Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not require exclusion of nontestimonial statements. Darrel Froelich appealed a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of simple assault domestic violence. The State alleged Froelich assaulted his girlfriend's son-in-law, a household member. The case proceeded to trial. At trial, the State called the alleged victim, the alleged victim's wife, the responding officer, and a 911 operator to testify. The State planned to call Froelich's former girlfriend, who made the 911 call, but she did not appear on the day of trial. The State sought to introduce a recording of the 911 call, and Froelich objected because the caller was not in court to testify. After some discussion, the district court permitted the State to play a recording of the 911 call after using the 911 operator to lay foundation for the recording. The State played only a portion of the 911 call for the jury. In a discussion outside the jury's presence, the State noted it stopped the recording early so the jury would not hear the entire call. The State explained, "the 911 caller[] does allude to previous acts of Mr. Froelich beating her at that point and she makes further comments which we believe may prejudice the defendant in this matter . . . ." Froelich presented his case after the State rested. Froelich testified and gave a conflicting account of events. Froelich testified the victim had been the aggressor, and the confrontation lasted only ten seconds before the victim left the home. On appeal, Froelich argued the admission of a portion of the 911 call violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The State argued admission of the 911 call did not violate Froelich's constitutional rights because the statements were not testimonial. Finding no reversible error in admission of the 911 call, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment. View "North Dakota v. Froelich" on Justia Law

An individual may be committed as a sexually dangerous individual only when, among other things, the individual has a present serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior making that individual a danger to others. Danny Nelson appealed a district court order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. He argued the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a sexually dangerous individual. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings were insufficient to demonstrate Nelson was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct or that he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. As such, the Court reversed the district court's order of commitment and directed Nelson be released from civil commitment. View "Interest of Nelson" on Justia Law

When a person committed as a sexually dangerous individual petitions for discharge, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual. Expert testimony in sexually dangerous individual proceedings will not be reweighed on appeal, and a choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Kelly Tanner appealed a district court order finding he remained a sexually dangerous individual and denying his petition for discharge from the North Dakota State Hospital. Tanner, at age 22, was convicted of sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old female. The district court sentenced Tanner to one year of probation for the offense. In 2009, Tanner was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to five years in prison with four years and eleven months suspended for two years of supervised probation. In 2010, Tanner's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to one year of incarceration with two years of supervised probation to follow. Just before Tanner was released from incarceration, the State petitioned the district court to civilly commit Tanner as a sexually dangerous individual. After the commitment hearing, the district court found Tanner was a sexually dangerous individual and ordered civil commitment. Tanner petitioned for discharge in 2013 and 2014, and the district court ordered continued commitment on both occasions. Tanner petitioned for discharge a third time in September 2015. The State's doctor evaluated Tanner and filed a report, which was updated with an addendum twice. An independent doctor who previously evaluated Tanner, conducted an evaluation and filed a report. The district court held a hearing at which both doctors testified. The district court concluded Tanner remained a sexually dangerous individual and denied the petition for discharge. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court order denying Tanner's petition for discharge was supported by the record and was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, it affirmed the district court order continuing civil commitment. View "Interest of Tanner" on Justia Law

When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant must show ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions from the face of the existing record to obtain relief. Wesley Cody appealed the district court's order requiring Cody pay $13,455.78 in restitution as part of his sentence in a criminal matter. Cody argued that his counsel was ineffective at his restitution hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the record before it did not affirmatively show ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, and this issue was more properly pursued in a post-conviction relief proceeding. The Court therefore affirmed, but remanded for correction of the amount of restitution in the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Cody" on Justia Law

Police officers outside of their jurisdiction generally act without official capacity and authority to arrest. A University of North Dakota (UND) police officer has the authority to initiate a traffic stop of a driver operating a motor vehicle on university property. Todd Wilkie appealed a criminal judgment after conditionally pleading guilty to reckless endangerment, fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer and driving under suspension, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the case. UND police officer Anthony Thiry was traveling east on Gateway Drive when he saw a vehicle traveling east on the 3000 block of Gateway Drive at a fast rate of speed and exhibiting erratic driving behavior. Officer Thiry checked the vehicle's license plate and discovered the owner, Wilkie, had a suspended drivers license. The vehicle driver matched Wilkie's description. According to Officer Thiry, he activated his overhead lights attempting to stop Wilkie, but the vehicle sped past, ultimately becoming disabled from hitting a median. Wilkie fled by foot and was apprehended.  Wilkie filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the case, arguing Officer Thiry lacked jurisdiction to stop him. After a hearing the district court entered an order finding Officer Thiry was within the UND police department's jurisdiction and had official capacity and power to arrest Wilkie because UND owns the property encompassing the eastbound lane of Gateway Drive. The district court further determined Officer Thiry was in hot pursuit of Wilkie when Wilkie did not stop his vehicle within UND police department's jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The preliminary hearing is a tool to ferret out groundless and improvident prosecutions; the State is not required to prove with absolute certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime occurred, but need only produce sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that a crime occurred and that the defendant committed it. The State appealed a district court order dismissing with prejudice a class B felony charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver against Kensley Turbeville for lack of probable cause. Turbeville was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia following the execution of a search warrant at Turbeville's residence. Turbeville's counsel questioned the officer about the amount of marijuana found. The officer testified he did not feel he could get an accurate weight and that it was being analyzed at the state crime lab. The officer testified the individual "nuggets" of marijuana were not packaged separately. Turbeville argued there was nothing presented at the hearing to indicate she had intent to deliver. The State argued there was sufficient evidence presented for probable cause Turbeville possessed marijuana with intent to deliver. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the State produced sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for a charge of class B felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, it reversed and remanded. View "North Dakota v. Turbeville" on Justia Law

When a party objects to the State's admission of evidence with a pretrial motion in limine, the party must renew their objection at trial in order to give the district court an opportunity to rule on the issue at trial. A party's failure to renew their objection at trial acts as a waiver of the claim of error. Harold Shick appealed a district court's judgment entered after a jury convicted him of terrorizing, reckless endangerment, felonious restraint, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shick's motion for a mistrial, and there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. View "North Dakota v. Shick" on Justia Law

A district court's analysis of whether "corroborating circumstances" indicate the trustworthiness of the statement is a preliminary determination regarding the admissibility of the evidence. Precious Bailey appeals a criminal judgment entered after a jury found her guilty of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Bailey argued the district court erred by excluding hearsay testimony after analyzing the credibility of the witness she wanted to testify on her behalf. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme court affirmed the district court. View "North Dakota v. Bailey" on Justia Law

During an investigatory stop of a vehicle, a traffic violator can be temporarily detained until the legitimate investigative purposes of the traffic stop have been completed. Michael Phelps appealed a criminal judgment entered after he conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. Phelps argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and the dog sniff unreasonably extended the traffic stop. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded: (1) the district court did not err in finding the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop; and (2) the dog sniff conducted on Phelps' vehicle did not require independent reasonable suspicion because it occurred contemporaneously to the completion of duties related to the initial traffic stop. View "North Dakota v. Phelps" on Justia Law

The odor of an alcoholic beverage, poor balance, and open containers of alcohol may permit an officer to reasonably formulate an opinion the body of a driver in a single-car crash contains alcohol. Matthew Marman appealed the district court's judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's suspension of his driving privileges for 180 days. Because Marman failed to rebut the prima facie evidence of the Report and Notice, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marman v. Levi" on Justia Law