Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma considered whether an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges constituted a "pending charge" for the purposes of expungement. The appellant, Andrew Dale Brassfield, sought to expunge his arrest records under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation objected, arguing that Brassfield was not qualified for expungement because he had pending charges against him due to an ongoing investigation by the federal government and the Cherokee Tribe. The district court and Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed these decisions. The court held that an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges is not a pending charge under the relevant Oklahoma statute, and therefore, the appellant qualified to seek expungement. The court reasoned that a criminal investigation into whether an individual's conduct is chargeable as a crime is not the same as the individual having a pending felony or misdemeanor charge. The court also found that the requirement that the prosecuting agency will not refile the charge is satisfied, as the State of Oklahoma lacks jurisdiction to do so in this case. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "BRASSFIELD v. STATE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant, S. K. W. (W.) was convicted of five crimes relating to the manufacturing, trafficking, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance in Blaine and Canadian Counties, Oklahoma in 2001 and 2002. According to W., her arrest stemmed from her two-year addiction (2000-2002) to methamphetamine, which she struggled with after the unexpected death of her mother. Also according to W., while in the Department of Corrections custody, she dried out, got help dealing with her underlying emotional issues, and has been sober for nineteen years. On January 5, 2021, the Oklahoma Governor pardoned W. of all five convictions. Subsequently, she sought expungement of her criminal records pursuant to 22 O.S. Supp. 2019 section 18. The Blaine County District Court granted W.'s expungement request, but the Canadian County District Court denied it. The trial court based its denial on two Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals cases which interpreted the statute to allow one single conviction to be expunged, not multiple convictions. W. appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because the expungement was based on the Governor's pardon of all five convictions, the plain, unambiguous text of 22 O.S. Supp. 2019 section 18 allowed expungement of all of them. View "S.K.W. v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

On July 9, 2020, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), determining that Congress never disestablished the Creek Reservation in eastern Oklahoma and, therefore, it was "Indian country" for purposes of the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153. Under the Major Crimes Act, "[o]nly the federal government, not the State, may prosecute Indians for major crimes committed in Indian country." Relying on McGirt, Plaintiffs-appellants Jason Nicholson, Justin Hooper, Cael Burgess, and Derek Hair filed the underlying civil suit seeking to recover fines and fees they were ordered to pay as a result of allegedly unlawful prosecutions by the State and certain municipalities. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for money had and received. Plaintiffs' claims required a determination that their state and municipal court criminal convictions and sentences were invalid. “Challenges to criminal jurisdiction are governed by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. … Plaintiffs' convictions and sentences cannot be invalidated by the trial court in this civil action for money had and received. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” View "Nicholson v. Stitt" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari review for a second time in this case. Appellant Richard Dopp, appealed the trial court's dismissal of the refiling of his petition pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011, section 100, and his motion to reconsider the order of dismissal. The Appellant was an inmate, and his name appeared on the Oklahoma Registry of Frivolous or Malicious Appeals three or more times. The trial court dismissed without prejudice his first case because he had not prepaid the required filing fees pursuant to 57 O.S. 2011, section 566.2. Appellant then filed a motion to reconsider within ten days of that order, which the trial court denied. He appealed those orders to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required appellate cost deposit after the Court ordered him to pay it. Appellant refiled his petition. The trial court dismissed the petition as being untimely, finding that he did not file it within one year of the date of the order dismissing his first case. The trial court determined that his motion to reconsider was void ab initio pursuant to section 566.2. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding that only a validly filed appeal would extend the time to refile a petition pursuant to section 100 and the Appellant's first appeal was not valid. The Supreme Court vacated the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings, holding the Appellant's first appeal was valid and the one-year period to refile began to run the day after the first appeal was final. View "Dopp v. Kirkendall" on Justia Law

