Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Chadley Overlie appealed a district court order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. In 2009, Overlie pled guilty to one count of violation of a domestic violence protection order--second or subsequent offense. Under a binding plea agreement, the district court sentenced Defendant to one year and suspended all but thirteen days for two years, with supervised probation. Defendant's probation was later revoked when he violated the conditions of his probation. The district court then re-sentenced Defendant to two years of incarceration. In June 2010, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to reduce his sentence. Subsequently, Defendant filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief, alleging "[e]vidence, not previously presented and heard, exists requiring vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice[.]" The court dismissed Defendant's application without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court found there was no evidence in the record that Defendant had requested to offer. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the district court erred in summarily dismissing Defendant's application. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendants Timothy Deviley and Ryan Lee appealed the criminal judgments entered on their conditional guilty pleas for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and reserving the right to appeal the order denying their motions to suppress evidence. Deviley and Lee argued they were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because they were detained without a reasonable and articulable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity. Lee further argued the length of time for the drug dog to arrive created a de facto arrest. Lee also argued the district court erred by denying a motion to reduce the charge against him because of inconsistent statutes. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the motions to suppress evidence, concluding there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion the defendants were engaged in criminal activity, and there was no unreasonable delay creating a de facto arrest. Further, the Court concluded Lee was correctly charged with a Class A felony and affirmed the criminal judgments.

Petitioner Dennis Gaede appealed an order that denied his application for post-conviction relief. In 2006 a jury convicted Petitioner of murdering Timothy Wicks in Gardner, and the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In October 2008, Petitioner filed his application raising 23 issues. An attorney was appointed to represent him. On the State's motion, the district court summarily dismissed five of the issues on the basis of misuse of process and res judicata, and ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider the remaining issues. The court subsequently granted Petitioner's motion to supplement his application to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise meritorious issues on direct appeal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court rejected Petitioner's remaining allegations and denied his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, newly discovered evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other alleged defects in his jury trial. The Court denied Petitioner's application and dismissed his appeal.

Defendant Branden Clark appealed an order that denied his motion for correction of sentence. Defendant argued his sentences were illegal because they merged with his sentences in two other cases and his due process rights were violated by the delay in holding a hearing on the petition to revoke his probation. In January 2005, Defendant was convicted of theft by deception (a class C felony) for which he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison with fifteen suspended and three years probation in each case. In April 2005, Defendant was convicted of theft of property (a class C felony) for which he was sentenced to five years in prison with three suspended and five years probation. In November 2005, Defendant was convicted of theft of services (a class C felony), for which he was sentenced to five years in prison with three years suspended and three years probation. In December 2005, the State filed a petition to revoke Defendant's probation. In 2009, the district court entered an order revoking Defendant's probation in all of his 2005 cases, and resentenced him to serve five years' imprisonment in each case. Upon review of Defendant's lengthy criminal record and the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's sentence was not illegal and his due process rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny Defendant's motion for correction of sentence.

Defendant Kyle Pederson appealed a district court order that denied his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant became a suspect in multiple armed robberies in the Grand Forks area. Police officers decided to arrest Defendant based on information a confidential informant provided. Law officers conducted surveillance on Defendant's house and followed him when he left his home with the informant. Defendant and the informant went to a motel and reserved a room. Later that night the informant left the motel room and met with law officers. Four officers went to the motel room, carrying firearms and dressed in SWAT t-shirts and body armor. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of robbery and multiple counts of drug possession. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing all evidence seized after he was arrested should be suppressed because he was illegally arrested at the motel without a warrant, and any statements he made during his interrogation should have been suppressed because he invoked the right to an attorney. After a hearing, the district court denied Defendant's motion, ruling officers lawfully entered the motel room because Defendant voluntarily consented to the entry. The court concluded the statements made during the interrogation should not have been suppressed because Defendant did not unambiguously request an attorney. Defendant conditionally plead guilty to the charges against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supports the court's findings, and the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements.

