Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Mitchell Holbach appealed a municipal court judgment that summarily dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the judgment was not appealable, but considered Defendant's appeal under its supervisory jurisdiction. Defendant was convicted for driving under suspension and driving without insurance. The arresting officer mistakenly believed Defendant's last name was "Knutson," and a check on "Mitchell Knutson" revealed a bench warrant was out for Knutson's arrest. The officer stopped Defendant on the mistaken identity, discovered his mistake, and learned of Defendant's suspension. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had no insurance. Defendant pled guilty to both offenses in municipal court, and signed and dated an acknowledgement indicating he had been informed of and understood his rights. Several years later, Defendant filed this appeal, alleging his conviction was based on evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest. The Supreme Court held that post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1 was not available in municipal courts in North Dakota. The Court concluded the judgment was void and directed the municipal court to dismiss Defendant's application.

Defendant-Appellant Jens Lee appealed his conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. He was stopped for speeding while riding his motorcycle. After failing field sobriety tests and a preliminary screening, Defendant was arrested and agreed to submit to an Intoxilyzer test. The in-car video showed that approximately four minutes later, while they sat in the patrol car waiting for assistance with the motorcycle, Lee twice told the arresting officer, "I hope you understand I've got to have Cash give me a good try." When the officer asked what he meant, Lee answered, "Cash Aaland," the name of a Fargo attorney. At the administrative hearing, the arresting officer testified Lee had stated that "he'd be getting a hold of Cash." The arresting officer admitted he understood "Cash" was a reference to Cash Aaland. After being transported to the police station, Lee made no further reference to an attorney before submitting to the Intoxilyzer test. The arresting officer did not provide Lee an opportunity to contact an attorney prior to administering the Intoxilyzer test. On appeal, Defendant contended the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the Intoxilyzer test results, claiming his statement to the arresting officer that "I've got to have Cash give me a good try" invoked his statutory right to consult with an attorney before submitting to the chemical test and triggered the officer's duty to provide a reasonable opportunity for Lee to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion, and affirmed his conviction.

Petitioner-Appellant Cecil H. Bell appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation decision to revoke his driving privileges for one year. Petitioner argued he was denied his statutory right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test. Finding no denial of rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision.

Petitioner-Appellant Douglas Kooser appealed a district court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argued the district court erred by denying his request to withdraw his "Alford" plea and by finding he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no abuse of discretion nor a violation of his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial.

Petitioner-Appellant Mark Palmer appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for relief for post-conviction relief. In 2001, Petitioner was convicted of four counts of gross sexual imposition. He appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. In February 2011, Petitioner applied for post-conviction relief, and an attorney was appointed to represent him. On March 1, 2011, the State responded to Petitioner's application and moved for summary dismissal. The district court denied Petitioner's application. His attorney moved on his behalf for relief from the order denying his post-conviction application, arguing Petitioner was entitled to relief from the order because of mistake or inadvertence. The district court denied the motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not explain its rationale for denying Petitioner's motion for relief. The order denying the motion stated, "The motion for relief, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal [sic] Procedure and dated May 23, 2011, is in all things SUMMARILY DENIED." The court provided no explanation for denying Palmer's motion. Therefore, the Court remanded the case back to the district court for an explanation of its decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Parizek appealed a district court order that affirmed an administrative enforcement action which placed a lien on his personal property held by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The State, through the High Intensity Enforcement Unit of Child Support Enforcement, placed a lien on any funds or accounts the Department was holding for Plaintiff to secure payment for his past due child support obligation. Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested judicial review of the lien, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and therefore the property did not qualify for an account lien. Plaintiff them moved to dismiss the lien with prejudice, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and an account lien could not be enforced against the accounts it managed, and his spending account did not qualify as personal property. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued the Department and the State violated state law by entering into an agreement or relationship under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, with the sole purpose of enforcement of an administrative action upon him. Furthermore, Plaintiff claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the lien without allowing him a hearing as he requested. He maintained the court erred when it failed to allow him 14 days from the service of the "notice of proposed order" before denying his motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the order denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss was filed after the notice of appeal, and therefore it was not appealed and was not properly before the Court.

Defendant Richard Morin appealed a criminal judgment that was based upon his conditional plea of guilty to simple assault on a peace officer. Defendant pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. In 2010, Bismarck police officers responded to a domestic-disturbance call at the residence of Defendant and Christine Chase, Defendant’s girlfriend. At the suppression hearing, Chase and Officer Dustin Miller, one of the officers who responded, testified. Defendant moved to suppress evidence, alleging "[l]aw enforcement officers in this matter unlawfully entered the residence of Mr. Morin in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure." Defendant moved to suppress all "illegally obtained evidence seized" as a result of the entry and any statements he made after the entry. The State resisted Defendant’s motion. The district court held a hearing and denied Defendant’s motion, determining Chase consented to Officer Miller's entry of the home and exigent circumstances existed to allow Officer Miller to enter the home without a warrant. Based on the issues presented from the parties and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there was sufficient competent evidence to support the district court's findings.

Defendant Christian Antonio Alaniz, Jr., appealed an order deferring imposition of sentence entered after he conditionally pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because there was not probable cause to justify the search of his person and the exception to the probable cause requirement for warrantless searches by school officials did not apply. Troy Vanyo was a police officer with the Grand Forks Police Department and was assigned to work as a school resource officer at a high school in Grand Forks. Vanyo had received information about possible drug use involving students in an area approximately a block and a half from the high school. One of the students was later identified as Defendant. The students walked to a town square area and Vanyo followed in his patrol car. Vanyo testified the students were seated when they saw him, stood up, and quickly walked toward a stage area in the town square. Later, Vanyo observed Defendant waiting to talk to the attendance secretary and he informed the school principal that Defendant was the other individual he observed in the town square and suspected was involved in drug activity. The principal took Defendant into a detention room and Vanyo followed them. Vanyo testified the principal questioned Defendant, Vanyo testified he told Defendant something like "if you have anything on you, you need to lay it on the table now." Defendant emptied his pockets, which contained a glass pipe and synthetic marijuana. In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant argued the police failed to advise him of his rights under "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), there was not probable cause justifying the search of his person, and the exception to the probable cause requirement for searches by school officials did not apply. The district court denied the motion, ruling the reasonableness standard for searches by school officials applied and the search was reasonable. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of Defendant's age, gender, and nature of the suspicion.

Petitioner Paul Schock appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative order suspending his driver's license for 180 days for driving a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding "a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded Schock provided a breath sample within two hours of driving a motor vehicle." The Court declined to grant his request for attorney's fees and costs.

The City of Bismarck appealed from a district court order granting Defendant Daniel J. McCormick's post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal. In 2010, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence in violation of a Bismarck city ordinance. Defendant pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. In 2011, Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal because the City did not introduce the driving-under-the-influence ordinance into evidence. The City resisted, asserting Defendant was not surprised by the ordinance because the ordinance is almost identical to the statute prohibiting driving under the influence in the North Dakota Century Code. The City further asserted Defendant's post-trial motion was untimely because it was a motion that should have been made before trial. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court held that without a statutory requirement it was not permitted to take judicial notice of a city ordinance unless a copy of the ordinance was received into evidence or the parties stipulated to its admission into evidence. The court also determined McCormick's motion was timely because he argued the city failed on its burden of proof at trial, which was a motion he could not have argued before trial. Concluding that the district court erred in granting Defendant's judgment of acquittal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.