In April 2014, Tulsa police officers seized cash from the claimant-appellant Austin Hingey, pursuant to three search warrants relating to alleged drug sales. As a result of the seizures, the State filed three forfeiture cases. The last case, pertinent here, concerned $325,080.00 found in a storage unit. Hingey objected to the forfeitures and sought return of the money. The trial court consolidated the cases. The State dismissed the case concerning $5,530.00 during trial. A jury returned a verdict determining that the $2,121.00, and $25,080.00 of the $325,080.00, should have also been returned to Hingey. Subsequently, Hingey sought recovery of his attorney fees pursuant to 63 O.S. Supp. 2016 section 2-506, which became effective November 1, 2016. The trial court limited the award of attorney fees to those incurred only after November 1, 2016, and then awarded Hingey approximately 10% of his requested attorney fees because he recovered approximately 10% of what he originally sought to recover. Hingey appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, determining that the trial court should have applied the attorney fee statute retroactively. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that: (1) 63 O.S. Supp. 2016 sec. 2-506 applied retroactively; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees based on the percentage of the amount of money recovered compared to the amount sought to be recovered; and (3) the claimant was also entitled to appeal related attorney fees. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Harris v. $325,080" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff-appellant James Payne pled nolo contendere to stalking in Case No. CF-2010-27 in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma. He received a five-year deferment with special rules and conditions of probation. He was required to have no contact with the stalking victim. In addition, Payne pled guilty to violating a protective order in many other cases filed in Pittsburg County related to the same victim and was sentenced to six months in the county jail. The sentences were to run concurrently. He received extra credits and was released from custody on May 5, 2010. A month later, on June 10, 2010, the district attorney filed a motion to accelerate the deferred judgment for probation violations, alleging Payne had been contacting and harassing the victim. The district court issued a felony warrant and Payne was arrested and booked into jail by the Pittsburg County Sheriff's Office on June 11, 2010. Payne did not post bail and remained in the county jail. The district court ultimately executed a minute order finding Payne guilty of violating the terms of his deferred sentence, for which he received a five year sentence: four suspended and one year to serve in the Department of Corrections. Payne received credit for time served in the county jail since his June 10 arrest. The Judgment and Sentence ordered Payne into DOC custody and directed the Pittsburg Sheriff's office to transfer Payne to the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center to begin serving his time in DOC custody. The Sheriff's Office of Pittsburg County did not transfer Payne to the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC) until September 6, 2011, almost three months past the end of his sentence. Payne was released that same day without serving any of his time in DOC custody. Payne sue various Pittsburg county corrections and governmental officials, arguing his constitutional rights had been violated because he remained in custody beyond his sentence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari on the remaining issue preserved for review, i.e., whether a private right of action under Article 2 Section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution existed under the facts of this case. The Court held a private right of action existed at the time Payne was detained past his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Payne v. Kerns" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Jake Watkins was driving under the influence of alcohol and rear-ended a vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff-appellant Lee McIntosh. McIntosh's vehicle was damaged and he and the former co-plaintiff Anthony McIntosh were injured. Both vehicles pulled over to the shoulder of the road and the parties exited their vehicles to discuss the accident and to inspect the damage. At some point plaintiff stated he needed to call the police to report the accident. When Watkins heard this he returned to his vehicle and fled the scene without providing McIntosh any information required by law. Watkins was later arrested and charged with two counts: (1) driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; and (2) leaving the scene of an accident involving damage. He pled no contest to the two counts and received a deferred judgment and sentence.Months late, McIntosh signed a settlement agreement which settled all of his bodily injury claims for the sum of $25,000.00. McIntosh was also paid $17,545.66 to fully repair his vehicle and an additional $7,000.00 for the diminution of value claim. The only remaining issue left to be decided by the trial court was whether McIntosh was entitled to receive treble damages for the damage sustained to his vehicle. Watkins moved for summary judgment on the treble damages issue, which the trial court granted, finding McIntosh was not entitled to treble damages due to the fact he had incurred not only property damage to his vehicle but he also sustained a nonfatal injury. McIntosh appealed the trial court's ruling on that issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, finding the treble damage provision in 47 O.S. 2011, section 10-103 applied even if a victim sustains an injury. View "McIntosh v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Purcell, Oklahoma Police Department arrested the petitioner-appellee, D. A. for Larceny of CDS (a controlled