Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant after learning that the vehicle’s registered owner had a suspended license, but before identifying the driver. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because the driver was not identified before the stop. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it was reasonable for the officer to infer that the registered owner was driving. The defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license.On appeal, the defendant acknowledged that the stop would be lawful under the Court of Appeals case law, State v. Panko, but argued that Panko was wrongly decided and should be overruled. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that Panko was not "plainly wrong" and was binding. The defendant then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop when the officer believes, based on specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a specific crime, and that belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded that the officer’s suspicion that the defendant was driving with a suspended license was objectively reasonable because the officer saw a vehicle matching the description and license plate of the defendant’s vehicle, knew the defendant’s license was suspended, and confirmed the defendant was the sole registered owner. The court held that these facts made the officer’s inference objectively reasonable, and the possibility that someone else was driving did not undercut this reasonableness. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Betancourt" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Abraham Torres-Lopez, sought to compel the Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC) to grant him credit towards his Marion County prison sentence for the 125 days he spent in Clackamas and Marion County jails before being sent to prison. The circuit court granted the relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court had misinterpreted ORS 137.370(4).The circuit court had granted Torres-Lopez credit for the time served in jail before his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the circuit court had erred in its interpretation of the statute, leading to the current appeal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve two statutory interpretation questions regarding ORS 137.370(4). The first question was whether a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit for time served for unrelated conduct, even when the person has not yet been convicted or sentenced for that conduct. The second question was whether a person held in custody in a local jail awaiting resolution of a pending probation violation matter while serving an unrelated prison sentence is in "jail" presentencing for purposes of ORS 137.370(4).The Oregon Supreme Court held that a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit in both circumstances. The court concluded that confinement for certain conduct, even in the absence of a sentence, is covered by ORS 137.370(4). Additionally, the legislature expressly authorized trial courts to order presentence credit for time spent in jail awaiting resolution of a probation violation matter, even if the person was also serving a prison sentence for an unrelated crime. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal trial where the defendant was charged with second-degree sexual abuse and third-degree rape. Before his arrest, law enforcement conducted a phone interview with the defendant, during which he made no admissions. The state did not present evidence of this phone call during its case-in-chief, and the prosecutor assumed that this precluded defense counsel from mentioning the call during cross-examination. During closing arguments, defense counsel referred to the lack of evidence about any interview or admissions by the defendant, leading to multiple objections from the state, which the trial court sustained.The trial court allowed defense counsel to argue that there was no evidence of admissions by the defendant but prohibited statements suggesting that no interview had occurred. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objections and that the court's sua sponte instruction to the jury not to speculate about whether an interview had occurred was improper.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining the objections and that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the jury instruction. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court did not err in sustaining the state's objection to the first statement by defense counsel but did err in sustaining the objection to the fourth statement. However, the court found that the error was harmless. The court also agreed that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the jury instruction and declined to reach the merits of that issue. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with first-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon following a stabbing incident. The central issue at trial was whether the defendant acted in self-defense. The prosecution argued that the defendant was the initial aggressor, which would negate the self-defense claim. The trial court instructed the jury using Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction (UCrJI) 1110, which did not define the term "initial aggressor." During closing arguments, the prosecutor incorrectly suggested that being an initial aggressor could be determined by words alone, not just physical actions. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements or request a supplemental instruction to define "initial aggressor."The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not defining "initial aggressor" for the jury. The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court's failure to provide a definition amounted to plain error under the first prong of the Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc. decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the trial court should have sua sponte provided a definition for "initial aggressor."The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give an unrequested custom supplemental instruction. The court explained that UCrJI 1110 was a correct statement of the law and that the trial court's duty to instruct the jury does not extend to providing definitions for terms unless the given instruction is legally incorrect. The Supreme Court emphasized that plain error review requires the error to be apparent on the record, and without a requested supplemental instruction, it is impossible to determine if the trial court's failure to provide one was legally incorrect. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. View "State v. Worsham" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with four Measure 11 offenses, including first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and three counts of first-degree sexual abuse against a child under twelve. The parties reached a plea agreement where the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, with the remaining charges to be dismissed. The plea agreement included a stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences on the two charges.At sentencing, the defendant argued that Oregon law required the trial court to make specific findings under ORS 137.123(5) before imposing consecutive sentences, as the offenses arose from a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct. The state contended that the stipulation in the plea agreement allowed the court to impose consecutive sentences without making those findings. After a discussion, the defendant withdrew his legal argument and affirmed that the court could impose consecutive sentences without the statutory findings. The trial court then imposed consecutive sentences totaling 180 months.The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plea agreement did not prevent the defendant from arguing that consecutive sentences were legally impermissible without the required findings, and that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no plea agreement. The state petitioned for review.