Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), which was challenged by the petitioners, Sandy Chung and Yvonne Garcia. IP 54, also known as the "Oregon Crimefighting Act," proposes significant changes to the pretrial release system for individuals charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors in Oregon. The Act also empowers local governments to pass ordinances to fight local crime and requires the state to pay for jail space for those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need to be held until trial.The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title for IP 54 and, after considering public comments, modified the draft and certified the final ballot title. The petitioners, who had submitted comments on the draft, challenged the certified ballot title, arguing that the summary did not comply with the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d).The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with the requirements. The court agreed with the petitioners that the summary was deficient. It found that the summary did not adequately convey the breadth of the changes that IP 54 would effectuate, particularly in relation to pretrial release decisions at arraignment. The court concluded that the summary must be modified to clarify that IP 54 would override existing law and to provide a more accurate description of the changes that IP 54 would make to the current law governing pretrial release at arraignment. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Chung v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Oregon and Stephen Andrew Aranda. Aranda was charged with first-degree rape and chose to testify in his own defense. The state sought to impeach his testimony with evidence of his prior felony convictions, including two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree assault. Aranda argued that the court should weigh the probative value of his conviction history against its potential for unfair prejudice before admitting it as evidence. The trial court denied his motion, and Aranda was subsequently convicted.On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Aranda's argument and reversed his conviction, holding that due process required the trial court to conduct a balancing test before admitting his prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon.The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that due process required a balancing test before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The court found that neither historical practice nor principles of fundamental fairness required such a balancing test. The court noted that while the admission of prior convictions could be prejudicial, it was also highly relevant to a defendant's credibility as a witness. The court concluded that due process did not require a balancing test under Oregon Evidence Code 403 before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence under Oregon Evidence Code 609. View "State v. Aranda" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a criminal defendant who was charged with unlawful purchase of a firearm, false information in connection with the transfer of a firearm, and attempted felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant had attempted to buy a firearm and on the required form, he checked "no" to the question of whether he had been convicted of a felony, despite having two previous felony convictions in the State of Washington. At trial, the defendant testified that he had assumed or hoped that his prior felony convictions had been expunged, as he had consulted an attorney and filled out paperwork to that effect.Prior to the closing arguments, the defendant made a preemptive objection to the state's closing argument, arguing that the state should not be permitted to make "burden-shifting" arguments or mention related topics. The trial court engaged in a lengthy discussion on the defendant's objection and largely agreed with the legal principles that he had articulated. The state delivered its closing argument without objection from the defendant.On appeal, the defendant assigned error to a purportedly impermissible burden-shifting argument the prosecution made in closing. The Court of Appeals treated the defendant's assignment as preserved, relying on the defense counsel's preemptive objection made before closing arguments, and reversed the decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon concluded that the defendant's assignment of error was not preserved. The court noted that the defendant did not object to the trial court's ruling on his preemptive objection or to the actual statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument. The court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. Skotland" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Alberto Quebrado, who was charged as an accomplice to second-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Quebrado's co-defendant fired a shotgun from the passenger window of the car Quebrado was driving, hitting a passenger in another car. Prior to trial, the co-defendant entered a plea deal with the state in return for her testimony against Quebrado. However, the state did not call her as a witness during the trial, instead introducing several of her statements through other witnesses. Quebrado's defense counsel filed a motion for a mistrial, arguing that the state's failure to call the co-defendant as a witness violated Quebrado's confrontation rights under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.The trial court denied the motion, ruling that no confrontation violation had occurred. Quebrado was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that Quebrado's motion had been untimely and therefore not preserved as error on appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Quebrado's motion for a mistrial was timely and therefore preserved the issue for appeal. The court reasoned that a confrontation challenge under Article I, section 11, is not the direct equivalent to a challenge to the admission of evidence. Instead, it looks to the co-occurrence of two events at trial: the state’s introduction of hearsay statements, and the state’s failure to call the declarant without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. The court concluded that the practical purposes of preservation were served by defendant’s objection at the close of the state’s case, rather than at the time when the hearsay statements were admitted. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "State v. Quebrado" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants. After his conviction, the defendant fled the state, delaying his sentencing and the entry of a judgment of conviction for over ten years. Upon his return to Oregon, the trial court imposed a sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, which the defendant appealed. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to caution the jury that a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be considered evidence of guilt.The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal based on the "former fugitive doctrine," which presumes that an appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss a criminal defendant’s direct appeal if the defendant was formerly a fugitive from justice and the flight significantly interfered with the appellate process. The state argued that the defendant's decade-long absence would prejudice the state in any retrial due to the passage of time and difficulty in locating witnesses.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that while the Court of Appeals may have inherent authority to dismiss an appeal when the defendant's former fugitive status significantly interferes with the appellate process, this authority does not extend to dismissing a direct appeal to address the appellant’s flight from the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's former fugitive status did not interfere with the appellate court’s ability to address the merits of the appeal. The court held that concerns about potential prejudice that would arise in the trial court in relation to a retrial are most appropriately left for the trial court to address on any remand. View "State v. Satter" on Justia Law

