Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and attaining a habitual felon status. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Defendant a new trial, holding that the testimony of a forensic scientist who stated her expert opinion that a substance was cocaine based upon her independent analysis of testing performed by another analyst in her labor violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal the issues he raised before the Court; and (2) even if Defendant had timely objected to the testimony at trial, he would not be entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not err in admitting the expert's opinion that the substance was cocaine, as the testimony did not violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "State v. Brent" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for appropriate relief based upon newly discovered evidence, alleging that, after the trial, Defendant's father told a probation officer that the contraband belonged to him. The trial court set aside Defendant's convicted and ordered a new trial, concluding that the father's post-trial statement constituted newly discovered evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that due diligence was used to procure the father's testimony at the trial, and the information implicating the father was available to Defendant before his conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding Defendant had newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

After a house on property belonging to a motorcross park caught fire, an investigator for property's insurer (Farm Bureau) found evidence of arson. The investigator's findings also included allegations that the park's president and sole shareholder (Volpe) had failed to report to Farm Bureau that there was a deed of trust on the property when she insured it and when she filed a claim of loss after the fire. Volpe was subsequently charged with obtaining property by false pretenses based upon her sale of the burned property to a purchaser who did not know it was encumbered. The trial court found Volpe was not involved in the fire, that Farm Bureau caused a criminal proceeding to be instituted against Volpe, and that Farm Bureau was liable to Volpe for malicious prosecution. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding that the insurance investigator's report to a law enforcement officer did not constitute the initiation of a malicious prosecution, and Farm Bureau's actions did not constitute an unfair and deceptive practice. View "N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cully's Motorcross Park, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was driving a vehicle that stopped in the middle of the road and appeared to initiate a three-point turn by beginning to turn left and continuing onto the shoulder of the road. A highway patrol trooper testified that these actions caused him to suspect that the driver was attempting to avoid a checkpoint. The trooper stopped the vehicle and approached the vehicle, whereupon he detected the odor of alcohol on Defendant. The trooper subsequently charged Defendant with driving while impaired. The trial court concluded that the checkpoint was valid and that the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant pled no contest to driving while impaired. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and vacated the resulting judgment, holding the checkpoint to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's stopping in the middle of the roadway and turning away from a license checkpoint gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have been violating the law. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual offense based on insertion of male sex organ into the mouth of the alleged victim and first-degree sex offense based on insertion of the male sex organ into the anus of the alleged victim. The court of appeals (1) held that there was no error with respect to the first offense, and (2) held that the trial court's failure to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree sexual offense was plain error and granted a new trial with respect to the second offense. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that Defendant failed to show plain error under the standard set forth in State v. Lawrence. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

Defendant was named in two indictments and entered a negotiated plea in each. The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that Defendant took advantage of a position of trust, then sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range for the convictions on both indictments. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had stipulated to the aggravating factor in the earlier indictment only and that the trial court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence on the latter indictment because he had entered no stipulation in that case. The court of appeals vacated the sentence imposed on the latter indictment and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on that indictment, finding that the transcript of plea was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant unambiguously stipulated to application of the aggravating factor for both indictments and that application of the aggravating factor for both indictments was supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. View "State v. Khan" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with a number of violations of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, including trafficking in twenty-eight grams or more of a mixture containing opium. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the General Assembly did not intend the charges stemming from possession of prescription medications be based on total weight. The opium trafficking statute explicitly provides that a defendant's criminal liability shall be based on the total weight of the mixture involved. The trial court denied Defendants' motions, and the jury found Defendants guilty as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because tablets and pills are mixtures, the opium trafficking statute applies in cases involving tablets and pills of prescription pharmaceutical drugs, and thus, Defendants were properly sentenced under the opium trafficking statute. View "State v. Ellison" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to traffic in cocaine by transportation and possession. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, alleging that the stop was an illegal seizure. Specifically, Defendant argued that the law enforcement officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was engaging in illegal activity by operating a vehicle without a properly functioning brake light. The court of appeals reversed, holding that state law requires a motor vehicle to have only one brake light, and therefore, the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the officer was mistaken about the requirements of the motor vehicle laws, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and under the totality of the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in this case. View "State v. Heien" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The State filed a notice of appeal seven days after the trial judge in open court orally granted Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress but three months before the trial judge issued his corresponding written order of suppression. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the State's appeal, finding that the State's notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' dismissal of the State's appeal, holding that, under Rule 4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1448, the window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a criminal case opens on the date of rendition of the judgment or order and closes fourteen days after entry of the judgment or order. View "State v. Oates" on Justia Law

Defendant reserved her right to appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and then pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in marijuana by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were either without merit or inconsequential and that law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend a detention of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.