dangerous substance), unlawful possession of CDS and obtaining CDS by forgery/fraud. The State charged her with three felonies. Upon the State's request, the trial court dismissed the larceny and obtaining CDS by forgery/fraud; subsequently, the court entered a five year deferred sentence for the remaining count of possession of CDS. Then in October 2010, the McClain County Sheriff arrested D.A. for two counts of obtaining (or attempted) CDS by forgery/fraud. A plea deal provided that, upon successful completion of drug court, the latest two counts would be dismissed. However, if she did not successfully complete drug court, then she would receive fifteen years with the Department of Corrections. In 2013, D.A. was accepted into a drug court in McClain County. She successfully completed drug court, and the trial.court dismissed D.A.' two nonviolent felony counts in 2015. In 2017, D.A. filed a petition for expungement of both of her arrests, charges, and court dispositions pursuant to 22 O.S. Supp 2016 section 18(7). The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) entered an appearance and objected, arguing that a drug court's dismissal of charges upon the successful completion of the program was statutorily exempt from eligibility for expungement. The trial court denied the OSBI's objection and granted the petition for expungement. The OSBI appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held a drug court's dismissal following successful conclusion of the drug court program was not excluded from expungement under 22 O.S. Supp. 2016 section 18, and may be expunged immediately, after successful completion of the program and the charges have been dismissed. View "D. A. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Russell Foutch and Randall Barrios died while incarcerated in Oklahoma jails: Barrios by his own hand; Foutch from complications related to pneumonia. Their estates sued the respective jails, one sheriff, and various employees and healthcare contractors of those jails. Their claims included: (1) federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution; (2) negligence and wrongful death claims; (3) negligent conduct, training, hiring, and supervision claims; and (4) tort claims alleging violations of rights guaranteed by Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution. Two federal courts certified questions of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: (1) the Governmental Tort Claims Act renders the State immune from any tort suit arising out of the "[p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility." Do Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution nonetheless allow an inmate to bring a tort claim for denial of medical care? and (2) if so, is the private cause of action to be recognized retrospectively? Responding required the Court to determine whether to extend the holding in Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority (305 P.3d 994) to include tort claims brought by inmates alleging violations of their rights to due process and to be free from cruel or unusual punishments. The Oklahoma Legislature responded to Bosh by amending the Governmental Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"), 51 O.S. 151 et seq., to clarify that the State's immunity from suit extended even to so-called "constitutional" torts. The Court, therefore, answered the first certified question "no," and did not reach the second question. View "Barrios v. Haskell County Public Facilities Authority" on Justia Law

Appellant, John Burks was a bondsman who posted one hundred thousand dollar ($100,000) bail for defendant Billy Durfey in a criminal case. Durfey did not appear in court and the court forfeited the bond. On December 15, 2014, the same day that Durfey failed to appear, the bondsman made a written request to the Sheriff's office that Durfey be entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The bondsman did not place any restrictions or limitations on his request and he signed a letter agreeing to pay for all extradition expenses incurred in returning Durfey to Garvin County, Oklahoma. Days later, Burks learned that the Sheriff's office had entered Durfey into the database, but that the extradition directive had been geographically limited to Oklahoma and its surrounding states. At his own expense, Burks conducted an investigation for Durfey which led him to Montana. Local law enforcement, however, was unable to assist Burks because Durfey was not listed in the NCIC database due to the restrictions placed by the Garvin County Sherriff. Burks again contacted the Sheriff's office and asked that any territorial restrictions be removed. It was not until the Bondsman obtained information that Durfey may have traveled to Mexico that an Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper assigned to the U.S. Marshal's office got involved. The Sheriff ultimately lifted the geographical restrictions pursuant to the Highway Patrol's request. The bondsman paid the bond forfeiture after he was unable to apprehend Durfey and return him to Garvin County. The only question presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in this case was whether, under the facts of this case, the bondsman was entitled to remittance of the posted bond pursuant to 59 O.S. Supp. 2014 section 1332. The Supreme Court found Burks fully complied with 59 O.S. Supp. 2014 section 1332, yet the Sheriff did not honor his request within the statutory period. Consequently, the bond was exonerated by operation of law. Burks presented convincing evidence of good cause why Durfey did not appear. The bondsman was entitled to remittance of the posted bond pursuant to statute. View "Oklahoma v. Durfey" on Justia Law