not err in declining Defendant's request to instruct the jury on either the affirmative defense of perfect self-defense or imperfect self-defense and that Defendant received a fair trial.On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because the evidence presented at trial did not warrant such an instruction. Thus, the court of appeals found no error in Defendant's trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence entitling Defendant to have the jury to be instructed on self-defense. View "State v. Harvey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the State's appeal from the trial court's order granting J.C.'s expunction with respect to his conviction for the offense of indecent liberties with a child, holding that the State has no right of appeal in orders granting expunctions under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-145.5.J.C. was granted an expunction of arrest, trial, and conviction record from a prior conviction and from previously dismissed charges. The trial court granted the expunction under section 15A-145.5. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature did not give the State the right to appeal an expunction under section 15A-145.5 and did not amend section 15A-1445 to include this right. View "State v. J.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's conviction for manufacturing marijuana, holding that the indictment returned for the purpose of charging Defendant with manufacturing marijuana was not fatally defective.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the manufacturing marijuana charge for insufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's conviction, concluding that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege that Defendant acted with an "intent to distribute." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the indictment at issue sufficed to give the trial court jurisdiction to enter judgment against Defendant based upon his conviction for manufacturing marijuana given that it also alleged that Defendant manufactured marijuana by "producing," "propagating," and "processing" it. View "State v. Lofton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals determining that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by allowing the jury, without consent of the parties, to review certain photographs that had been admitted into evidence in the jury room and by instructing the jury concerning the effect of a determination that Defendant was the "aggressor" upon Defendant's right to act in self-defense, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.A jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to review photographs that had already been admitted into evidence in the jury room without Defendant's consent, but the error was not prejudicial; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error by including a discussion of the "aggressor" doctrine in its instructions to the jury concerning Defendant's claim to have killed the victim in the exercise of his right of self-defense. View "State v. Mumma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the superseding indictment upon which Defendant was tried and convicted was facially defective, and thus failed to establish jurisdiction in the trial court, because it failed to name the victim.The indictment identified the alleged victim in this case as "Victim #1." Defendant was found guilty of sexual offense with a child by an adult offender. Before the court of appeals, Defendant argued that the indictment was invalid because it identified the victim as "Victim #1" rather than naming the victim as directed by the short-form indictment statute for the offense. The court of appeals concluded that the indictment was valid because the identity of the victim could be ascertained by reference to other documents in the record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) use of the phrase "Victim #1" does not constitute "naming the victim"; and (2) facially validity is determined by evaluating only the allegations in the criminal pleading. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court imposing lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) upon Defendant without prejudice to the State's ability to file another application for SBM, holding that the trial court committed error relating to a substantial right.The trial court ordered him to enroll in SBM for life upon his release from prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in imposing lifetime SBM because it failed to determine whether the monitoring effectuated a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. In response, the State asserted that Defendant waived the ability to challenge this constitutional issue on appeal by failing to preserve it below. The court of appeals concluded that Defendant had properly preserved the Fourth Amendment issue and, alternatively, that Appellate Rule 2 allowed it to review the issue. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendant waived his ability to raise the issue of the imposition of SBM on constitutional grounds; (2) the court of appeals properly invoked Rule 2 to review the unpreserved issue; and (3) where the State conceded that the trial court committed error relating to a substantial right, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by invoking Rule 2. View "State v. Bursell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals holding that the State's remarks during its closing argument in this criminal case did not entitle Defendant to a new trial but reversed the court of appeals' determination that a short-form indictment insufficiently charged attempted first-degree murder, holding that the indictment was sufficient to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction to try Defendant for attempted first-degree murder.At issue were whether the indictment was sufficient to vest the trial court with jurisdiction to try Defendant for attempted first-degree murder when the wording of the indictment did not precisely duplicate the language of the relevant statute and whether the State's characterizations during its closing argument were so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu. The Supreme Court reinstated Defendant's conviction for attempted first-degree murder, holding (1) the use of the term "slay" instead of "murder" in an indictment that also includes an allegation of "malice aforethought" complies with constitutional and statutory requirements for valid murder offense indictments and serves its functional purposes with regard to both the defendant and the court; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to intervene ex mero motu during the State's closing argument. View "State v. Tart" on Justia Law