Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, who was incarcerated, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming (1) the Adult Parole Authority improperly revoked his parole, and (2) the evidence obtained by his parole officer's search of his e-mail account constituted a criminal act, and the evidence obtained from the search could not be used to revoke his parole. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant's habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's parole was properly revoked; (2) the evidence obtained by Appellant's parole officer's search was lawfully obtained; and (3) habeas corpus is generally not available to challenge parole conditions that allegedly restrained a petitioner's liberty.

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus action in federal district court, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial. Respondent, warden of the London Correctional Institution, countered that Petitioner's plea of no contest in the underlying criminal case constituted a waiver of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner objected, arguing that under Ohio law, the state may not use his no-contest plea and resulting conviction against him, including using the plea as evidence that he waived his right to effective assistance. Finding there was no controlling precedent on the admissibility of a no-contest plea in a habeas proceeding, the federal district court certified a question for the Supreme Court's resolution. The Supreme Court answered by holding that Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(B)(2) and Ohio R. Evid. 410(A)(2), which prohibit the use of a defendant's no contest plea against the defendant in any subsequent civil proceeding, do not apply to prohibit the use of such a plea in a subsequent civil proceeding which is a collateral attack on the criminal judgment which results from the no contest plea, such as the current habeas corpus action.

Defendant, who was convicted for criminal offenses, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the county common pleas court judge, to issue a new sentencing entry. Defendant asserted that his current sentencing entry was not a final, appealable order because it did not contain a disposition concerning specifications that he was charged with but not convicted of. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied the requested relief, holding that the sentencing entry for Defendant fully complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) and Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02 because it stated that he was convicted by a jury of specified crimes, set forth the sentence, was signed by a judge, and was entered upon the journal by the clerk of court.

Appellant pled no contest to burglary and was sentenced accordingly. Appellant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arrest warrant pursuant to which Appellant had been arrested was invalid because the deputy clerk who issued the warrant impermissibly acted in a dual capacity; but (2) the invalid warrant led to no evidence subject to suppression. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) a person acting in the dual capacities of deputy sheriff for a county and deputy clerk for a municipal court located in the same county is not a neutral and detached magistrate for purposes of determining whether probable cause exists for issuing an arrest warrant; and (2) because the arrest was predicated primarily upon Appellant's pre-arrest confession, the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for an invalidly issued arrest warrant was not properly before the Court.

In July 2010, a grand jury returned a 73-count indictment charging several current and former public officials and three organizations with criminal charges. In December 2010, the county court of common pleas judge granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a bills of particulars and notices of intent to introduce "other acts" evidence. Relators, a newspaper and television station, filed this writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all records in the criminal case and a writ of prohibition to vacate the December 2010 order. The Cafaro defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. In July 2011, the indictment was dismissed. In August 2011 the judge unsealed many of the sealed filings but granted the Cafaro defendants' motion to seal a discussion of facts in the state's memorandum in opposition to the Cafaro defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus to compel the judge to release all remaining records that were sealed and granted the writ of prohibition to compel the judge to vacate his December 2010 and August 2011 decisions and to prohibit him from issuing further orders presumptively sealing any documents or records in the criminal case.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the petition of Appellant for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel Appellees, the court of common pleas judge and the common pleas court, to issue a valid, final judgment in one of his criminal cases and to vacate his sentence in another of his criminal cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's sentencing entries constituted final, appealable orders; (2) the sentences Appellant challenged complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) by specifying that Appellant was convicted upon his no-contest pleas; and (3) insofar as Appellant argued that one of his sentences was erroneous because there was no authorization for consecutive six-month jail sentences, Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his claim of sentencing error.

Appellee, together with four codefendants, was indicted for murder, aggravated robbery, involuntary manslaughter, and theft. The defendants' initial convictions were reversed due to a Batson violation. On retrial, the trial court declared a mistrial. The state proceeded to retry three of the defendants, including Appellant, and a third jury returned verdicts finding them guilty of all charges. The court of appeals again reversed their convictions. In Appellee's case, the court held (1) the trial court should have declared a mistrial after the second trial because a statement of a state's witness from a previous trial, which had not been admitted into evidence, had inadvertently been submitted to the jury; and (2) double jeopardy barred retrial because there had not been a manifest necessity for the mistrial declared at the second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it held the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial, holding (1) the trial judge erred during the second trial by improperly declaring a mistrial; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of Appellee.

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the filing of a pretrial motion to suppress by a co-defendant automatically tolls the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of aggravated robbery and felonious assault, concluding that Defendant was timely tried on those charges, as the time to bring Defendant to trial was tolled when his co-defendant filed a pretrial motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the time in which to bring Defendant to trial was not automatically tolled when his co-defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress. Remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether the setting of the trial date beyond the statutory time was reasonable.

Appellant was indicted on twelve counts of deception to obtain a dangerous drug. Appellant moved for intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC). The trial court ordered an intervention plan, and Appellant pled guilty to the charges, pending successful completion of her intervention program. After Appellant successfully completed the intervention program, the trial court dismissed the twelve pending charges against her. Appellant then filed an application for sealing of her record after dismissal of the proceedings. The trial court denied Appellant's application. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court has discretion to determine that successful completion of the ILC program entitles the defendant to immediate sealing of his or her record under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the waiting period set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.23(A)(1).

After a jury trial, Appellant Maxwell White was convicted of aggravated murder with capital specifications and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. White subsequently obtained federal habeas corpus relief from his death sentence, obliging the trial court to resentence him. Before the federal court invalidated White's death sentence but after White killed the trooper, the Legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06(B), which requires the trial court, when resentencing a capital offender whose death sentence has been set aside, to empanel a new jury and conduct a fresh penalty hearing, at which death may be a penalty to be considered by the jury. The trial court held it could not retroactively apply the statute in resentencing White, and therefore, White was ineligible for a death sentence. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution does not bar the statute's retroactive application in cases where the aggravated murder was committed before its enactment but the death sentence was set aside after its enactment; (2) the statute's application in this case does not violate the ex post facto clause; and (3) retroactive application of the statute does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.