Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, an inmate serving sentences from separate convictions, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the jurisdiction of the common pleas court to order him back to prison in the first case after he received an unconditional final release in that case. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata, attaching numerous exhibits. The court of appeals granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals should have granted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because the res judicata defense depended on documents outside the pleadings. Further, the appellate court compounded its error by failing to give Appellant an opportunity to respond to the motion. Remanded. View "Jefferson v. Bunting" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the effect of H.B. 86 on a defendant who was convicted of possession of crack cocaine prior to its effective date but who was not sentenced until after its effective date. In practice, the enactment of H.B. 86 decreased the penalties for possession of crack cocaine. After a sentencing hearing conducted two weeks after H.B. 86’s effective date Defendant in this case was sentenced in accordance with the sentencing law in existence at the time she entered a plea of no contest to possessing crack cocaine. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a decreased sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defendants who were convicted of possession of crack cocaine prior to the effective date H.B. 86 but were not sentenced until after that date must be sentenced under the provisions of H.B. 86. View "State v. Limoli" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder, each of which carried three death specifications. Defendant waived a jury and was tried by a three-judge panel. The panel found Defendant guilty of felony murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s jury waiver and voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (2) the procedure whereby the judges were appointed to the panel was not plain error; (3) Defendant’s confession was voluntary; (4) Defendant’s claim that the State violated his Sixth Amendment rights by seizing “attorney work product” during a search of his jail cell was waived at trial; (5) prosecutorial misconduct did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (6) the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors in this case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the death sentence in this case was appropriate and proportionate. View "State v. Osie" on Justia Law

The Cincinnati Enquirer filed two original actions in the Supreme Court seeking extraordinary writs. In the first case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county court judge to vacate his order sealing records relating to the prosecution of a defendant for a disorderly-conduct misdemeanor charge. In the second case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to produce criminal records for the past five years that had been incorrectly sealed and a writ of prohibition to prevent him from enforcing his orders to seal those records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ in the first case because the judge did not follow the proper statutory procedure in sealing the case; and (2) denied the writs in the second case because the Enquirer failed to establish a clear legal right to the records it requested. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Sonya Jackson, an inmate, was represented by Assistant State Public Defender Dennis Pusateri when she filed a complaint for writ of mandamus alleging that she was entitled to parole. Pusateri allowed the magistrate to dismiss the action and then refiled the complaint. Because Pusateri erroneously believed that the court had dismissed the second complaint, he filed a new mandamus petition raising the same issues. Pusateri then voluntarily dismissed the second complaint in order to proceed with the third action. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Defendants under the “double dismissal” rule. Pusateri filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal, arguing that the voluntary dismissal was the product of “excusable neglect.” The court of appeal denied the motion. Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jackson failed to establish excusable neglect. View "State ex rel. Jackson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of tampering with evidence in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2921.12(A). The appellate court reversed, concluding (1) for a defendant to be guilty of violating section 2921.12(A)(1), the defendant must impair evidence in an investigation that is ongoing or likely to occur by tampering with evidence related to the investigation; and (2) the record did not support a finding that Defendant acted with purpose to impair the value of evidence of any ongoing investigation or of any likely investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for tampering with evidence requires proof that the defendant intended to impair the value or availability of evidence related to an existing or likely official investigation; and (2) in this case, the record did not support conviction for tampering with the evidence. View "State v. Straley" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to two counts on which he was indicted. Appellant later filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court overruled the motion and then sentenced Appellant. The court of appeals affirmed. After Appellant’s second motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied by the trial court and the court of appeals, Appellant filed this action in mandamus requesting an order compelling the trial court to conduct a hearing on his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court of appeals granted the court of common pleas judge’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ because he had and exercised an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way his motions and the appeal of the denial of those motions. View "State ex rel. Nickelson v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Erin McCardle and Leatrice Tolls, protesters involved in the Occupy Cleveland movement in the Public Square area of Cleveland, were arrested and charged with a curfew violation under Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541. The ordinance prevents any person from remaining in the Public Square area between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. without a permit. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Cleveland Municipal Court denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants subsequently pled no contest to the curfew violation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because Cleveland’s interests were insufficient to justify its limit on speech, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was constitutional under the United States Constitution, as it was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allowed alternative channels of speech. View "City of Cleveland v. McCardle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his former mother-in-law, his five-year-old daughter, and his three-year-old son. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each of the three aggravated murders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue did not violate Defendant's rights to due process and to a fair trial by an impartial jury; (2) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in seating two jurors that Defendant claimed were unfairly biased in favor of the death penalty; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of autopsy photos; (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (6) Defendant’s challenges to the death penalty failed; and (7) there was no error in the sentences imposed. View "State v. Mammone" on Justia Law

Appellants were convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under Ohio’s version of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for their involvement in the sale of drugs. The total amount of money involved in the sales attributed to each appellant was $460 and $250 respectively. Appellants appealed, arguing that the State failed to offer evidence demonstrating that either of them was involved in drug sales that totaled $500 or more, although the enterprise they were involved in profited significantly, and therefore, the $500 threshold set forth in Ohio’s RICO statutes had not been satisfied as to either of them individually. The Supreme Court overturned Appellants’ first-degree felony convictions under Ohio’s RICO statutes, holding that in order for a defendant to obtain a conviction for engaging in a patter of corrupt activity, Ohio’s RICO statutes must be construed so that the stated threshold amount applies to each individual and not to the enterprise as a whole. Remanded. View "State v. Stevens" on Justia Law