Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual offense with a child under the age of thirteen and two counts of first-degree statutory rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted conclusory expert testimony on whether the juvenile victim had been sexually abused, as it was "highly plausible" that the jury would have reached a different result absent the expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified, holding (1) the admission of the testimony was plain error; but (2) the plain error standard requires a determination that the jury "probably would have" returned a different result. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape of a child, two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense, two counts of sexual offense with a child, and five counts of indecent liberties with a child. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial for Defendant's two convictions for sexual offense with a child, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by a disjunctive jury instruction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in ordering a new trial for two of Defendant's sexual offense convictions based on fellatio, as the State satisfied the corpus delicti rule by presenting evidence of the trustworthiness of Defendant's confession to the incidents of fellatio.

After Defendant appealed his district court conviction for driving while impaired, the superior court granted Defendant's motion to suppress based upon its conclusion that there was not probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle because of the contradictory testimony of the arresting officers and the allegations contained in Defendant's affidavit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the superior court erred by applying the probable cause standard instead of the reasonable suspicion standard to determine the validity of Defendant's traffic stop. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the superior court did not apply the correct legal standard and failed to make findings of fact sufficient to allow a reviewing court to apply the correct legal standard. Remanded.

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while impaired, reserving her right to appeal. Defendant subsequently appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of her vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, holding that one of the trial court's findings of fact was not supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in finding that one of the trial court's findings of fact was not supported by the evidence; but (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress because there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of committing a misdemeanor sexual battery. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony referring to Defendant's post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court's determination of guilt, concluding that the admission of the statements was not plain error; but (2) vacated the trial court's order requiring that Defendant register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of the post-Miranda testimony was error; but (2) this error did not amount to plain error.

Defendant was indicted for first degree rape. Four years later, he was indicted for additional charges of felony child abuse by committing a sexual act on a child, incest, and indecent liberties with a child. The victim in this case was Defendant's daughter, who experienced a "flashback" to the alleged events and reported the allegedly repressed memory to her therapist. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress expert testimony regarding the repressed memory, concluding that even though evidence of repressed memory was relevant, the evidence must be excluded because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' determination that the trial court properly granted Defendant's motion; but (2) disavowed the portion of the opinion that, relying on an earlier opinion of that court, required expert testimony always to accompany the testimony of a lay witness in cases involving allegedly recovered memories. Remanded.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and trafficking in cocaine by possession. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. Defendant contended that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the charges and therefore the charges should not have been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to reach a reasonable inference that Defendant constructively possessed the cocaine and rifle at issue, and therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child and first-degree sexual offense. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of prior acts was properly admitted against Defendant under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b). The court of appeals reversed the convictions, determining that the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the alleged crimes to be admitted under Rule 404(b). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concluding that the trial court, after carefully evaluating the evidence, correctly ruled that the prior acts had sufficient similarity and temporal proximity to those alleged in the charged crimes. Remanded.

Defendant Paul Lewis was convicted of first-degree sexual offense, felonious breaking or entering, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Defendant discovered information previously unknown to him relating to his trial. Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR), alleging that his trial had been tainted because of improper communication between the investigating detective and a juror. The trial court denied Defendant's MAR, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. On retrial, Defendant was once more convicted of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the charges against Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the retrial court erred in limiting Defendant's ability to examine before a jury the State's lead investigator about the investigator's possible bias and about instances of purported misconduct by the investigator during Defendant's first trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant David Lawrence was convicted by a jury for two counts each of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, attempted kidnapping, attempted breaking and entering, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court's erroneous jury instructions on conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon amounted to plain error and granted Defendant a new trial on that charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an incorrect formulation of the plain error standard of review; and (2) Defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating plain error because, in light of the evidence, Defendant could not show that, absent the error, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict, and thus, he could not show the prejudicial effect necessary to establish that the error was a fundamental error.