Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted for the 1989 killing of the Department of Corrections director. At the time, Oregon law provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life with the possibility of parole (ordinary life). Petitioner contended that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at the time of his criminal trial, specifically that he was not told he had the right to object to a new sentencing law to his case on ex post facto grounds. The post-conviction court found that as a matter of fact, petitioner did not established that the advice would have made a difference. The appellate court and Supreme Courts affirmed that decision. View "Gable v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on what constitutes a reprieve under the Oregon Constitution. After the Court affirmed Plaintiff-Respondent Gary Haugen's aggravated murder conviction and death sentence, he dropped all appeals, and the trial court set an execution date. The Governor subsequently issued a reprieve suspending Defendant's sentence for the duration of the Governor's term. Defendant purported to reject the reprieve, and sought to have it declared ineffective and invalid. The trial court held that a reprieve must be accepted to be effective and ruled the Governor's reprieve ineffective. The Governor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the reprieve was valid and effective regardless of whether Defendant rejected it, and accordingly reversed the trial court. View "Haugen v. Kitzhaber" on Justia Law

Two law enforcement officers, believing that defendant was being assaulted, responded to an incomplete 9-1-1 call that had been traced to defendant's home. One officer took defendant's husband into custody, while the other officer proceeded to interview defendant on the porch of her home. While interviewing defendant, the officer made an observation that caused him to reasonably believe defendant might be in possession of drugs. The officer asked defendant if he could search her, and she agreed. During the search, the officer discovered a glass pipe with drug residue on it. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the officers' actions, commands, and inquiries in investigating the possible domestic assault resulted in a seizure of defendant within the meaning of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and, if so, whether that seizure was constitutionally permissible. The Court concluded that defendant was seized for constitutional purposes, but the Court further concluded that the seizure was lawful. The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Fair" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder and was "sleep driving" at the time he was stopped in his vehicle. Defendant argued he did not voluntarily drive his vehicle, an element of proof necessary to establish criminal liability for DUII. The trial court excluded defendant's proffered evidence, concluding it was not relevant because DUII is a strict-liability offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that DUII is a strict-liability offense and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was indeed relevant to the driving element of the DUII charge, and accordingly reversed. View "Oregon v. Newman" on Justia Law

In 2007, a Portland police officer investigated a dispute between defendant and his girlfriend. During that investigation, the officer learned that defendant was 21 years old and that his girlfriend (victim) was 16. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had had sexual intercourse with the victim on several occasions during the previous year. Given that information, a grand jury indicted defendant for four counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Specifically, on four occasions "on or between December 11, 2006 to December 24, 1 2007," defendant "unlawfully and knowingly subject[ed the victim] to sexual intercourse, [the victim] not consenting thereto by reason of being under 18 years of age." Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties tried the charges to the court. The issue in before the Supreme Court in this case was what the phrase "does not consent" meant: defendant argued that it referred only to those instances in which the victim does not actually consent; the state responded that it also includes instances in which the victim lacks the capacity to consent. The trial court agreed with the state and convicted defendant of second-degree sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ofodrinwa" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in this case in January, 2013; that decision reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. A few weeks later, defense counsel filed a petition for reconsideration, asking the court to reconsider and modify or reverse its decision or, at a minimum, to remand the case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. In February 2013, defense counsel filed a notice pursuant to ORAP 8.45 informing the court that defendant had died more than a year before (on January 27, 2012), and contended therefore that the case was moot. Defense counsel also moved to vacate the Supreme Courts opinion and the judgment of conviction. Defense counsel argued that, because defendant's death rendered the case moot as of January 2012, the case necessarily was moot at the time this court issued its decision, and the appropriate disposition was to vacate that decision. Defense counsel further asserted that because: (1) the proper disposition of the case was to remand the case back to trial court for further proceedings; and (2) defendant's death meant that he could not take steps in the trial court to undo his conviction, the Supreme Court also should have vacated the judgment of conviction. The state opposed the motion to vacate, arguing that "the public interest in leaving the court's decision undisturbed far outweighs any equitable interests supporting vacatur." Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated its decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacated defendant's judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant attempted to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. In both cases, the trial court refused to consent to the waiver, and juries subsequently convicted each defendant of the charges against him. In "Oregon v. Harrell," (250 P3d 1 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing defendant Harrell's requested jury waiver and affirmed the convictions. On review in Harrell, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. In "Oregon v. Wilson," (247 P3d 1262 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's refusal to consent to defendant's requested jury waiver had been within the trial court's discretion and affirmed defendant's convictions. On review in Wilson, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. View "Oregon v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Leland Hemenway with possession of methamphetamine. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police, arguing that his consent to search was the product of an illegal seizure, and therefore was inadmissible under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the stop was unlawful and the evidence from the search was presumptively obtained through exploitation of the earlier unlawful conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, using the opportunity of this opinion to modify the exploitation analysis announced in the case-law authority the Court of Appeals relied on in its reversal (Oregon v. Hall, 115 P3d 908 (2005)). View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

In his criminal case, defendant unsuccessfully sought an order compelling the victim to produce the hard drive of her laptop computer so that the defense could obtain a forensic examination of the hard drive. After his conviction, defendant requested that the trial court order that an already-existing copy of the hard drive, preserved in a related civil case, be placed under seal in the trial court record of defendant's criminal case, for purposes of appellate review. The trial court granted that motion and rejected the victim's claim that the order violated her right as a crime victim under Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution to refuse a discovery request. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order did not violate the victim's rights under Article I, section 42. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant's conviction was based, for the most part, on eyewitness identification evidence. In "Oregon v. Lawson," the Court of Appeals concluded that, despite the state's use of unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures, under the test first articulated by the Supreme Court in "Oregon v. Classen," (590 P2d 1198 (1979)), the victim's identification of defendant Lawson had been reliable enough to allow the jury to consider it in its deliberations. In "Oregon v. James," (again relying on "Classen") the Court of Appeals similarly concluded that, although the witnesses had been subject to an unduly suggestive police procedure in the course of identifying defendant James, those identifications had nevertheless been sufficiently reliable, and were therefore admissible at trial. The Supreme Court allowed review in each of these cases to determine whether the Classen test was consistent with the current scientific research and understanding of eyewitness identification. In light of the scientific research, the Court revised the test set out in Classen and adopted several additional procedures, based generally on applicable provisions of the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC), for determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. View "Oregon v. Lawson" on Justia Law