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the plea agreement's stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences was ambiguous. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in addressing the ambiguity by seeking clarification and proceeding to sentence the defendant after he withdrew his legal argument. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court acted appropriately under the circumstances. View "State v. Walsh" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with second-degree disorderly conduct, second-degree criminal trespass, harassment, and resisting arrest after an incident at a Fred Meyer store. The defendant was reportedly loud and yelling in the parking lot, refused to leave when asked by store employees, and subsequently engaged in aggressive behavior, including hitting an employee with a piece of cardboard and attempting to touch her with a lit cigarette. When police arrived, the defendant resisted arrest.At trial, the state presented testimony from witnesses and video evidence. The defendant testified, admitting to some actions but claiming intoxication and challenging certain aspects of the charges. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had plainly erred by not intervening sua sponte to address improper comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding the comments plainly improper and prejudicial, warranting reversal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court examined whether the prosecutor's comments were plainly improper and so prejudicial that they denied the defendant a fair trial. The court concluded that the comments, while inartful, were not obviously improper. The prosecutor's statements about the purpose of the trial and the lack of a factual controversy were found to be within the bounds of permissible argument, given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the defendant had not demonstrated plain error. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

The defendant is being prosecuted for the murder of DB. The state challenged a trial court order that suppressed statements the defendant made about DB while in custody for an unrelated crime. At the time of his arrest for the unrelated crime, the defendant was already a suspect in DB's death and was represented by counsel in connection with the DB investigation. The counsel had instructed officers to contact her before questioning the defendant about DB. However, when officers arrested the defendant for the unrelated crime, they advised him of his right to remain silent and to speak with an attorney but did not notify his attorney before conducting an interrogation that led to incriminating statements about DB.The Deschutes County Circuit Court granted the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the statements, ruling that officers violated the defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution by conducting the interrogation without notifying the defendant's counsel. The state pursued an immediate and direct appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, was not triggered by the defendant's arrest and custodial interrogation regarding crimes for which he had not been charged. The court emphasized that protections under Article I, section 11, ordinarily do not arise until a person has been charged with a crime. The court also declined to consider the defendant's alternative argument that Article I, section 12, provided a basis for affirming the trial court's decision. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Kilby" on Justia Law

An informant informed law enforcement that a person named "Tom Collins" was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to use the informant in a controlled buy at the residence. Instead of waiting for the results of the controlled buy to apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for and obtained a search warrant that anticipated the controlled buy. The state argued that the warrant was an "anticipatory warrant" as approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs. The defendant argued that such warrants are incompatible with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.The Linn County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, ruling that anticipatory warrants were valid under both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that anticipatory warrants were permissible under Article I, section 9, and that the affidavit established probable cause.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to address the constitutional question. Instead, the court focused on Oregon's statutory warrant requirements, specifically ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6). The court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to comply with ORS 133.545(6), which requires that the facts and circumstances show that the objects of the search are in the places to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. As a result, the warrant did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves allegations of child sexual abuse against the defendant, who was accused by his daughter, M, of sexually abusing her when she was between 5 and 10 years old. M disclosed the abuse to her mother when she was 15, leading to an investigation and charges against the defendant. The defendant sought to exclude expert testimony on delayed reporting of abuse and out-of-court statements made by M when she was a child.The Clackamas County Circuit Court denied the defendant's pretrial motions to exclude the expert testimony and the out-of-court statements. The jury convicted the defendant on all charges. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, relying on its own precedents regarding the admissibility of such evidence.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that expert testimony on delayed reporting of abuse is admissible to help the jury assess the victim's credibility, even if the defendant does not argue that the delay undermines the victim's credibility. The court also held that out-of-court statements made by a child victim of sexual abuse are admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b) if the victim testifies at trial, regardless of the victim's age at the time of trial. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony and the out-of-court statements. View "State v. Akins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with reckless driving and recklessly endangering another person. Unable to secure counsel, the defendant represented himself at trial, where his arguments were not responsive to the charges, leading to his conviction by a jury. On appeal, the defendant continued to represent himself, filing a pro se brief with arguments similar to those made at trial. The state interpreted the brief as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a nonprecedential opinion.After the defendant was appointed appellate counsel in a separate case, the Court of Appeals also appointed counsel for this case. However, the case had already been submitted for decision. The appellate counsel filed an emergency motion to withdraw the case from submission to file a brief, arguing that the defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel and that the trial court erred in not ordering a competency evaluation. The Court of Appeals denied the motion but invited a petition for reconsideration, which was also denied.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and allowed the petition for review. The court granted the joint motion for remand, vacating the Court of Appeals' decision and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the parties that the record did not show the defendant had validly waived his right to counsel, as there was no colloquy or indication of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, ensuring the defendant's right to a new trial with proper legal representation. View "State v. Cotter" on Justia Law