Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims were not reviewable on direct appeal, even for plain error, because Defendant completely waived them.A police officer found cocaine in Defendant’s coat pocket during a traffic stop. Defendant did not move in liming to suppress evidence of the cocaine, nor did Defendant object to the State’s use of the cocaine evidence at any point during his trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by admitting evidence of the cocaine and that the seizure of the cocaine violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court committed plain error by admitting evidence of the cocaine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant waived his Fourth Amendment claims by not moving to suppress evidence of the cocaine before or after trial. The Court remanded the case for consideration of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the court of appeals did not reach this claim. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder, sexual offense of a child by a adult offender, and other crimes and his sentence of death, holding that there was no error in Defendant’s trial or sentencing and that Defendant’s death sentence was not disproportionate to his crimes.Among other things, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant failed to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), of establishing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) Defendant failed to identify any error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings; (3) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motions for a mistrial based upon an improper remark by the prosecutor during closing arguments; (4) there was no error in the jury instructions; (5) Defendant received a capital sentencing proceeding free of prejudicial error; and (6) the death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate. View "State v. McNeill" on Justia Law

At issue was the validity of the procedures prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1340.19A - 15A-1340.19(D) (the Act) for the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in light of Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012) and its progeny.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, a sentence that was then mandatory. After Miller was decided, the trial court resentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Act but reversed the resentencing judgment, concluding that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its decision to impose the sentence. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding (1) the Act does not incorporate a presumption in favor of a sentence of life without parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of a theory other than the felony murder rule; (2) the Act is not impermissibly vague, conducive to the imposition of arbitrary punishments, or an unconstitutional ex post facto law; and (3) further sentencing proceedings are required in this case. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

There was sufficient evidence of restraint that was separate and apart from that inherent in the commission of Defendant’s first-degree sexual offense to support Defendant's second-degree kidnapping conviction.Defendant was convicted of several offenses, including felonious breaking or entering, first-degree sexual offense, second-degree kidnapping, misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury, and intimidating a witness. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction for second-degree kidnapping, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that any restraint was separate and apart from the force necessary to facilitate the sex offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence of the element of restraint that was separate and apart from that inherent in the commission of the sex offense. View "State v. China" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals determining that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the complainant’s history of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 412(b)(2) where other evidence showed that Defendant was not infected with those STDs.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree sex offense with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the complainant’s history of STDs because its inclusion would have made sexual contact between the complainant and Defendant less likely, thereby qualifying for the Rule 412(b)(2) exception. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the exception was not applicable in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s offer of proof indicated that the STD evidence fell within the Rule 412(b)(2) exception, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in ruling that there was no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence. View "State v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals determining that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the complainant’s history of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 412(b)(2) where other evidence showed that Defendant was not infected with those STDs.Defendant was found guilty of first-degree sex offense with a child. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the complainant’s history of STDs because its inclusion would have made sexual contact between the complainant and Defendant less likely, thereby qualifying for the Rule 412(b)(2) exception. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the exception was not applicable in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s offer of proof indicated that the STD evidence fell within the Rule 412(b)(2) exception, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in ruling that there was no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence. View "State v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

The General Assembly intended for N.C. Gen. Stat. 9-95(e)(3) of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, which provides that a Class 1 misdemeanor “shall be punished as a Class I felon[y]” when the misdemeanant has committed a previous offense punishable under the Act, to establish a separate felony offense rather than merely to serve as a sentence enhancement of the underlying misdemeanor.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to a marijuana possession charge, acknowledged his prior convictions in violation of the Act, and admitted his habitual felon status. Although the marijuana possession charge was a Class 1 misdemeanor, the judge treated it as a Class I felony because of the prior conviction. Because of Defendant’s habitual felon status, the court punished the Class I felony as a Class E felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the substantive offense remained a class 1 misdemeanor, and consequently, Defendant’s habitual felon status could not be used to further enhance a sentence that was not itself a substantive offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly elevated Defendant’s possession of marijuana offense and then correctly punished that substantive Class I felony as a Class E felony on the basis of his habitual felon status. View "State v. Howell" on Justia Law

The General Assembly intended for N.C. Gen. Stat. 9-95(e)(3) of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, which provides that a Class 1 misdemeanor “shall be punished as a Class I felon[y]” when the misdemeanant has committed a previous offense punishable under the Act, to establish a separate felony offense rather than merely to serve as a sentence enhancement of the underlying misdemeanor.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to a marijuana possession charge, acknowledged his prior convictions in violation of the Act, and admitted his habitual felon status. Although the marijuana possession charge was a Class 1 misdemeanor, the judge treated it as a Class I felony because of the prior conviction. Because of Defendant’s habitual felon status, the court punished the Class I felony as a Class E felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the substantive offense remained a class 1 misdemeanor, and consequently, Defendant’s habitual felon status could not be used to further enhance a sentence that was not itself a substantive offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly elevated Defendant’s possession of marijuana offense and then correctly punished that substantive Class I felony as a Class E felony on the basis of his habitual felon status. View "State v. Howell" on Justia Law

The trial court erroneously instructed the jury when it omitted the relevant stand-your-ground provision from its instructions on self-defense, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial with proper self-defense and stand-your-ground instructions.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court’s “omission of a jury instruction that a person confronted with deadly force has no duty to retreat but can stand his ground” was error, or plain error. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) by omitting the relevant stand-your-ground provision from the agreed-upon instructions on self-defense, the trial court’s jury instructions constituted preserved error; and (2) Defendant showed a reasonable possibility that, had the trial court included the stand-your-ground provision in its instructions, a different result would have been reached at trial. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

The trial court erroneously instructed the jury when it omitted the relevant stand-your-ground provision from its instructions on self-defense, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial with proper self-defense and stand-your-ground instructions.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court’s “omission of a jury instruction that a person confronted with deadly force has no duty to retreat but can stand his ground” was error, or plain error. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) by omitting the relevant stand-your-ground provision from the agreed-upon instructions on self-defense, the trial court’s jury instructions constituted preserved error; and (2) Defendant showed a reasonable possibility that, had the trial court included the stand-your-ground provision in its instructions, a different result would have been reached at trial. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law