Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Carolina Supreme Court
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While on probation, Defendant was indicted for several crimes. After a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at the revocation hearing, which consisted of hearsay evidence, was not competent so as to satisfy a judge that Defendant had willfully violated a valid condition of probation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court was justified in activating Defendant’s suspended sentence where the evidence allowed the reasonable conclusion that Defendant had continued a course of criminal action and posed a danger to the public. View "State v. Murchison" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The State submitted as an aggravating factor that Defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy. The trial court also instructed the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of murder if it determined that he acted in concert to commit the murder. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court concluded that an aggravated sentence was justified in this case. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence of his concerted action was the same evidence used to support the aggravating factor, and thus, the use of this aggravating factor to enhance his sentence violated the statutory prohibition against using evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense to also prove an aggravating factor. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder under an acting-in-concert theory was not the same evidence the State used to support the aggravating factor. View "State v. Facyson" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree kidnapping, possession of a firearm by a felon, assault of a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and related offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of removal, an essential element of second-degree kidnapping. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Defendant’s second-degree kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an appellate court concludes that a defendant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, the court must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a lesser included offense of the convicted crime, and if the court so determines, the jury’s verdict is recognized as a verdict of guilty to the lesser included offense; (2) the court of appeals in this case erred by refusing to consider whether Defendant’s actions constituted the lesser included offense of attempted second-degree kidnapping; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence that Defendant’s actions satisfied each element of attempted second-degree kidnapping. Remanded for entry of judgment on the lesser offense. View "State v. Stokes" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Eric Jones was found guilty of two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of identity theft, and Jerry White was found guilty of four counts of trafficking in stolen identities. The charges arose from unauthorized charges made on the credit cards of several persons. The trial court subsequently dismissed the charges against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and all trafficking in stolen identities charges against White on the basis that the indictments were insufficient as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Jones possessed the specific intent to commit identity theft; and (2) the indictments against the defendants were insufficient to support the convictions against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and against White for trafficking in stolen identities. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of trafficking in opium by possession. During the trial, a laboratory report of the results of a chemical analysis of the contraband were admitted, over Defendant’s objection, without calling the testing chemist as a witness. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State failed to establish that Defendant waived his confrontation rights because the record did not demonstrate that the State had provided a pretrial copy of the lab report to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant failed properly to raise or preserve the issue regarding the State’s compliance with the statutory requirement that the State provide a copy of the lab report to a defendant before trial. Remanded. View "State v. Whittington" on Justia Law

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Greensboro police officers recovered a firearm ten to twelve feet from a car in which Defendant, a convicted felon, was a passenger. Defendant was arrested and later confessed that the firearm belonged to him. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon because, pursuant to the corpus delicti rule, the State did not present corroborative evidence, independent of Defendant's confession, tending to show that the crime in question occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the State v. Parker articulation of the corpus delicti rule, the State was not required to submit alternative evidence proving Defendant's identity as the perpetrator beyond Defendant's confession, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the State to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and Defendant thereafter admitted his habitual felon status. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of testimony by an expert in forensic chemistry regarding the results of a chemical analysis performed by another chemist violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The court of appeals reversed and granted Defendant a new trial, concluding that the admission of the testimony was error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if admission of the testimony was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the testimony of an expert in forensic science as to her opinion that the substance found in Defendant's vehicle was cocaine based upon her independent analysis of testing performed by another analyst in her laboratory violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated in this case, where (1) the admission of the expert's opinion, from the expert's own analysis of the data, constituted the substantive evidence being prevented against Defendant, and Defendant was able to cross-examine the expert concerning all aspects of her testimony; and (2) even assuming the admission of the expert's opinion violated Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the error was harmless. View "State v. Ortiz-Zape" on Justia Law

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After a trial, Defendant was convicted of several drug-related counts. The court of appeals vacated Defendant's convictions for two counts of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine and one count of sale or delivery of cocaine, holding that the trial court violated Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by admitting into evidence lab reports through the testimony of a substitute analyst. The Supreme Court agreed that there was a Confrontation Clause violation where the testifying analyst did not give her own independent opinion, but rather gave "surrogate testimony" reciting the testing analysts' opinions. The Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' decision that Defendant was entitled to a new trial for the sale or delivery charge; but (2) reversed the court of appeals' decision vacating Defendant's conspiracy convictions, as those convictions were not affected by the erroneous admission of the substitute analyst's testimony. View "State v. Craven" on Justia Law

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After a trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court permitted a State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) special agent to testify that the substance found on Defendant was cocaine based solely on her supervisor's notes and lab report. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated where (1) the SBI agent presented an independent opinion formed as a result of her own analysis, not surrogate testimony; (2) Defendant was able to conduct a cross-examination that exposed the weaknesses in the agent's testimony; and (3) the supervisor's lab notes were not admitted into evidence. View "State v. Brewington" on Justia Law