Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Corey Hazel filed a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison. With his petition, Hazel filed an affidavit of indigency and sought waiver of prepayment of the court's filing fees. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was defective because Hazel failed to include in his affidavit of indigency a statement setting forth his balance in his inmate account for the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals did not err in finding the petition defective because (1) the petition was in violation of section 2969.25(C), (2) as Hazel could have raised his claims in a previous habeas corpus case, res judicata barred Hazel from filing a successive habeas corpus petition, and (3) as Hazel's petition did not state a facially valid habeas corpus claim, the appellate court's dismissal without prior notice was proper.

Edward Lang was convicted of the aggravated murder of two persons and aggravated robbery, with each count carrying gun specifications. Lang was sentenced to death for one murder and life with no possibility of parole for the other murder. The trial court also imposed a ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated-robbery conviction and a three-year term for the gun specifications, which it had merged for sentencing. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Lang's convictions and sentences of death and life without parole despite Lang's mental illness and history of abuse, but (2) remanded for the proper imposition of postrelease control pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2929.91 on Lang's sentence for aggravated robbery.

Michael Pruitt filed writs of mandamus and prohibition to compel Appellees, common pleas court judges, to vacate his convictions and sentence. Pruitt argued that the common pleas court erred in entering a sentence that incorrectly stated that Pruitt had entered pleas of guilty to having a weapon while under disability and to a firearm specification relating to an attempted-murder charge. The court of appeals dismissed Pruitt's claims, noting that all of the cases cited by Pruitt were resolved in the ordinary course of law by appeal rather than in an action for an extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed Pruitt's claims as Pruitt had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law to raise his claims.

Christopher Barker pleaded guilty to five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. On appeal, Barker argued that the entry of his no-contest plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing because the trial judge had failed to fully comply with the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C) when the judge told Barker that by entering the plea he was giving up the "right to call witnesses to speak on his behalf." The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court's admonition to Barker was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional mandate to compulsory process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the language employed by the trial court while addressing Barker was a reasonable explanation of Barker's right to compulsory process, and (2) other portions of the record may be referenced in resolving an alleged ambiguity such as the one here during the oral colloquy.

After a jury trial, Thomas Dunlap was convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under the age of thirteen, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of disseminating obscene matter to juveniles. The court sentenced Dunlap to two years in prison and found Dunlap to be a tier three sex offender under Ohio Rev. Code 2950, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (S.B. 10). Dunlap appealed the section 2907.05(A)(4) convictions and his sex-offender classification, arguing that (1) section 2907.05(A)(4) requires a men rea element of recklessness, and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to offenses committed before its effective date violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that section 2907.05(A)(4) requires no precise culpable state of mind. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the element of sexual contact in a section 2907.05(A)(4) violation requires a mens rea of purpose, but the indictment and jury instructions in this case sufficiently set forth the required mens rea; and (2) the application of S.B. 10 to Dunlap violated the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Remanded.

After being found guilty of domestic violence, appellant Mor Mbodji appealed, contending the trial court did not have jurisdiction because the domestic-violence complaint and affidavit filed by appellant's wife were not reviewed by a reviewing official pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09. The court of appeals held the trial court had jurisdiction despite lack of review and later denied a motion for reconsideration. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a complaint that meets the requirements of Ohio R. Crim. P. 3 invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court; (2) when a complaint and affidavit are signed by a private citizen but are not reviewed by a reviewing official before filing pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2935.09, the defect is not jurisdictional but may be the subject of a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion before trial; and (3) because a Ohio R. Crim. P. 12(C) motion was not filed in this case, the procedural defect was waived by appellant.

In June 2008, appellant Thomas Everette was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. The next year Everette submitted a petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state moved to dismiss Everette's petition as untimely because it had been filed more than 180 days after the filing of the transcript of proceedings, which the state deemed to be the videotapes of the trial and hearings. Everette opposed the motion, arguing that his 180-day time limitation did not begin until the written transcripts were filed and thus his appeal was timely. The trial court dismissed Everette's petition, holding it was untimely under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the videotaped recordings constituted the transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme reversed and remanded, holding that for purposes of determining when the 180-day time period for filing a postconviction relief petition shall accrue, only the certified, written transcript constitutes a "transcript" under Ohio R. App. P 9(A) and Ohio Rev. Code 2953.21(A)(2) when both a videotape recording and the written form of the proceedings are available.

Appellee Lynn was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary. The indictment contained a clerical error naming the underlying offense as theft. During the trial the trial court denied the state's request to amend the indictment to remove the word 'theft.' At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of assault and theft. The jury found Lynn guilty of aggravated burglary, concluding Lynn had committed the underlying offense of assault but had not committed the underlying offense of theft. Lynn argued that once the indictment stated the underlying offense as theft, a jury instruction on assault or any other predicate offense was error. The court of appeals held the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assault and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that when an aggravated burglary indictment incorrectly states the underlying criminal offense, the trial court does not violate defendant's due process rights by conforming the jury instructions to the evidence presented at trial and instructing the jury on the correct underlying offense.

Appellee Joseph Wilson was tried before a jury and found guilty on three counts of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping. Wilson appealed, arguing the three offenses for which he was convicted were allied offenses of similar import and should have been merged into one offense for sentencing. The court of appeals held that kidnapping and felonious assault were allied offenses and kidnapping and aggravated robbery were allied offenses. The court vacated Wilson's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the state could elect which of the allied offenses it wanted to pursue for sentencing. The state appealed, arguing the scope of a resentencing judge's authority upon a remand to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error is limited to accepting the state's election among allied offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a cause is remanded to a trial court to correct an allied-offenses sentencing error, the trial court must hold a new sentencing hearing for the offenses that remain after the state selects which allied offense or offenses to pursue. The Court also held res judicata does not preclude a defendant from objecting to issues that arise at the new sentencing hearing.

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not.