Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder and was "sleep driving" at the time he was stopped in his vehicle. Defendant argued he did not voluntarily drive his vehicle, an element of proof necessary to establish criminal liability for DUII. The trial court excluded defendant's proffered evidence, concluding it was not relevant because DUII is a strict-liability offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that DUII is a strict-liability offense and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was indeed relevant to the driving element of the DUII charge, and accordingly reversed. View "Oregon v. Newman" on Justia Law

In 2007, a Portland police officer investigated a dispute between defendant and his girlfriend. During that investigation, the officer learned that defendant was 21 years old and that his girlfriend (victim) was 16. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had had sexual intercourse with the victim on several occasions during the previous year. Given that information, a grand jury indicted defendant for four counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Specifically, on four occasions "on or between December 11, 2006 to December 24, 1 2007," defendant "unlawfully and knowingly subject[ed the victim] to sexual intercourse, [the victim] not consenting thereto by reason of being under 18 years of age." Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties tried the charges to the court. The issue in before the Supreme Court in this case was what the phrase "does not consent" meant: defendant argued that it referred only to those instances in which the victim does not actually consent; the state responded that it also includes instances in which the victim lacks the capacity to consent. The trial court agreed with the state and convicted defendant of second-degree sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ofodrinwa" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in this case in January, 2013; that decision reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. A few weeks later, defense counsel filed a petition for reconsideration, asking the court to reconsider and modify or reverse its decision or, at a minimum, to remand the case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. In February 2013, defense counsel filed a notice pursuant to ORAP 8.45 informing the court that defendant had died more than a year before (on January 27, 2012), and contended therefore that the case was moot. Defense counsel also moved to vacate the Supreme Courts opinion and the judgment of conviction. Defense counsel argued that, because defendant's death rendered the case moot as of January 2012, the case necessarily was moot at the time this court issued its decision, and the appropriate disposition was to vacate that decision. Defense counsel further asserted that because: (1) the proper disposition of the case was to remand the case back to trial court for further proceedings; and (2) defendant's death meant that he could not take steps in the trial court to undo his conviction, the Supreme Court also should have vacated the judgment of conviction. The state opposed the motion to vacate, arguing that "the public interest in leaving the court's decision undisturbed far outweighs any equitable interests supporting vacatur." Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated its decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacated defendant's judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant attempted to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. In both cases, the trial court refused to consent to the waiver, and juries subsequently convicted each defendant of the charges against him. In "Oregon v. Harrell," (250 P3d 1 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing defendant Harrell's requested jury waiver and affirmed the convictions. On review in Harrell, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. In "Oregon v. Wilson," (247 P3d 1262 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's refusal to consent to defendant's requested jury waiver had been within the trial court's discretion and affirmed defendant's convictions. On review in Wilson, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. View "Oregon v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Leland Hemenway with possession of methamphetamine. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police, arguing that his consent to search was the product of an illegal seizure, and therefore was inadmissible under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the stop was unlawful and the evidence from the search was presumptively obtained through exploitation of the earlier unlawful conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, using the opportunity of this opinion to modify the exploitation analysis announced in the case-law authority the Court of Appeals relied on in its reversal (Oregon v. Hall, 115 P3d 908 (2005)). View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

In his criminal case, defendant unsuccessfully sought an order compelling the victim to produce the hard drive of her laptop computer so that the defense could obtain a forensic examination of the hard drive. After his conviction, defendant requested that the trial court order that an already-existing copy of the hard drive, preserved in a related civil case, be placed under seal in the trial court record of defendant's criminal case, for purposes of appellate review. The trial court granted that motion and rejected the victim's claim that the order violated her right as a crime victim under Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution to refuse a discovery request. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order did not violate the victim's rights under Article I, section 42. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant's conviction was based, for the most part, on eyewitness identification evidence. In "Oregon v. Lawson," the Court of Appeals concluded that, despite the state's use of unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures, under the test first articulated by the Supreme Court in "Oregon v. Classen," (590 P2d 1198 (1979)), the victim's identification of defendant Lawson had been reliable enough to allow the jury to consider it in its deliberations. In "Oregon v. James," (again relying on "Classen") the Court of Appeals similarly concluded that, although the witnesses had been subject to an unduly suggestive police procedure in the course of identifying defendant James, those identifications had nevertheless been sufficiently reliable, and were therefore admissible at trial. The Supreme Court allowed review in each of these cases to determine whether the Classen test was consistent with the current scientific research and understanding of eyewitness identification. In light of the scientific research, the Court revised the test set out in Classen and adopted several additional procedures, based generally on applicable provisions of the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC), for determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. View "Oregon v. Lawson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a physician's conclusion that defendant physically abused a child met the requirements for admissibility of scientific evidence. The child in this case, C, was approximately 18 months old when he arrived at the emergency room with multiple injuries, including a golf-ball-sized lump on his forehead and a fractured skull. The state accused defendant of causing C's injuries and charged him with two counts of criminal mistreatment and first- and third-degree assault. To prove first-degree assault, the state had to show that defendant had caused C "serious physical injury," defined as injury that "creates a substantial risk of death." The jury convicted defendant of third-degree assault and two counts of criminal mistreatment. The jury acquitted defendant on the charge of first-degree assault, but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault. Like first-degree assault, second degree assault requires a finding that the inflicted injury created a substantial risk of death. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the expert's diagnosis was not limited to determining the cause of C's injuries, but included a conclusion that C's injuries were the result of child abuse. That aspect of the expert's diagnosis addressed a second disputed issue, whether defendant's actions were intentional or accidental. Because the Court could not conclude that there was little likelihood that the admission of the expert's diagnosis did not affect all of defendant's convictions, the Court also could not conclude that the trial court's error was harmless as to the convictions for first degree mistreatment and third-degree assault. The decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Sanchez-Alfonso" on Justia Law

Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in "Oregon v. Leistiko," (282 P3d 857 (2012)). He argued that the Court erred in two respects: (1) in stating that he had not pursued two issues on review that he had raised in the Court of Appeals; (2) in not deciding whether the admission of evidence of an uncharged rape affected the jury's determination that he had committed crimes other than rape. The Court allowed the petition and after review of defendant's contentions of error, modified the original opinion. View "Oregon v. Leistiko" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for the mental state of criminal negligence and, when tested by that standard, whether the record in this case was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Defendant, while driving a tractor-trailer truck, collided with the victim's catering truck from the rear. The collision pushed the victim's truck into the oncoming lane of traffic where it was struck by a logging truck. The victim died at the scene. The state charged defendant with criminally negligent homicide. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of the manner in which he had been driving 10 to 15 minutes before the collision. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then waived his right to a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. At the close of the state's case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The trial court subsequently convicted defendant. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Finding no error in the trial court's interpretation of the standard for criminal negligence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Lewis" on Justia Law