Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellee was indicted on drug-related charges. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search, finding the search violated the Fourth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The State subsequently filed an application for en banc consideration and moved to have all eight judges of the court of appeals rule on its application. The three-judge panel that heard the State's original appeal denied the motion for participation of all eight judges and found that en banc consideration was unwarranted. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper for only the panel, and not the en banc court, to review and deny the State's application for en banc consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the court of appeals' method of handling the State's application for en banc consideration was permissible under Ohio R. App. P. 26(A)(2). View "State v. Forrest" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sixty-eight counts, including one first-degree-felony count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of Ohio's Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. Defendant was sentenced to a total prison term of sixteen years after the trial court determined that a mandatory ten-year prison term was required under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(D)(3)(a) for the corrupt-activity count. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the guilty verdicts for the corrupt-activity count and three of the predicate violations but reversed most of the remaining guilty verdicts; and (2) vacated the mandatory ten-year prison term imposed for the corrupt-activty count, finding section 2929.14(D)(3)(a) ambiguous as to whether the mandatory ten-year term applied to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a mandatory ten-year prison term is required pursuant to section 2929.14(D)(3)(a) if the court imposing a sentence for a felony finds the offender is guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony in the first degree. View "State v. Willan" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to domestic violence. Defendant was later indicted on three counts of felony abduction and one count of domestic violence stemming from the same incident. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of abduction. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's guilty plea. On remand, the case went to trial, and a jury convicted Defendant of one count of abduction. Once again, the court of appeals reversed, and Defendant was ordered discharged. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint requesting that he be declared a wrongfully imprisoned person, a declaration required by statute before damages may be sought against the State. The trial court found that Defendant's prior guilty plea did not disqualify him from recovery under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 and declared Defendant a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person who has pled guilty to an offense is not eligible to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual for that offense, even if the plea is later vacated on appeal. Remanded. View "Dunbar v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants were five upper-level employees of the Ohio Department of Natural Resource's Division of Wildlife (DOW). The Ohio inspector general (OIG) asked a deputy inspector to investigate alleged misconduct of a DOW wildlife officer. The inspector interviewed Appellants. The OIG's subsequent investigative report concluded that Appellants failed to report the wildlife officer's criminal conduct to the appropriate authorities. A grand jury later indicted each appellant on obstructing justice and complicity in obstructing justice. Appellants filed motions to suppress or, alternatively, dismiss, on the ground that their statements to the investigator were coerced by threat of job loss and were therefore inadmissible under Garrity v. New Jersey. The trial court suppressed Appellants' statements as compelled and therefore inadmissible under Garrity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Appellants' statements during the OIG investigation required suppression because Appellants answered questions after receiving a warning that they could be fired for failing to do so, and statements extracted under these circumstances cannot be considered voluntary within the meaning of Garrity. View "State v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, speeding, and failing to reinstate his driver's license. Rather than participate in discovery pursuant to Ohio R. Crim. P. 16, Defendant submitted a public records request directly to the Highway Patrol. After the Highway Patrol provided Defendant with numerous records, the State successfully moved the trial court to compel Defendant to provide discovery, asserting that the public records request amounted to a demand for discovery and triggered a reciprocal duty of disclosure pursuant to Rule 16. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a public records request is not a demand for discovery, and therefore, Defendant owed no duty of reciprocal disclosure to the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when an accused makes a public records request for information that could have been obtained from the State through discovery, that request is the equivalent of a demand for discovery, and a reciprocal duty of disclosure arises in accordance with Rule 16; and (2) because Defendant received evidence from the Highway Patrol that could have been obtained from the prosecutor through discovery, he had a reciprocal duty to provide discovery to the State. View "State v. Athon" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo seeking to compel Appellee, the county court of common pleas, to issue a sentencing opinion in his criminal case that complied with a statute requiring a court or panel of three judges to state in a separate opinion certain findings when imposing a sentence of life imprisonment in a capital case. The court of appeals denied relief because Appellant's complaint failed to comply with Loc. App. R. 45(B)(1)(a) and because Appellee already issued the sentencing order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's document did not satisfy Rule 45(B)(1)(a), and the court of appeals was justified in denying relief on that ground alone; and (2) the court of appeals correctly reasoned that relief was unwarranted because mandamus and procedendo will not compel performance of a duty that has already been performed. View "State ex rel. Hopson v. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. In his first postconviction application, Defendant sought DNA testing of a cigarette butt. The trial court rejected the application because it found an earlier DNA test to be definitive. Defendant subsequently filed a second application for DNA testing of the cigarette butt based on newly discovered evidence he asserted identified other suspects in the murders. The trial court again rejected the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.73(E)(1) is constitutional in conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the Court from a trial court's denial of postconviction DNA testing in a case in which the death penalty was imposed; and (2) before dismissing a subsequent application for postconviction DNA testing under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.72(A), a trial court must apply the definition of "definitive DNA test" set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.71(U) and the criteria of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.74. Remanded to consider whether prior definitive DNA testing, as defined in section 2953.71(U), precluded Defendant's second application. View "State v. Noling" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of several felonies and sentenced to an aggregate total of ten years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to terminate postrelease control. When no decision was made on that motion for several months, Defendant filed a complaint in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and procedendo in an attempt to get the trial judge to rule on his motion to terminate postrelease control. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant's complaint for the writs on the basis that he had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his postrelease claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a writ of procedendo was appropriate in this case because the trial judge failed to rule on an uncomplicated motion for over a year. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Court of Common Pleas (Collier)" on Justia Law

At the end of his jury trial for attempted murder, Defendant requested an instruction on the lesser included offenses of assault and aggravated assault but opposed the state's request for an instruction on felonious assault. The trial court provided instructions on all lesser included offenses as requested by both parties. Defendant was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of felonious assault. The court of appeals reversed, holding that felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court correctly provided the jury with an instruction for felonious assault as a lesser included offense at the close of Defendant's trial, as a charge of attempted murder reasonably puts a defendant on notice that he may be convicted of felonious assault by causing physical harm. View "State v. Deanda" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, violating a protection order, and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to establish that at the time of the altercation he knew there was a protection order in place because the order was not delivered before the offense occurred. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant knew of the order, knew of the risk that his conduct would violate the order, and acted recklessly by disregarding that risk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to sustain a conviction for violating a protection order under Ohio Rev. Code 2919.27(A)(2), the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it served the defendant with the order before the alleged violation. Remanded. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law