Petitioner Paul Smestad appealed an order that denied his application for post-conviction relief. In December 2003, Petitioner pled guilty in Burleigh County to one count of theft by deception and one count of forgery. He was sentenced to three years in jail with all but eighteen months suspended and was placed on probation for three years following completion of his incarceration. In May 2008, a petition for extension of probation was filed because Petitioner had not fully paid restitution ordered under his initial sentence and an order was issued to extend Petitioner's probation for five years. After a hearing, the district court revoked his probation and sentenced him to three years in jail. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to post-conviction relief in part because documents that bore his signature extending his probation were not actually signed by Petitioner. The State opposed Petitioner's application claiming some issues raised were barred by res judicata. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant's claim that his signature on a document extending his probation was not his signature was barred by res judicata. The Court denied Petitioner's application and dismissed his appeal.

The State appealed a district court order that granted Defendant Kevin Gefroh's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant was stopped for traffic violations. Officers had a drug-sniffing dog walk around the vehicle during the traffic stop, while Defendant was still sitting in his vehicle, and the drug-sniffing dog indicated the presence of controlled substances at the passenger-side door of the vehicle. Defendant was asked to step out of his vehicle, and he complied. After a pat-down search of Defendant, officers discovered four bundles of white powder that tested positive for cocaine. Defendant was arrested after the officers discovered the cocaine. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant made a motion to suppress his statements and all physical evidence obtained by law enforcement during the stop, arguing he was illegally seized and searched. The district court found there was no testimony indicating officers believed the soft object found from the pat down could be a weapon, and concluded officers lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion Defendant's pocket contained a weapon. On appeal, the State argued the district court erred in suppressing the cocaine evidence because the search of Defendant's person was within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the warrantless search of Defendant's person. The Court affirmed the district court's order to suppress evidence.

Defendant Charles Blunt appealed a district court order that denied his motion for a new trial. He argued the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the State violated procedural discovery rules. Defendant was the Executive Director of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") from 2004 to 2007. The State Auditor's Office conducted a performance review of WSI in 2006, and the Auditor's report questioned the use of public funds at WSI. As a result of the Auditor's report, Defendant was charged with two counts of misapplication of entrusted property in violation of state law. State rules of procedure hold that if the State fails to disclose certain discoverable information to a criminal defendant, the trial court has discretion in applying a remedy when a violation of the rule has been shown. Without a showing of an abuse of the court's discretion, the issue is not appealable. Although the Supreme Court concluded the State likely violated the discovery rules, a careful review of the entire record reflected that the information contained in the undisclosed documents was contained in other documents provided to Defendant. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Defendant did not establish he was prejudiced by the violations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant Kenneth Murchison appealed a district court order that summarily denied his application for post-conviction relief. Defendant was convicted of assaulting a correctional institution employee, and judgment was entered on November 3, 2003. Represented by an attorney, Defendant appealed his conviction arguing he was denied a fair trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was denied the right to an impartial and unbiased trial judge. In July 2010, Defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court. Defendant argued his due process rights were violated because the arraignment, preliminary hearing, pretrial hearing and trial were held on the same day. Furthermore, Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and during his appeal. The State moved for summary judgment and dismissal of Defendant's application for post-conviction relief. The district court granted the State's motion, and Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant failed to meet "his heavy burden" of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Murchison claimed he did not receive the appellate briefs or this Court's decision, but he failed to state how he was prejudiced or how the result would have been any different. Further, his attorney's decision to waive oral argument cannot alone be considered ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Defendant failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney's conduct, the district court did not err in denying his application for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner David Allen Day sought a supervisory writ from the Supreme Court to direct the district court to vacate its order denying his motion to dismiss. In April 2010, Petitioner was charged by complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol. A jury trial was held in February 2011. After the jury was empanelled and sworn, the trial court called a brief recess and the attorneys left the courtroom. At some point, Petitioner was alone in the courtroom with the jurors and the bailiff. When the attorneys returned to the courtroom, they witnessed what appeared to be a conversation between the bailiff, the jurors, and Petitioner. The trial court returned to the courtroom and read the opening instructions. After the instructions were read, the State moved for a mistrial based on the communication between the bailiff, the jurors and Petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing a second trial was prohibited under Fifth Amendment double jeopardy principles. The trial court, with a different presiding judge, denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss, finding a mistrial was reasonably necessary. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a supervisory writ, concluding that double jeopardy prohibited the district court from retrying Petitioner. The Court directed the lower court to enter an order dismissing the complaint.