Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jose Cabanilla is a native Spanish speaker whose command of English was described as "weak." A witness saw Defendant's vehicle leave the road at a high rate of speed, roll over and come to rest in a nearby field. The responding officer arrested Defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned whether for purposes of implied consent, the officer "informed" Defendant of the consequences of refusing to take a breath test when those consequences were explained in English. The trial court concluded that Defendant had been adequately informed and declined to suppress evidence of Defendant's refusal to take the test. A jury convicted Defendant of driving while under the influence (DUII), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that evidence of a DUII defendant's refusal to take a breath test is admissible against that defendant even if the state does not establish that the defendant understood the information given about his rights and the consequences of refusing the breath test.

In 2004, Defendant Nicholas Rainoldi was convicted of first degree forgery and identity theft, and was sentenced to 24 months' probation. On the judgment, the trial judge wrote "misd. treat. on completion of probation." Defendant completed probation in May 2006. Several months later, Defendant attempted to purchase a shotgun from a gun show. As part of that transaction, Defendant completed the background check form indicating he had never been convicted of a felony. Based on the background check, Defendant's application to purchase the gun was denied. Two police officers were at the gun show, and cited Defendant for attempted unlawful purchase of a firearm and attempted felon in possession of a firearm. The State then charged Defendant by information with those offenses, alleging Defendant "knowingly" attempted to purchase an "intentionally" attempted to own a firearm. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Oregon law requires proof that Defendant knew he had been convicted of a felony before he possessed or attempted to possess a firearm. The Court of Appeals held that Oregon law requires proof of such knowledge, and that the trial court erred in failing the deliver a jury instruction to that effect. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the legislature clearly intended to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement as to the element that a defendant "has been convicted of a felony." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction that it could not convict unless it found he knew he was a felon at the time he attempted to purchase the gun.

This matter came to the Supreme Court on a "request" that it enforce, on its own motion, an alternative writ of mandamus that it previously issued in connection with Defendant Gary Haugen's death-warrant proceeding. After that writ issued, the Court determined that it had been complied with, and then sua sponte dismissed it. The request to enforce the dismissed writ was premised on an assertion that the trial court did not comply with the writ. The trial court held a hearing on whether to issue the death warrant. Defendant was represented by two lawyers, but before the hearing, Defendant made clear he wanted to represent himself and waive all future challenges to his conviction and sentence. Defense counsel objected, believing Defendant not competent to be executed. The trial court then asked Defendant a series of questions to evaluate his competency. Finding Defendant competent, his counsel was withdrawn but placed on "standby." After validly waiving his rights, the trial judge issued the death warrant and set a date for Defendant's execution. The Oregon Capital Resource Center (OCRC) attempted to participate by filing a writ of mandamus contending that the trial court discharged Defendant's counsel and issued a death warrant without a sufficient inquiry into Defendant's competence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCRC had not made the necessary showing that it had any legal authority to bring the proceeding on Defendant's behalf. Furthermore, however, Defendant's former lawyers had authority to challenge Defendant's competency to discharge them. Finding no error in the trial judge's inquiry as to Defendant's competence to represent himself, the Court denied OCRC's request and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Petitioner Marco Montez sought review of an appellate court decision that denied him post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court had rejected Petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase retrial proceeding that resulted in him receiving the death penalty. In his petition for reconsideration, Petitioner contended that one of the Justices on the Supreme Court should not have participated in the decision to deny review of the appellate court's decision. Petitioner pointed out that the Justice in question served on the Court of Appeals at the time of his appeal, and that the then-judge recused himself from considering Petitioner's appeal. Though the record in this case provided no explanation for the judge's decision to recuse himself from considering Petitioner's post-conviction appeal at the Court of Appeals, the Judge/Justice recused himself from the Supreme Court's review of Petitioner's appeal. As such, the Court concluded that Petitioner's arguments about the Justice's previous participation in the Court's decision to deny review was made moot. The Court subsequently allowed Petitioner's petition for reconsideration.

The state charged Defendant Tyler Kurokawa-Lasciak with various drug offenses, and Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence that the police had obtained from a warrantless search of his rental van. The state contended that no warrant was required under the automobile exception to Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution or, alternatively, that Defendant's companion was in possession of the van and had given her consent to search. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress and the state appealed. Defendant was detained in the parking lot of a casino. Officials there called police because Defendant had been disorderly earlier in the evening. The arresting officer told Defendant that he'd go to jail, but that he had another option: if Defendant consented to a search of his van, the officer might cite him at the casino and release him there. Defendant asked for a lawyer. The officer told Defendant he would impound the van and later obtain a search warrant. Further investigation would reveal that Defendant had given the keys to his girlfriend who was inside the casino. Officers found her inside and asked her whether they could search the van. She replied that she did not believe she had authority to permit the search. Eventually she acquiesced, and officers found 77 grams of marijuana, 56 grams of hashish, electronic scales, and approximately $48,000 in cash inside. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and held that the search was valid under the automobile exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not permit the warrantless search of Defendant's van. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide the issue that it did not reach -- whether the search was permitted by Defendant's companion's consent.

