Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Oregon Supreme Court
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Defendant Anthony Delaney appealed his convictions on multiple sex offenses arising from two separate incidents, each involving a different victim. He challenged the trial court’s refusal to sever the counts involving the first incident from the counts involving the second incident. At issue was the proper application of ORS 132.560(3), which described actions that a trial court “may order” when “it appears, upon motion, that the state or defendant was substantially prejudiced by a joinder of offenses” that otherwise satisfy the requirements for joining multiple offenses. Defendant contended the State’s pretrial description of the evidence that it expected to offer demonstrated that defendant would be substantially prejudiced by a joint trial, and he contended that the prejudice that he identified required the court to sever the counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking severance under ORS 132.560(3) must identify a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice that was more than the prejudice that was inherent whenever joined charges allow the jury to hear that the defendant may have committed other bad acts. And whether a defendant has identified a case-specific theory that meets the “substantially prejudiced” standard was a question of law that the appellate court reviews without deference to the trial court. Applying those standards, the Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to sever. View "Oregon v. Delaney" on Justia Law

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This case concerned a driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) conviction following the termination of a diversion agreement. Defendant Rhonda Colgrove pled guilty to misdemeanor DUII and petitioned to enter diversion. Defendant’s diversion petition stated, in part, that she had “read and underst[ood] all of the information in the attached Explanation of Rights and DUII Diversion Agreement” and “agree[d],” among other things, to “[a]ttend a victim impact panel as ordered by the court.” Defendant failed to pay $335 in fees and to attend a victim impact panel within the diversion period. The trial court thereafter terminated the diversion agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, and defendant appealed. As pertinent here, defendant challenged her conviction on the ground that the trial court had erroneously terminated her diversion agreement either because the agreement had not set a deadline to attend the victim impact panel or because the trial court had discretion to waive the attendance requirement. The Court of Appeals assumed that defendant’s challenge was reviewable under ORS 138.105(5), but concluded that it failed on the merits. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to address the reviewability issue that the Court of Appeals did not: whether ORS 138.105(5) precluded a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest from obtaining appellate review of legal challenges to the conviction in the judgment entered in the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that such challenges were not reviewable under ORS 138.105(5). Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Oregon v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

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Defendant Patrick Fox and the victims were involved in a property dispute, and the victims hired a civil attorney to assist them in that matter. During an incident regarding the property dispute, defendant struck the victims with a metal chain causing them significant injury. The state charged defendant with one count each of second- and third-degree assault, and defendant eventually pleaded guilty to both counts. During defendant’s prosecution, the victims retained the attorney who was representing them in the civil case to represent their interests in that criminal proceeding. At sentencing, the victims’ attorney argued against the state’s recommended prison sentence and advocated for a probationary sentence to increase the likelihood that defendant could pay restitution to the victims. After defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing, the state sought restitution for the medical expenses that the victims had incurred as a result of the assault and the attorney fees that the victims had incurred in the criminal proceeding. Defendant conceded that the claimed attorney fees resulted from defendant’s criminal activities but objected to their recovery, arguing that neither the medical expenses nor the attorney fees were reasonable or necessary and that the attorney fees did not constitute “economic damages” recoverable as restitution. The trial court awarded the full amount of the medical expenses. The trial court also awarded $3,200 in attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the award for the medical expenses incurred by one of the two victims but affirmed as to those incurred by the other. With respect to the victims’ attorney fees, the court affirmed the award for the attorney fees incurred in the criminal case, determining that “it is reasonably foreseeable that a victim would hire an attorney to advise them about their rights in a criminal case,” and that, “because a victim is entitled to seek separate representation, the services provided by [the victims’ attorney] that were directly related to the criminal case were necessarily incurred by the victims.” Defendant appealed both decisions by the appellate court. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the trial court erred in awarding the resulting attorney fees from the victims' counsel in defendant's criminal proceedings as restitution. View "Oregon v. Fox" on Justia Law

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Defendant Christopher Ralston was arrested, booked, and charged by district attorney’s information with misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and reckless driving. Five days later, the prosecutor dismissed the misdemeanor charges to investigate whether defendant had predicate convictions that would have elevated the charge to felony DUII. Six weeks later, a grand jury indicted defendant on a charge of felony DUII. By that time, video footage from the jail on the night that defendant was arrested and booked had been overwritten automatically. When defense counsel later learned that the booking video had been overwritten, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that his right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution had been violated, arguing that his inability to use the video of his booking at trial was prejudicial to him. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which held defendant did not establish prejudice resulting from the delay so as to warrant dismissal of the charges against him. The trial court judgment was affirmed in part and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Ralston" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license for refusing a breath test was valid when, in addition to providing petitioner with the statutorily required information regarding rights and consequences, the arresting officer also told petitioner that she would seek a search warrant for a blood draw if petitioner refused the test. The Department of Transportation, Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, but, after petitioner sought judicial review from the circuit court, the circuit court set aside that suspension, a decision that the Court of Appeals later affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that DMV properly suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals’ and the circuit court’s judgments. View "Murdoch v. DMV" on Justia Law

