Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Dakota Supreme Court
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Zachary Archambault appealed from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Archambault had been found guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a minor child, a class AA felony. Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In these proceedings, the applicant bears the burden to establish the grounds for relief.Archambault claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in six ways. The district court addressed each of his claims and made detailed findings and conclusions regarding each ground. Among his claims, Archambault argued that his trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress his three-hour video confession because he was suffering from drug and alcohol effects and wanted to self-harm. Additionally, he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not interview the minor victim before trial.The district court found that Archambault did not show his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court made a series of findings that were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and were supported by evidence. These included the court's conclusion that the decision to permit equipment in the jury room is a discretionary decision that will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion, and that an unsuccessful trial strategy does not make defense counsel’s assistance defective. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the record, it agreed with the district court in denying Archambault’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the order denying his application for postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Archambault v. State" on Justia Law

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The case involves Kimberly Ann Henderson, who was convicted of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and attempted theft. Henderson worked for Home Helpers, an agency that assists elderly people. During her time there, she was assigned to Mr. and Mrs. Cooper and had access to their financial information. The State alleged she used the Coopers’ financial accounts to pay her bills and make personal purchases. She was charged with exploitation of an eligible adult and criminal attempt of theft of property, with the value of the funds in question exceeding $50,000 and $10,000 respectively.At trial, the State presented testimony from four witnesses and submitted thirteen exhibits, including financial documents, receipts, an eviction notice, surveillance photos from multiple businesses, and a video of an interview with Henderson. Henderson objected to the admissibility of 12 exhibits, arguing they were not properly authenticated and were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court overruled these objections and admitted the exhibits. The jury subsequently convicted Henderson on both counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the District Court had abused its discretion by admitting the exhibits without proper authentication and as inadmissible hearsay. The Supreme Court held that the testimony did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(6)(D), N.D.R.Ev. which provides a hearsay exception for records kept in the regular course of business. The Court found that the detective's testimony did not explain how the exhibits came into existence in the ordinary course of business, nor did the record contain an affidavit that could have rendered them self-authenticating. Given these pervasive errors and considering a set value was alleged in each count, the judgment was reversed. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Lawrence Weber, who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Weber's driving privileges were suspended for 180 days by a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer following his refusal to take a chemical breath test after his arrest. Weber argued that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, which he claimed invalidated the authority of the North Dakota Department of Transportation to revoke his driving privileges.On February 26, 2023, Weber was arrested after an onsite screening test showed a blood alcohol content of .152 percent. Following his arrest, when asked to take a chemical breath test, Weber invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and requested an attorney. Despite being given access to his phone to contact his attorney, Weber made a call to an individual who refused to help him contact his attorney. Weber did not attempt to make further calls or ask for additional time to contact his attorney.The hearing officer found that Weber refused to take the chemical breath test and had a reasonable opportunity to call an attorney. The officer's findings were upheld by the district court. Weber appealed the decision, maintaining that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Weber was provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and his right to counsel was satisfied. Weber's claim that he was denied the opportunity to contact an attorney was not supported by the evidence. The court found that the hearing officer's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and her conclusion that Weber was not deprived of his right to consult counsel was in accordance with the law. View "Weber v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State v. Rinde" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota had to decide whether the district court had implicitly accepted a plea agreement by accepting a guilty plea from the defendant, Devin Fischer. Fischer had initially entered a plea agreement with the State, in which he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of menacing, with the remaining charges of burglary, reckless endangerment, and tampering with physical evidence being dismissed. The district court accepted Fischer's guilty plea, but ultimately rejected the plea agreement after hearing victim impact statements and viewing video evidence of the crime. Fischer was subsequently tried and found guilty of terrorizing and reckless endangerment.Fischer appealed, arguing that by accepting his guilty plea, the district court had implicitly accepted the plea agreement. The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed, ruling that a court can accept a guilty plea without accepting an associated plea agreement. The court found that the district court had acted within its discretion to separately consider the guilty plea and the plea agreement.Fischer also argued that the district court judge should have recused himself after making a comment that, after viewing the video evidence, he did not see how Fischer could be found not guilty of all charges. The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected this argument, finding that the judge had not demonstrated bias as the comments were made outside of the presence of the jury and were a necessary part of the judge's explanation for rejecting the plea agreement.The court affirmed Fischer's convictions for terrorizing and reckless endangerment, as well as the district court's denial of Fischer's motion for recusal. View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

