Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant who was charged with second-degree disorderly conduct, second-degree criminal trespass, harassment, and resisting arrest after an incident at a Fred Meyer store. The defendant was reportedly loud and yelling in the parking lot, refused to leave when asked by store employees, and subsequently engaged in aggressive behavior, including hitting an employee with a piece of cardboard and attempting to touch her with a lit cigarette. When police arrived, the defendant resisted arrest.At trial, the state presented testimony from witnesses and video evidence. The defendant testified, admitting to some actions but claiming intoxication and challenging certain aspects of the charges. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had plainly erred by not intervening sua sponte to address improper comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding the comments plainly improper and prejudicial, warranting reversal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court examined whether the prosecutor's comments were plainly improper and so prejudicial that they denied the defendant a fair trial. The court concluded that the comments, while inartful, were not obviously improper. The prosecutor's statements about the purpose of the trial and the lack of a factual controversy were found to be within the bounds of permissible argument, given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the defendant had not demonstrated plain error. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

The defendant is being prosecuted for the murder of DB. The state challenged a trial court order that suppressed statements the defendant made about DB while in custody for an unrelated crime. At the time of his arrest for the unrelated crime, the defendant was already a suspect in DB's death and was represented by counsel in connection with the DB investigation. The counsel had instructed officers to contact her before questioning the defendant about DB. However, when officers arrested the defendant for the unrelated crime, they advised him of his right to remain silent and to speak with an attorney but did not notify his attorney before conducting an interrogation that led to incriminating statements about DB.The Deschutes County Circuit Court granted the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the statements, ruling that officers violated the defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution by conducting the interrogation without notifying the defendant's counsel. The state pursued an immediate and direct appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, was not triggered by the defendant's arrest and custodial interrogation regarding crimes for which he had not been charged. The court emphasized that protections under Article I, section 11, ordinarily do not arise until a person has been charged with a crime. The court also declined to consider the defendant's alternative argument that Article I, section 12, provided a basis for affirming the trial court's decision. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Kilby" on Justia Law

An informant informed law enforcement that a person named "Tom Collins" was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to use the informant in a controlled buy at the residence. Instead of waiting for the results of the controlled buy to apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for and obtained a search warrant that anticipated the controlled buy. The state argued that the warrant was an "anticipatory warrant" as approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs. The defendant argued that such warrants are incompatible with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.The Linn County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, ruling that anticipatory warrants were valid under both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that anticipatory warrants were permissible under Article I, section 9, and that the affidavit established probable cause.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to address the constitutional question. Instead, the court focused on Oregon's statutory warrant requirements, specifically ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6). The court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to comply with ORS 133.545(6), which requires that the facts and circumstances show that the objects of the search are in the places to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. As a result, the warrant did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves allegations of child sexual abuse against the defendant, who was accused by his daughter, M, of sexually abusing her when she was between 5 and 10 years old. M disclosed the abuse to her mother when she was 15, leading to an investigation and charges against the defendant. The defendant sought to exclude expert testimony on delayed reporting of abuse and out-of-court statements made by M when she was a child.The Clackamas County Circuit Court denied the defendant's pretrial motions to exclude the expert testimony and the out-of-court statements. The jury convicted the defendant on all charges. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, relying on its own precedents regarding the admissibility of such evidence.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that expert testimony on delayed reporting of abuse is admissible to help the jury assess the victim's credibility, even if the defendant does not argue that the delay undermines the victim's credibility. The court also held that out-of-court statements made by a child victim of sexual abuse are admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b) if the victim testifies at trial, regardless of the victim's age at the time of trial. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony and the out-of-court statements. View "State v. Akins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with reckless driving and recklessly endangering another person. Unable to secure counsel, the defendant represented himself at trial, where his arguments were not responsive to the charges, leading to his conviction by a jury. On appeal, the defendant continued to represent himself, filing a pro se brief with arguments similar to those made at trial. The state interpreted the brief as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a nonprecedential opinion.After the defendant was appointed appellate counsel in a separate case, the Court of Appeals also appointed counsel for this case. However, the case had already been submitted for decision. The appellate counsel filed an emergency motion to withdraw the case from submission to file a brief, arguing that the defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel and that the trial court erred in not ordering a competency evaluation. The Court of Appeals denied the motion but invited a petition for reconsideration, which was also denied.