Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Dakota Supreme Court
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Defendant Gale Bruce appealed a judgment entered after the district court convicted him of menacing under N.D.C.C. 12.1-17-05. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the State presented sufficient evidence at trial for the court to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Defendant Rodney Chisholm appealed a criminal judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of murder in the death of his brother, Donald Chisholm. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit evidence that the victim had (several years earlier) brandished a firearm in disputes with another Chisholm brother.

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Defendant Kenneth Eide appealed a district court order that denied his motion to correct illegal sentences under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a) after the court discharged him from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual and amended five criminal judgments against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the order to the extent the court did not amend three of the criminal judgments, and reversed theĀ order to the extent the court amended five of the criminal judgments because the court did not provide Eide with notice before modifying hisĀ probation. On January 3, 2011, the court amended at Defendant's request one of the three judgments it did not amend on December 27, 2010, extending his probation for five years after the expiration of his original probationary period. Defendant remained on probation under the terms of the court's January 3, 2011 order.

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Defendant Manmohan Garg appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw guilty pleas in two criminal cases. He argued the district court erred by denying the motion because his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him of the deportation consequences of the plea agreements as required by the United States Supreme Court decision in "Padilla v. Kentucky," 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). Defendant was a non-citizen living in the United States. In April 2011, he received notice from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement that his immigration status was being revoked and that he was subject to deportation as a result of two previous criminal convictions in Ward County, North Dakota. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Even assuming Defendant's attorney failed to advise him of the deportation consequences of the 2000 guilty plea, Defendant could not prove prejudice because he knew the guilty plea could result in deportation as a result of his involvement in prior criminal proceedings. Because Defendant failed to prove prejudice, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his 2000 guilty plea.

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Defendant Trevor Mertz appealed a district court criminal judgment entered after a jury convicted him of burglary. Defendant argued that: (1) after the jury retired for deliberation, the district court erred by providing an incorrect and misleading answer to the jury's request for instruction on the law; and (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the conviction. Defendant was charged with burglary for entering his ex-girlfriend's home and taking a television. Defendant was tried by a jury and testified at trial. Defendant admitted to entering the residence and taking the television but claimed the television did not belong to his ex-girlfriend. Defendant testified the television was his and he loaned it to his ex-girlfriend for their child's use. Two witnesses called by the State testified the television belonged to Defendant's ex-girlfriend. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's criminal judgment.

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Jordan Michael Engelhardt appealed a domestic violence protection order prohibiting him from having contact with Sara J. Rinas for twenty years. Engelhardt and Rinas, who were never married, have a minor child together. In 2011, after the relationship ended, Rinas filed a petition for protective relief from Engelhardt. Rinas alleged Engelhardt had been physically abusive on multiple occasions, one of which occurred while Engelhardt was holding their child. Rinas also alleged Engelhardt had threatened to kill her and she received threatening text messages from him. The district court granted a temporary domestic violence protection order and scheduled a hearing. In October 2011, Engelhardt filed a parenting time action, but no parenting time order had been issued. Despite Engelhardt's testimony at the hearing, he did not challenge the finding of domestic violence on appeal. Nor did he challenge the interpretation of the domestic violence protection order statute; rather, he argued the judicial referee abused his discretion by including the specific terms of relief in the protection order. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the domestic violence protection order and affirmed it as modified.

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The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court's judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Petitioner's driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. "A reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded that the hearing officer's finding that [Petitioner] did not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke during the twenty minutes before the Intoxilyzer test" was supported by the weight of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the administrative suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges.

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Defendant Branden Clark appealed a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of theft of property. On appeal, Defendant argued: the district court erred in refusing to give his requested jury instruction; insufficient evidence existed to support his conviction; his sentence was erroneous and excessive; and the court erred in admitting evidence the State failed to disclose before trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court record, and that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction.

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On November 1, 2010, after speaking with her financial institution, Capitol Credit Union, and noting suspicious withdrawals from her savings account, Heidi Blum notified the Mandan Police Department about two unauthorized uses of her automated teller machine ("ATM") card. Blum claimed someone used her ATM card at two separate locations in Mandan to withdraw $165 from her bank account without her consent. During her conversation with Capitol Credit Union, Blum learned that Capitol Credit Union had mailed a new ATM card to her address and that it had separately mailed to the same address a corresponding personal identification number. Blum, however, had moved and no longer lived at that address. As part of the investigation, a Mandan police officer learned Defendant Steven Schmidt and his girlfriend resided at the address where Capitol Credit Union had mailed Blum's new ATM card and corresponding personal identification number. Defendant would later be charged with theft for having used the ATM card to make the withdrawals. He appealed his conviction; the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and his proposed jury instruction, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his pre-trial motion.

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In 2008, Defendant Vicente Chacano was charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition for having sexual contact with a victim less than fifteen years old. Defendant was charged with three additional counts of gross sexual imposition for conduct involving the same victim. The State moved to dismiss one count in the first complaint because the same charge was included in the second complaint. The district court granted the motion. The district court held a preliminary hearing on the charges in both complaints. The district court found probable cause to bind over Defendant for trial, and the State filed an information for each case. The Adams County State's Attorney moved to dismiss all charges against Defendant in 2009. The motion included the written statement: "To prevent a possible miscarriage of justice a further investigation is necessary." Defendant did not object to the dismissal. The district court granted the motion and dismissed all charges without prejudice. Then in 2010, an assistant attorney general filed a complaint charging Defendant with three counts of gross sexual imposition for conduct involving the same victim and the same time period as the 2008 charges. The district court held a preliminary hearing on the 2010 charges. The district court found probable cause to bind over Defendant for trial, and the State filed an information. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges "on the grounds that contrary to the State of North Dakota's representations to [the district court judge] and Defendant no 'further investigation' of the case has been conducted since January 15, 2009 and Defendant is prejudiced by the State of North Dakota['s] failure to honor [its] representation and the refiling of the charges." After a hearing, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. In early 2011, Defendant was tried by a jury. The jury found him guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition and not guilty of one count of gross sexual imposition. Defendant appealed the district court criminal judgment entered after the jury convicted him. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction: "The plain language of Rule 48(a) [of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure] applies to the dismissal of a criminal charge and does not require the prosecuting attorney to take any specific action before a charge dismissed without prejudice can be refiled. In this case, a state's attorney determined he did not have sufficient evidence to proceed on the 2008 charges and moved to dismiss. . . . A criminal charge dismissed without prejudice may be refiled within the applicable statutory period."