Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The state charged Defendant Ronald Leistiko with, among other things, three counts of first degree rape. Each count involved a different victim and arose out of a separate incident. The state offered evidence that defendant had forcibly compelled a fourth woman to engage in sexual intercourse with him. The trial court ruled that the fourth woman's testimony was admissible, and the jury convicted Defendant of two of the three counts of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the admission of the fourth woman's testimony, relying in large part on The Supreme Court's decision in "Oregon v. Johnson" (131 P3d 173 (2006)). The Supreme Court allowed Defendant's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals decision in part. "[The Court] recognize[d] that inferring a plan or design from prior similar acts to prove that a defendant acted consistently with that plan is vulnerable to the claim that the prior bad acts are merely propensity evidence. . . .[T]he fourth woman's testimony was not sufficiently similar for it to be admissible to prove intent. It necessarily follows that her testimony also was not sufficiently similar for it to be admissible to prove a plan that would permit the jury to infer that defendant acted consistently with that plan - namely, that he forcibly compelled each of the victims to engage in sexual intercourse with him. None of the grounds that the state has advanced justified admission of the fourth woman's testimony. The trial court erred in admitting it."

In 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant Gregory Bowen's convictions for aggravated murder and the imposition of the death penalty. However, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to merge two aggravated murder verdicts and one intentional murder verdict against Defendant into a single conviction set out in a single judgment that imposed one death sentence. On remand, the trial court denied several defense motions which were at the center of this case before the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court's corrected sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motions and also affirmed Defendant's merged conviction and death sentence. However, the Court reversed the corrected judgment and remanded the case for entry of a new corrected judgment.

Defendant Gregory McBride lived in his friend's house where the two grew, used and sold marijuana. THe friend's teen-aged daughter and her friend also lived there. Defendant occasionally smoked marijuana in the home, sometimes with the teenagers. Based on those circumstances, Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, delivering said substance to a minor and two counts of endangering the welfare of minors. Defendant moved for acquittal at trial, but was ultimately convicted by a jury on all counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant challenged only his child-endangerment convictions. Upon review of the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on those charges, and therefore reversed his conviction as to those counts.

In this criminal case, the victim filed an interlocutory appeal challenging several orders of the trial court that she contended violated her right to "refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request by the criminal defendant," under Article I, section 42(1)(c), of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant attempted to obtain from Google, Inc., by subpoena duces tecum "all internet activity and searches conducted by [the victim], email [of the victim] . . . including IP addresses, web searches requested, results, and sites viewed" as well as "[a]ny and all of [the victim's] email . . . to or from anyone concerning [defendant]." Google denied defendant's request, asserting that, under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 2702(a) (2006), the company was prohibited from disclosing the information without the victim's consent or a court order. The prosecuting attorney requested the victim's consent, but she refused. Defendant then renewed his motion to compel. The prosecuting attorney opposed defendant's motion, arguing that requiring the discovery of the requested information following the victim's refusal to provide it would violate her right to refuse a discovery request under the Oregon Constitution. In December 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecuting attorney's objections. Ultimately, the trial court overruled those objections and ordered the prosecuting attorney to obtain the Google information on defendant's behalf. Following arguments on the matter, the trial court denied the relief requested by the victim. The trial court explained that "the Court has never ordered the victim to produce anything and so there is nothing that the Court has ordered that is inconsistent with . . . her protections under . . . the Oregon [C]onstitution[.]" Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the interlocutory appeal: "[t]he victim had seven days from the trial court's issuance of its order denying her requested relief. . . . The victim did not file her notice of interlocutory appeal until April 27, 2012. The appeal was untimely. The timely filing of the notice of interlocutory appeal is 'jurisdictional and may not be waived.'" Accordingly, the Court dismissed the victim's appeal.

Defendant Jesse Moss filed a notice of appeal and then absconded. The state moved to dismiss his appeal pursuant to the state's fugitive dismissal rule (ORAP 8.05(3)). In the meantime, Defendant was arrested and returned to custody. On the basis of his return to custody, Defendant opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that he had "surrendered" within the meaning of the statute. The State responded that the mere fact that an absconding defendant has been apprehended by police is not sufficient to establish that he has "surrendered" within the meaning of the rule. The Court of Appeals agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court allowed Defendant's petition for review and affirmed the order of dismissal.

Realtor-Defendant Dylan McDowell petitioned for a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus to compel his release pending trial. He contended that he was entitled to release under ORS 136.290, which provides, in part, that a criminal defendant "shall not remain in custody pending commencement of the trial of the defendant more than 60 days after the time of arrest." According to Defendant, he was indicted, arrested, and then held more than 60 days, when the state dismissed the charges and released him. Several days later, however, the state reindicted him on the same charges and arrested him again. He contended that the 60-day statutory deadline ran and that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to be released under ORS 136.290. The state argued that the court did not err in denying relator's motion, because the statutory 60-day deadline recommenced upon his rearrest. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to release Defendant immediately.

This case arose out of Defendant Javier Eumana-Moranchel's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the State's expert witness in his prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). The issue presented was whether the state could introduce an expert's testimony to prove that defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was over the legal limit of .08 percent when a police officer stopped him for driving erratically, even though Defendant's BAC was under the legal limit at the time of his breath test, approximately an hour and a half later. At the pretrial hearing on Defendant's motion, the trial court excluded the expert's testimony interpreting defendant's breath test results to the extent that that testimony would explain that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The State filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the expert's testimony was derived from a chemical analysis of defendant's breath and was therefore admissible. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State should have been permitted to offer the expert's testimony explaining retrograde extrapolation to establish that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendants Michael Miskell and Anthony Sinibaldi sought review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming their convictions for aggravated first-degree theft and second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court allowed their petition for review to consider one of the issues defendants raised in their consolidated appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress an audio recording of a conversation between defendants and a police informant, which the police made without first obtaining a court order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the police acted unlawfully in failing to seek a court order under ORS 9 133.726 before intercepting and recording the conversation, and that the recording should have been suppressed. The Court further concluded that the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The State appealed, and Defendant Kevin Jarnagin cross-appealed a pretrial order in a murder case suppressing evidence. Neither party challenged the trial court's ruling that the officers violated Defendant's rights under the state constitution when they questioned him at the police station and later at a hospital without advising him of his Miranda rights. The parties focused instead on whether statements that defendant made the next day at his home and before and after a polygraph examination should be suppressed on the ground that those statements were a product of the Miranda violations the day before. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statements Defendant made at his home were a product of the Miranda violations the day before but that the statements he made before and after the polygraph examination were not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order in part and reverse it in part.

The Supreme Court previously affirmed Defendant Robert Langley, Jr.'s aggravated murder convictions, but twice vacated his death sentences and remanded the case for further penalty-phase proceedings. On this third review, Defendant raised 27 assignments of error related to the third and most recent penalty-phase proceeding. As his second assignment of error, Defendant contended the trial court erred by requiring him to proceed pro se without first securing valid waiver of his right to counsel. Because the Supreme Court determined that that assignment was well-taken, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further penalty-phase proceedings.