Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's orders declaring defendant's son, "Z" (a 19-year-old man who suffers from autism and developmental disabilities) not competent to testify at trial and excluding from evidence a video involving out-of-court statements made by Z and drawings made by Z. Z was called to testify at Defendant's aggravated murder trial accused of killing Z's caregiver William Mills. Finding that the State bore the burden to preserve alternative arguments supporting the admissibility of any part of evidence given by Z, and the State did not meet this burden at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude all of the evidence in question here. Furthermore, the Court determined that the decision not to admit the video testimony was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The Court affirmed both of the trial court's orders. View "Oregon v. Sarich" on Justia Law

This case was an automatic and direct review of death sentences imposed after a "penalty phase" trial. Defendant raised 33 assignments of error. Five of them the Supreme Court said merited discussion: specifically, defendant's claims that (1) the adoption of Article I, section 40, of the Oregon Constitution violated the "separate vote" requirement of Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution; (2) the so-called "third question," which asked whether defendant's conduct was "unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased," was unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence relevant to the third question or failing to pose the question to the jury; (4) the trial court erred in empanelling an "anonymous" jury; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing the state's expert to testify about defendant's consensual homosexual experience as a teenager. The Court discussed, but rejected, three of the five arguments; defendant's position as to the fourth and fifth were well taken. The Court concluded that that the trial court erred in empanelling an "anonymous" jury without finding, as required by the Court's decision in "State v. Sundberg," (247 P3d 1213 (2011)), that there were strong and particular grounds for believing that the jurors' identities needed to be protected. Because that error was not harmless, the Court vacated the death sentences and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new penalty-phase trial. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence of defendant's homosexual experiences as a teenager. View "Oregon v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by indictment with (among other things) assault in the first degree. At trial, the state proceeded solely under the theory that defendant had aided and abetted his codefendant's initial assault on the victim. A jury found defendant guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's first degree assault conviction and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on the lesser charges of second- and fourth-degree assault. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review to examine whether, on appellate review, the state can sustain a criminal conviction on a theory of criminal liability that it did not pursue at trial. Finding that it could not, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Douglas Pitt of two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct involving the victim and another individual. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions, concluding that the trial court did not err in declining to exclude the challenged evidence because it was relevant to bolster the victim's credibility in identifying defendant as her abuser. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion in limine. The trial court did not decide that the evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct was conditionally admissible. It ruled instead, without conditions, that the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant and admissible. In light of the record that existed when the trial court addressed the motion in limine, the court's ruling was erroneous. Accordingly, the appellate court's affirmation of the trial court was in error. The ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Pitt" on Justia Law

Tyler Blok, a criminal defendant who was released from custody pursuant to a security release agreement, sought the writ of mandamus to compel the judge who set the terms of the agreement to modify a condition that forbade him from having contact with his father. In his mandamus petition, and again in his brief on the merits to the Supreme Court, Defendant made two legal arguments: that the trial court had no statutory authority to impose the condition and that, if the relevant statute permitted the condition, it was unconstitutional. At oral argument, however, Defendant conceded that a "no contact with witnesses" condition could be lawfully imposed in some circumstances and argued, instead, that the condition was improper in this case because it was not supported by evidence in the record. Because Defendant's argument to the Supreme Court was not the argument that he raised in his mandamus petition, it did not present the legal question posed by the Court's issuance of the alternative writ. Accordingly, the Court exercised its discretion to dismiss the alternative writ of mandamus that it previously issued. View "Oregon v. Blok" on Justia Law

In this case the issue before the Supreme Court concerned an action under ORS 30.866 in which a plaintiff sought both a stalking protective order and a judgment for compensatory money damages, whether the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the claim for money damages. Plaintiff in this case filed a petition under ORS 30.866, alleging that the defendant had engaged in knowing and repeated unwanted sexual contact with her in the two years preceding the filing of the petition and that that contact had caused plaintiff reasonable apprehension regarding her safety. Plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to three forms of relief: a stalking protective order enjoining defendant from engaging in certain conduct; an award of compensatory damages for lost sick and annual leave, lost wages, and counseling expenses; and an award of reasonable attorney fees. Defendant asserted that he was entitled to a jury trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory money damages. The trial court disagreed and conducted the trial on all three claims without a jury. The court found in favor of plaintiff, issued a stalking protective order, entered a general judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of $42,347.78, and entered a supplemental judgment for reasonable attorney fees. Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a jury trial. The court reasoned that the text of ORS 30.866 contains "no reference that conveys any kind of indication that the legislature intended to confer a right to a jury trial." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the jury trial issue, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "M. K. F. v. Miramontes" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant filed his notice of appeal from a supplemental judgment awarding restitution within the time allowed by ORS 138.071(4), which requires that the notice of appeal be filed not later than 30 days after "the defendant receives notice that the judgment has been entered." The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's notice of appeal from the supplemental judgment was untimely and dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court also concluded that defendant's notice of appeal was not timely filed, and therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Defendant Terry Haynes was charged with murder and manslaughter. Defendant filed two pretrial motions to exclude evidence, the first seeking to exclude evidence of five allegations of prior bad acts, and the second seeking to exclude his interview with the police. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to exclude his prior bad acts in its entirety, and granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to exclude the police interview. The State sought direct review of both rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the state did not adequately preserve any of the arguments that it advanced on appeal with regard to the admissibility of the prior bad acts. In addition, the Court declined to consider the State's argument with regard to the partial exclusion of the interview because it assigned error to an order that the trial court did not make. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned the meaning of "aggrieved person" as that term was used in ORS 133.721(1), the statute that defines the class of persons who may seek suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to an order for a body wire or wiretap. Defendant was charged with various crimes arising from the murder of Asia Bell. Before trial, defendant filed motions to suppress certain evidence intercepted pursuant to a body wire order and a wiretap order. Specifically, through the body-wire order the police had obtained conversations that referred to defendant and indirectly suggested that he was involved in Bell's death. Based on that information, the police obtained the wiretap order, and, through the wiretap, intercepted conversations in which defendant made incriminating statements. The trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress. A jury convicted defendant of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that defendant could not challenge the body-wire order because he was not an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of ORS 133.721(1). As to the wiretap order, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that defendant was an "aggrieved person" who could challenge that order, but noted that defendant's only argument to exclude the incriminating communications obtained pursuant to that order was that the order was based on information obtained through the allegedly invalid body-wire order. It rejected that argument. The Court of Appeals also rejected defendant's argument that the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding certain evidence that defendant sought to introduce. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In this case, a trial court found that defendant's statements to private investigators were induced by the investigators' promises of leniency and other benefits and therefore suppressed those statements and a second set of inculpatory statements that defendant made to a police officer on the same subject. The state appealed the suppression order. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "the state [had] the burden to produce evidence that the coercive influence under which the prior confession was made had sufficiently dispelled to render the subsequent confession [to police] voluntary. . . .The trial court did not err in reaching that conclusion or in suppressing those statements."