Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to rape of a child under thirteen, gross sexual imposition on a child under thirteen, and two counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor. Appellant was sentenced to thirty-one years without the possibility of parole. After Appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2006, Appellant filed a second habeas petition in 2012. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law an that the petition was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding Appellant's petition barred by res judicata; but (2) the court of appeals acted properly when it concluded that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law, refused to reach the merits, and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim for habeas relief. View "Billiter v. Banks" on Justia Law

Appellants filed an original action in mandamus in the court of appeals, arguing that they should be eligible for parole hearings at intervals set by the version of Ohio Adm. Code 5120:1-1-10(B), effective as of January 2, 1979, rather than the current version, which did not become effective until after they were incarcerated. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants had no right to parole or to be considered for parole on a particular date because application of the new parole guidelines to Appellants did not constitute a violation of any protected constitutional or statutory interest, and therefore, they had no clear legal right to relief. View "State ex rel. Richard v. Mohr" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case pled not guilty to drug related charges. On the first day of the nonjury felony trial, during the testimony of the first witness, the trial court became aware that the State had failed to disclose to Defendants some evidence related to the case. The discovery violation was unintentional. On motion by the defense, the trial court declared a mistrial and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure of the trial court to explore whether a less severe sanction was appropriate was an abuse of discretion. Remanded. View "State v. Darmond" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming sentencing error in that he was given two separate sentences for what he argued were allied offenses and that he was denied a right to appeal because his initial appeal was dismissed for a procedural failure and two attempted delayed appeals were denied. The court of appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's failure to attach a complete copy of his commitment papers to the petition was fatally defective; and (2) the claims for which Appellant sought relief had no merit because they were not appropriate for review in habeas corpus. View "Jackson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder and multiple counts of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. Defendant was allegedly one of four men involved in the crimes. As part of the proof to establish Defendant's involvement, the State introduced cell-phone records in an effort to show Defendant's communication with the other co-conspirators and his whereabouts during the morning in question. The appellate court affirmed, holding that even if the admission of the cell-phone records was in violation of Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him, any error was harmless. Defendant appealed, arguing that the cell-phone records were inadmissible as business records without proper authentication. In this motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the admission of the cell-phone records was unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause because the records were not authenticated as business records; but (2) the admission of the records was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Hood" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, gross sexual imposition, kidnapping, and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Curry, other acts evidence offered to show a scheme, plan, or system is inadmissible unless it shows the background of the alleged crime or proves the identity of the accused; and (2) under Curry, the admission of evidence of a prior sexual relationship Defendant had with a different minor was precluded because the sexual acts of that relationship had been "chronologically and factually separate occurrences" and the identity of the accused was not an issue at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Ohio R. Evid. 404(B), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused may be admissible to prove intent or plan, even if the identity of an accused or the immediate background of a crime is not at issue; and (2) consequently, evidence that Defendant had engaged in sexual relations with a teenage boy could be admissible to prove Defendant had a plan to groom boys for sexual activity with the intent of sexual gratification. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of forcible rape of a child, gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to life in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions but reversed the trial court's judgment not to merge the kidnapping and rape offenses, holding that the convictions for rape and kidnapping were allied offenses of similar import that should have merged at sentencing. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court erred in applying a de novo review of the trial court's determination that Defendant's offense should merge, or whether the court should have applied an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an appellate court should apply a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial court's Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 merger determination. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who violated former Ohio Rev. Code 2950.99 by failing to give proper notice of an address change. At issue in this case was whether current section 2950.99 or former section 2950.99 governed the penalty for Appellant. The appellate court (1) reversed the sentence imposed by the trial court, and (2) applied the penalty provision in place when Defendant was classified rather than the penalty provision in place immediately before Megan's Law was replaced by the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), holding that current section 2950.99 does not apply to sex offenders originally classified under Megan's Law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a defendant whose sex-offender classification was determined under Megan's Law, the penalty for a violation of the reporting requirements of former section 2950.05 that occurs after Megan's Law was supplanted by the AWA is the penalty set forth in the version of section 2950.99 in place just before the effective date of the AWA. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Appellant’s failure to provide notice of a change of residence address. Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who was indicted for violating the address-notification requirements of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA) before State v. Bodyke was decided. Bodyke made the requirements of the AWA inapplicable to offenders such as Appellant. In addition, Appellant was charged with tampering with records because he filed an address-verification form with false information. The form was filed with a sheriff under the mistaken belief that it was required. Appellant pleaded guilty to the charges. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the charges against Appellant were based upon violations of the AWA, which, pursuant to Bodyke, did not apply to Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bodyke does not require the vacation of convictions where the conduct at issue was a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2950.05 both as it exists under the AWA and as it existed under Megan's law; and (2) regardless of whether a person has a duty to file an address-verification form, filing a form containing false information with the intent to defraud can be a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2913.42. View "State v. Brunning" on Justia Law

Appellee committed an act on September 1, 2007 that, if committed by an adult, would constitute rape. On May 19, 2010, the juvenile court classified Appellee as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10. Appellee appealed, asserting that he should not be classified as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10 because he committed his offense before the effective date of the applicable part of that statute. The First District Court of Appeals agreed and reversed. Noting, however, that its analysis was in conflict with the analysis of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the First District certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered by stating that S.B. 10's classification, registration, and community-notification provisions may not be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his sex offense between the July 1, 2007 repeal of Megan's Law and the January 1, 2008 effective date of S.B. 10's aforementioned provisions. View "In re Bruce S." on Justia Law