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The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision finding Erica Good Bear guilty of terrorizing, a class C felony. Good Bear appealed the judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, improper admission of hearsay evidence, and denial of her right to confront a witness. The alleged hearsay evidence was two statements made by the victim's four-year-old child, both of which were recounted by other witnesses. The first statement was recounted by the victim, and the second was recounted by the responding police officer. The court concluded that both statements fell under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule, making them admissible. The court also found that the second statement did not violate Good Bear's right to confront her accuser, as it was not considered "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment. The court determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilty on the terrorizing charge. View "State v. Good Bear" on Justia Law

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In this case, George Lyons appealed from a district court order dismissing his application for postconviction relief. Lyons had been convicted of gross sexual imposition in 2017, a conviction that was upheld on appeal. He filed an application for postconviction relief more than two years after his conviction became final, claiming newly discovered evidence and arguing that his conviction was barred by a statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition. The district court dismissed his application as untimely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01, which requires such applications to be filed within two years of the conviction becoming final.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the dismissal. The court first noted that while postconviction relief is available for convictions obtained without jurisdiction, such claims must be brought within the two-year deadline, and no exception exists for claims challenging the district court's jurisdiction. Therefore, Lyons' claim concerning the statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition was untimely.Second, the court rejected Lyons' argument that the newly discovered evidence exception to the two-year deadline applied. The court found that Lyons had failed to provide competent admissible evidence to support his claim that the new evidence was discovered after trial. As such, the court held that Lyons had failed to meet his burden to obtain an evidentiary hearing in the district court.Lastly, the court declined to address Lyons' ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he did not provide any argument or explanation concerning this claim in his brief. View "Lyons v. State" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Daynen Hoover contested a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. This penalty was the result of Hoover being arrested for being in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, with a blood alcohol concentration of .085 percent by weight. The Department conducted an administrative hearing by video conference, during which they introduced eight foundational exhibits from the State Crime Laboratory. Hoover objected to this on the grounds that he and his counsel did not have copies of these exhibits to review and analyze. Despite these objections, the hearing officer admitted the exhibits and the Department subsequently suspended Hoover's driving privileges for 91 days.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the procedure used by the Department, which admitted exhibits into evidence without providing Hoover a meaningful opportunity to examine them, deprived him of a fair hearing. The court noted that the Department's notice of information did not offer copies of the exhibits or specifically identify which documents maintained by the Department or available on the attorney general's website would be introduced at the hearing. The court found that this violated the requirement for parties to be afforded an opportunity to examine exhibits before they are admitted into evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that the Department's procedures did not comply with state law and substantially prejudiced Hoover's procedural rights. The court's decision emphasized the importance of a party's ability to examine exhibits introduced against them as a critical procedural protection in adjudicative proceedings. View "Hoover v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of North Dakota heard an appeal from Robert Williamson, who was sentenced for probation violations related to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of luring minors by computer. Williamson had initially served approximately four and a half years of a 10-year sentence, with all but five years suspended, and was then released on probation. He was given "good time" credit by the Department of Corrections, which aids in reducing a sentence. However, after violating his probation conditions, Williamson was re-sentenced to a 10-year term with credit for 4 years and 181 days, without any consideration of his accrued good time.Williamson appealed the decision, arguing that his re-sentencing was illegal because it did not account for his good time credit. The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed, stating that a court does not have the authority to waive or limit good time awarded by the Department of Corrections, and any credit for sentence reductions must be stated in the criminal judgment. The court held that the lower court had illegally sentenced Williamson by failing to include his accrued good time in the re-sentencing. The case was reversed and remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with the opinion. View "State v. Williamson" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed a decision from the District Court of Burleigh County, which had granted a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal trial. The defendant, Matthew Gietzen, was charged with possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia that were found in a locked bag within a backpack during a vehicle search. The driver of the vehicle had consented to the search, but Gietzen, a passenger, did not give explicit consent. The district court held that the driver's consent did not extend to the search of Gietzen's backpack, particularly the locked bag containing contraband, because it was unreasonable to believe the female driver had authority to consent to a search of a locked bag containing men’s items. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with this assessment, stating that it is the officer's burden to obtain affirmative consent for a search when a constitutional protection applies and consent alone serves as the basis for the search. The court therefore affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, upholding the principle that a third party's consent to a search does not necessarily extend to personal items belonging to another individual. View "State v. Gietzen" on Justia Law