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a criminal defendant may, after pleading 'no contest' to a misdemeanor offense, challenge his sentence on the ground that it violates the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction under ORS 6 138.050(1)(a), which provides that a defendant who has pleaded guilty may appeal after making a colorable showing that the sentence "[e]xceeds the maximum allowable by law." The State sought review, arguing that, because defendant's sentence was well within the maximum allowable by applicable statutes, the case should have been dismissed. Defendant responded that because the process by which the court arrived at his sentence was unconstitutional, that sentence "exceed[ed] the maximum allowable by law" in the sense that any sentence arrived at by that process was unlawful. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the state was correct that this appeal was not cognizable under ORS 138.050, and therefore the Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing one of the trial court's rulings excluding certain evidence. In response, Defendant Terry Davis challenged two of the trial court's other evidentiary rulings excluding evidence, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. Defendant was charged with murder and manslaughter based on allegations that he shook the victim, his 15-month-old daughter, and inflicted fatal abdominal and brain injuries on the night that she died. Defendant contended that the victim's autopsy revealed that the victim had been injured at least several days before the night of her death and that nothing that he intentionally did to the victim on that evening caused the catastrophic brain hemorrhage that killed her. As relevant to this case, Defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the victim had been subjected to physical abuse throughout her short life; that a friend of the victim's mother saw the victim four days before her death and concluded that the victim looked like the friend's own daughter, who had suffered a brain injury as a baby; and that that friend relayed that conclusion to the victim's mother. In each instance, the trial court excluded the evidence. Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding testimony that, four days before the child's death, a friend told the victim's mother that the victim resembled the friend's child, who had suffered a brain injury. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed without discussion the trial court's rulings as to the other evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's prior injuries. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case tested the limits of a defendant's free speech rights under Article I, 3 section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the his violation of a protective order. The victim was an editor with the Portland Tribune, a weekly newspaper. In 2005, the newspaper sponsored a social event to which the public was invited. Defendant John Ryan attended the event, and soon afterward, Defendant began writing to the victim. Defendant violated the terms of a stalking protective order issued against him by contacting the victim through a third party and was subsequently found guilty by a jury of two counts of violating ORS 163.750. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. That court reasoned that Article I, section 8, required that ORS 163.750 be judicially narrowed to require "an unequivocal threat of the sort that makes it objectively reasonable for the victim to believe that he or she is being threatened with imminent and serious physical harm," and so the State failed to meet its burden of proof on both counts. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Defendant's conviction: "because defendant's communications with the victim were already prohibited by the stalking protective order, the state was not required by Article I, section 8, to prove that defendant had communicated an unequivocal threat to the victim."

Plaintiff Keith Drollinger, a convicted felon, brought suit against the lawyers who represented him in his attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, but shortly before the matter was scheduled for trial, withdrew. Defendants Gordon Mallon, John Lamborn, Robert Raschio and their firm, Mallon Lamborn & Raschio, PC, moved to dismiss the malpractice action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They argued that, under the Supreme Courtâs decision in "Stevens v. Bispham," (316 Or 221)(1993)), the action was barred because plaintiff had not been exonerated of the underlying offenses. The circuit court agreed with Defendants, granted their motion, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Stevens," a case addressing the statute of limitations in a malpractice action brought by a former criminal defendant against trial counsel in the underlying case, did not preclude this convicted Plaintiff from pursuing a malpractice action against post-conviction counsel. Because the circuit court treated actual exoneration as a prerequisite for bringing the action, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Hezakiah Baker was charged with multiple counts related to the manufacture and possession of marijuana. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized by Medford city police officers who, without a warrant, entered defendant's residence to investigate a 9-1-1 domestic disturbance call. An issue central to the case was the use of a "code word": the 9-1-1 caller stated she had heard the female resident of the house use a prearranged code word indicating to the caller that police assistance was needed. Officers were dispatched with the belief that the situation constituted an emergency because the dispatched officer subjectively believed the use of code amounted to "something important" requiring him to enter without a warrant under the "emergency aid" exception. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the warrantless entry of defendant's residence was not authorized as emergency aid, and thus violated Defendantâs rights under the Oregon Constitution. Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that from the facts and circumstances of this case, a reasonable inference could have been drawn that emergency aid was needed. The Court affirmed the circuit courtâs decision.