Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Warren Lewis, a convicted misdemeanant, unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the pendency of his appeal. At issue was whether Lewis's completion of his sentence was voluntary, thus making his appeal moot. The Supreme Court held that the completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. The Court concluded that the expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction.

In 2007, grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant Jeremy Damron that charged one count of felonious assault, two counts of domestic violence and one count of rape. In 2009, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and to one count of domestic violence. In exchange, the State requested that the trial court enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining two counts. At the plea hearing, Defendant was advised of the applicable statutory maximum penalties for the charges to which he pled guilty. Before the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a sentencing memorandum. Defendant argued that the two charges against him should be merged as âallied offenses.â Defendant conceded that assault and domestic violence were not the same, but that he could not have committed one offense without the other. A merged offense as Defendant sought, would carry less total jail time. The trial court merged Defendantâs offenses, and sentenced him to eight years for assault, and five years for domestic violenceâwith the sentences to run concurrently. The State appealed, and the appellate court found that âEven if [it] were to conclude that the [trial] courtâs decision to impose concurrent sentences had been based on faulty reasoning, the fact remains that the courtâs order that the sentences be served concurrently resulted in a sentence authorized by the statutes governing sentencing.â The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courtsâ rulings, holding that the offenses for which Defendant was charged were not âalliedâ but two separate and distinct offenses for which Defendant received separate convictions and separate sentences. The Court vacated the sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.