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and allowed the petition for review. The court granted the joint motion for remand, vacating the Court of Appeals' decision and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the parties that the record did not show the defendant had validly waived his right to counsel, as there was no colloquy or indication of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, ensuring the defendant's right to a new trial with proper legal representation. View "State v. Cotter" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who intentionally set a fire in her apartment building, resulting in property damage and serious injuries to another resident. The defendant was convicted of first-degree arson after the trial court found that she had intentionally caused the fire and recklessly placed others in danger of physical injury. During sentencing, the trial court considered various mitigating circumstances related to the defendant's mental health and personal history and concluded that the mandatory 90-month prison sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Instead, the court imposed a 60-month term of probation.The state appealed the trial court's decision, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in relying on the defendant's personal characteristics and circumstances in its proportionality analysis. The appellate court concluded that the 90-month mandatory minimum sentence required by ORS 137.700(2)(b)(A) was not constitutionally disproportionate as applied to the defendant.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence violated the proportionality clause of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the 90-month mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree arson was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court reasoned that the defendant's conduct was egregious and caused significant harm, and that there was no societal consensus or objective evidence indicating that individuals with mental health issues similar to the defendant's are less morally culpable for their crimes. Therefore, the mandatory minimum sentence did not shock the moral sense of reasonable people. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer, qualified as an expert in evaluating impaired driving, testified in a criminal case that babies have limited peripheral vision and that a person impaired by alcohol could be said to be seeing just like a baby. The defendant objected to this testimony as hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that the officer was explaining the basis for his opinion. The defendant was subsequently convicted of DUII, reckless driving, and reckless endangerment.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony about baby vision as it was hearsay and beyond the officer's expertise. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the testimony was not hearsay because it did not recount a particular statement made by the ophthalmologist and was offered to explain the officer's expert opinion.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the officer's testimony about baby vision was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and merely repeated information beyond the officer's personal or specialized knowledge. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless, as the testimony was central to the state's theory of impairment and was qualitatively different from other evidence presented. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Bowman" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to 60 months in prison for Count 1, 100 months for Count 3, and 100 months for Count 5, with the sentences for Counts 3 and 5 to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed terms of post-prison supervision (PPS) for each count, calculated as 240 months minus the term of imprisonment served for each count. The petitioner completed his prison terms and was released in April 2016.The Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision calculated the PPS terms by subtracting the time served for each count from the 240-month maximum, resulting in 180 months for Count 1 and 140 months for Counts 3 and 5. The petitioner argued that the "term of imprisonment served" should be the total time served for all counts, which would result in a shorter PPS term. The board rejected this argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the "term of imprisonment served" in ORS 144.103 refers to the time spent in prison for the specific count of conviction, not the total time served for all counts. The court also concluded that the PPS term begins when the offender is released into the community, not while still incarcerated on other counts. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. View "Kragt v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, who was charged with 46 sex crimes against the same person over an eight-year period. The counts in the indictment were identical and did not specify the incidents they were based on. During the first trial, the state did not link any specific incidents to the counts, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of 40 counts and guilty of six. The defendant appealed, arguing an evidentiary error, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case.On remand, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that retrying him on the six counts of conviction would violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a second jury trial, where the defendant was again convicted of the six counts. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had erred in resolving the case on preservation grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had consistently raised the same double jeopardy argument throughout the case: that due to the lack of specificity in the indictment and the first trial, it was impossible to determine the factual basis for any count, and there was a risk that he would be convicted based on incidents of which he had already been acquitted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of the double jeopardy issue. View "State v. Dodge" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant charged with multiple first-degree sexual offenses against a victim, J, who has an intellectual disability. The defendant did not dispute J's disability but argued that she was capable of consenting to the sexual acts. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and a jury convicted him of various charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the state failed to prove that J's disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct.The Oregon Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that J was incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the conduct or exercising judgment to consent to it. The state petitioned for review, challenging the Court of Appeals' interpretation and application of the relevant statutes.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the interpretation of ORS 163.305(3) and ORS 163.315(1)(b), which define when a person is incapable of consenting to a sexual act due to a mental defect. The court clarified that to be capable of consent, a person must be able to appraise the nature of their conduct, which involves exercising judgment and making choices based on an understanding of the conduct's significance. The court emphasized that the state must prove that the person's intellectual disability prevented them from appraising the nature of the conduct at the time of the alleged offense.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find that J's intellectual disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment in part, but reversed the conviction on Count 5 due to a nonunanimous jury verdict, remanding for further proceedings. View "State v. Wallace" on Justia Law