The case involves Raji Afife Azar, who was charged with three counts of "computer crime" under ORS 164.377(2)(c) for selling items on eBay that he believed to be stolen. The state argued that by selling stolen merchandise on eBay, Azar had accessed and used a computer system for the purpose of committing theft of property. Azar moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not proved that he had engaged in "computer hacking," which he asserted was required to establish computer crime. The trial court denied Azar's motion, and a nonunanimous jury convicted him of those counts.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court concluded that Azar's conduct of selling stolen property on eBay constituted computer crime under ORS 164.377(2)(c). The court reasoned that "theft" as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses each of the forms of theft described in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiving.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the computer crime statute to reach conduct such as Azar's, which may constitute "theft" within the meaning of the Criminal Code but neither interferes with another’s protected interests in a computer, computer system, or computer network nor depends on computer technology as the means of gaining access to the thing that the person seeks to unlawfully obtain. The court held that the trial court erred in denying Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Azar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed a case involving a defendant convicted of two domestic violence offenses, who appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial court had erred in refusing to dismiss a prospective juror for actual bias. The prospective juror had expressed during jury selection that her close friends' experiences of sexual assault might influence her judgment. The trial court denied the defendant's request to excuse the juror, who was later dismissed by the defendant using a peremptory challenge.On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's for-cause challenge and that the error was prejudicial because it resulted in the loss of a peremptory challenge. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's for-cause challenge. However, the Supreme Court held that the error did not prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right, as required for reversal under ORS 131.035.The Supreme Court reasoned that the error did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial before impartial jurors, and the error's impact on how the defendant used his peremptory challenges did not prejudice him in respect to a substantial right. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Villeda" on Justia Law

In this Oregon Supreme Court case, the appellant Matthew Dwight Thompson challenged his death sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to changes in the law under Senate Bill (SB) 1013. Thompson also argued that two of the penalty-phase questions presented to the jury at his sentencing were unconstitutional. The post-conviction court vacated Thompson's death sentence and modified it to life without the possibility of parole. It also ruled that Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were procedurally barred.While Thompson's appeal was pending, Oregon Governor Kate Brown commuted his death sentence to life without the possibility of parole. After this action, the Supreme Court concluded that Thompson was not entitled to a resentencing, despite any earlier error by the post-conviction court. The commutation had the legal effect of treating the sentence of life without parole as if it had been originally imposed. As a result, Thompson's challenge to his death sentence was rendered moot.Furthermore, Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were not preserved for appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. View "Thompson v. Fhuere" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Jason Thomas Wilcox, who was taken into police custody for public intoxication under ORS 430.399, a noncriminal statute. During this process, the police seized and inventoried his backpack, discovering a butterfly knife. As Wilcox had a prior felony conviction, he was charged and convicted for being a felon in possession of a restricted weapon under ORS 166.270(2). Wilcox appealed, arguing that the seizure of his backpack was unlawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the seizure was unlawful, and based its decision on a previous case, State v. Edwards.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis because it treated the seizure as a criminal one rather than an administrative one. The Court pointed out that when a person or their property is seized under ORS 430.399, the seizure is administrative, not criminal, and such seizures must comply with a different set of constitutional standards. The Court also clarified that the state’s interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the person objects to the interference.The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the backpack was indeed a seizure. However, it did not decide whether the seizure was lawful, instead remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether ORS 430.399, or some other source of authority, authorized the seizure of defendant’s backpack and if so, whether that seizure was effectuated in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, which set the framework for assessing the constitutionality of an administrative search or seizure. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the defendant, William Jack Parkerson, had been convicted of assault in the first degree and sentenced under Oregon’s dangerous offender statutes. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court had violated ORS 161.735 by sentencing him as a dangerous offender without reviewing new presentence investigation and psychological evaluation reports specifically prepared for this case. He also argued that the determinate part of his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence allowed by ORS 161.605 and OAR 213-008-0003(2).The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the defendant that the trial court had erred in sentencing him as a dangerous offender using old presentence investigation and psychological evaluation reports. The court held that ORS 161.735 requires the court to consider new reports prepared for the case. Therefore, the case was remanded to the lower court for resentencing.However, the Supreme Court of Oregon disagreed with the defendant's argument that the determinate part of his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The court concluded that the maximum determinate part of a dangerous offender sentence that may be imposed is twice the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines, and thus, the 260-month determinate part of the sentence imposed by the trial court did not exceed the maximum allowed by the statute. View "State v. Parkerson" on Justia Law