Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Lonnie Howard appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to delivery of methamphetamine. On two occasions, a confidential police informant bought methamphetamine tablets from Kayla Bruning. On both occasions, Defendant drove Bruning to pick up the tablets from a supplier and drove her to the site where the informant bought the tablets. After sentencing, Howard made a motion in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea. Howard argued he had not touched the drugs or money, and he was actually innocent of delivery. Howard argued the factual basis offered by the State did not support his guilty plea to "delivery." The State argued Defendant admitted to driving the vehicle that transported the methamphetamine, knew he was transporting methamphetamine in his vehicle to sell to another individual, and was present while the informant bought the methamphetamine in his vehicle. The district court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, noting that the definition of "delivery" included "constructive delivery" and "attempted delivery." Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant-Appellee Salome Hinojosa appealed a jury verdict finding him guilty of delivering methamphetamine within one thousand feet of a university. The incident was alleged to have occurred in June 2009, in an apartment building near university property where law enforcement officers had sent a female confidential informant to purchase the drugs. In October, Defendant, who was already serving a prison sentence in North Dakota on a previous conviction, filed a request to have his trial held within 90 days. The case was set for a jury trial to be held on December 29, 2009. At the scheduled preliminary hearing on December 10, 2009, Defendant's attorney obtained a continuance of the preliminary hearing. On December 15, 2009, the State moved for a continuance of the trial to February 2010 because one of the State's scheduled witnesses was unavailable. Defendant's trial date was continued on two more occasions with his consent, subject to the condition that Defendant was not waiving his "ability to argue that his right to a speedy trial was violated at some time in the past." The trial was eventually held in April 2010. On appeal, Defendant argued his rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act were violated when the district court in December 2009 granted the State's motion for a continuance which pushed his trial date beyond the 90-day limit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act was not violated by the failure to hold Defendant's trial within 90 days of the filing of his request and that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision and Defendant's conviction.

On April 7, 2010, officers entered Tucker Payne's residence under the authority of Mr. Payne's probation. The officers limited their search to the living room area and to Mr. Payne's bedroom, which he shared with his girlfriend, Defendant-Appellant Karleen Peterson. In the bedroom, the officers found drug paraphernalia and a purse on the bedroom floor. A search of the purse revealed more drug paraphernalia. Defendant told the officers all drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom belonged to her. The State charged Defendant with one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from her purse, arguing the warrantless search of the purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court found that by choosing to reside with a probationer, Defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in the areas of the residence that she shared with the probationer. However the trial court concluded that Defendant's decision to live with a probationer could not "translate into consent for a warrantless search of her purse." Accordingly, the trial court concluded the warrantless search of Defendant's purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights, and it granted her motion to suppress. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record revealed that while searching Payne's bedroom, the officers found the paraphernalia in plain view. Nothing in the record demonstrated the non-suppressed evidence was inadequate for the drug paraphernalia charge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's suppression of evidence taken from Defendant's purse because the State had ample other evidence to prove its case.

The State appealed from a district court order dismissing a charge of gross sexual imposition against Defendant-Appellee Willie Midell. At the preliminary hearing, the complaining witness, S.D.W., testified on behalf of the State. Upon the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court dismissed the charge with prejudice, finding the State failed to establish probable cause that Defendant committed the offense. On appeal, the State contended it presented evidence sufficient to support a finding of probable cause that Defendant committed the offense. The State also argued the district court erred by finding S.D.W.'s testimony implausible and incredible. Upon review of the testimony presented at the hearing, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not resolve conflicts between the witnesses' testimony in favor of the prosecution. The Court found that the evidence produced by the State was sufficient to establish that a crime had been committed and Defendant was probably guilty. The testimony was a "classic question of fact" for a jury and not for the district court in this preliminary hearing. The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Jonathan Kasowski appealed the revocation of his driving privileges by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) and the district court judgment affirming the revocation. Petitionerâs privileges were revoked for four years after he refused to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. The basis of Petitionerâs argument centered on whether he was âunder arrestâ when officers asked that he submit for the test. When he was first pulled over by police, the officer asked whether Petitioner had been drinking, and told him ânot to lie.â Petitioner stated that he âwanted to speak to his attorney about that.â No test was conducted at that time. Petitioner was taken to jail, and âsaid something about not being able to get a hold of an attorney at that time of the night.â The arresting officer repeated the state implied consent advisory, and again Petitioner refused to take the sobriety test. An administrative hearing was held at the DOT, and the hearing officer concluded that Petitioner was not under arrest when he was told ânot to lie.â When at the jail, the hearing officer found that Petitioner decided against speaking with an attorney. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reasoned that even if Petitioner was effectively subjected to a de facto arrest when he was first questioned, the arresting officers reasonably understood that Petitioner decided against speaking to an attorney. Petitioner was not denied the reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. The Court affirmed the revocation of Petitionerâs driving privileges.

Defendant Shane Duncan appealed his sentence stemming from domestic violence charges. He argued that judgment should be reversed and that he should be acquitted because of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendantâs wife refused to testify against him at trial. The State sought to admit an audio recording of the 911 call Mrs. Duncan made. Defendant alleged that his due process rights were violated when the State sought admission of the phone call. Defendant did not argue that the court erred in admitting the recording. Upon review, the Supreme Court did not find that Defendantâs due process rights were violated by the admission of the tape recording. The Court affirmed Defendantâs conviction.

Defendant Billy Joe Kinsella appealed the jury verdict that found him guilty of sexual assault and the order that denied him a new trial. Defendant argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the juryâs verdict and asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendantâs motion for a new trial because the record contained sufficient evidence to establish each of the elements of the offenses. The Court held that the verdict did not go against the weight of the evidence, and affirmed the lower courtâs decisions.

Defendant Ryan Zottnick violated a restraining order that prohibited contact with Katie Abt. The order specified, in bold print, âconsent of [Abt] does not invalidate this order.â Evidence at trial showed he had sent repeated emails, repeated texts, made telephone calls, and visited her residence. Thereafter, a jury found him guilty of violating the order. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred by not allowing a jury instruction on the âexcuseâ that Ms. Abt allowed the contact. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtâs verdict, finding ample evidence in the record from which the jury could find Defendant guilty.