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Defendant Michael Burris was convicted of attempting to commit the misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm. The issue his appeal presented for the Oregon Supreme Court was the legal effect, if any, of a cross-reference between two statutes that criminalized the same conduct: possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The first statute, ORS 166.270, defined the felony offense of felon in possession of a firearm. The second statute, ORS 166.250, defined the misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession of a firearm. The statute defining the felony offense included an exception for certain persons discharged from imprisonment, parole, or probation at least 15 years earlier. The statute defining the misdemeanor offense did not include a similar exception, but it began with a prefatory clause that cross-referenced other statutes, including the felony offense. The question was whether the 15-year exception to the felony offense also applied to the misdemeanor offense through the latter’s prefatory clause. The state argued the prefatory clause’s reference to ORS 166.270 had no legal effect because, by its terms, the 15-year exception to the felony offense applied only to the felony offense and therefore did not create an exception to the misdemeanor offense. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Burris" on Justia Law

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In a 20-count indictment, defendant Nathan Chitwood was accused of sexually abusing his then-13-year-old stepdaughter. A jury acquitted defendant of all but three counts. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the prosecutor made two highly improper statements during the rebuttal closing argument. Defendant did not object to either of those statements, but, on appeal, he argued that the prosecutor’s argument was so prejudicial that the trial court judgment should be overturned on plain error review. The Court of Appeals agreed the prosecutor’s statements were improper, but it declined to conduct plain error review, reasoning the prosecutor’s argument was not so prejudicial as to deny defendant a fair trial and that there was a possibility that defense counsel’s failure to object was strategic. The Oregon Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s argument constituted plain error: the statements were impermissible and, taken together, were so egregious that they deprived defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court exercised its discretion to review that error and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Chitwood" on Justia Law

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Defendant Darius Thompson robbed someone with a knife, and the victim shot defendant. Defendant sought treatment in a hospital, where police officers questioned him. An officer seized defendant’s cell phone as likely containing evidence of the shooting and other crimes. The officer did so without a warrant, fearing that, if he did not seize the phone, defendant could otherwise destroy the phone or its contents. Police kept the phone for five days before applying for a warrant to seize and search the phone. Once they had the warrant, police searched the phone and found records of calls and messages related to the robbery and shooting. They then used that information in questioning defendant, eliciting statements that defendant argued were incriminating. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the phone and all derivative evidence, and the trial court denied the motion. A jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery, among other crimes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the resulting conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court's review of this case was limited to issues raised by the motion to suppress, including preservation questions at trial and on appeal. The State conceded, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding it did not need to consider three statements defendant claimed should have been suppressed because he identified them only in his reply brief to the appeals court, and not in his opening brief. The Supreme Court also found defendant adequately raised and preserved his objection to the admission of evidence derived from the seizure of his cell phone, which the Supreme Court found police holding it for five days without a warrant was unreasonable and unlawful. Errors notwithstanding, the Supreme Court determined the evidence that should have been suppressed did not prejudice defendant, and therefore his conviction was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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Defendant John Shedrick walked into a bar and sat at a video poker machine near the ATM the bar maintained for customers. The bar’s owner was about to refill the ATM and placed a bundle of currency on top of it. Within two or three seconds, while the owner turned around to greet a patron who had entered the bar, defendant took the bundle of money, placed it in his jacket pocket, and walked toward the door. A bar patron saw defendant take the bundle and stopped him before he could leave. Defendant was ultimately convicted of first-degree theft. As defined in ORS 164.055(1)(a), the offense requires the State to prove, among other things, that the “total value of the property” stolen in the transaction “is $1,000 or more.” The issue on review was whether proof of a culpable mental state concerning the “value of the property” element was required. The trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with the state that none was required; Defendant argued the jury should have been instructed that the state had to prove his culpable mental state—at least criminal negligence—concerning the value of the money taken. The Oregon Supreme Court held that in order to prove first-degree theft, the state must prove the defendant’s culpable mental state with respect to the value of the property stolen and that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested instructions. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless and, therefore, affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and the trial court’s judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Shedrick" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review stemmed from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief filed by a petitioner who was a fugitive from justice while his criminal case was pending in the trial court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on the basis that petitioner’s flight from justice, which ultimately delayed his sentencing by 10 years, would impair the State’s ability to present witness testimony in any retrial that the post-conviction court might order. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked whether the common-law “fugitive dismissal rule” should have been extended to post-conviction cases filed by former fugitives. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "even if a petitioner’s former fugitive status might sometimes justify a post-conviction court refusing to carry out the statutorily prescribed post-conviction relief process, we conclude that the court’s concerns in this case—about delay-based prejudice to the state in any retrial—did not justify dismissal of petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief." View "Sills v. Oregon" on Justia Law