Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Haley was convicted under ORS 164.215 after he entered a university administrator’s office and stole a briefcase. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a college administrator’s office within a university building was a “separate unit” in the building, thereby making the office a “separate building” for purposes of ORS 164.215. The Court of Appeals concluded that the office was not a “separate unit,” and thus not a “building” as defined in ORS 164.205(1), because the administrator shared the room’s “function and occupation” with the university. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's interpretation and application of the statute: "Whether a space within a building is considered a 'separate unit' as defined in ORS 164.205(1) depends on the structure, occupancy, function, physical layout, and appearance of both the building as a whole and the space at issue." Here, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record for a factfinder to find, based on those factors, that the administrator’s office was a “separate unit.” The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Haley" on Justia Law

A.R.H. challenged a juvenile court order directing him to report as a sex offender. At issue was the meaning and application of ORS 163A.030, which directs a juvenile court to conduct a hearing at which the youth bears the “burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence” that the youth “is rehabilitated and does not pose a threat to the safety of the public.” If the court finds the youth has not met that burden, then the court must enter an order requiring the youth to report as a sex offender. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the inquiry assigned to the juvenile court (clear and convincing evidence) is a factual inquiry. Finding that the evidence presented in this case permitted the juvenile court to find that the youth failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was “rehabilitated” and not “a threat to the safety of the public,” the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order. View "Oregon v. A. R. H." on Justia Law

The issue defendant's appeal presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's consideration was the nature and scope of the Court of Appeals’ authority to deny an appellant’s motion to dismiss. After that court issued a decision resolving defendant’s criminal appeal, he filed an unopposed motion to dismiss, which the court denied. On review, both parties agreed the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendant’s motion, but they approached the analysis differently. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendant’s motion in this case. Accordingly, the appellate court's order was reversed and defendant's appeal was dismissed. View "Oregon v. Mott" on Justia Law

While interrogating defendant George Craigen about the murder at the heart of this case (for which defendant had not yet been charged with), detectives asked defendant about firearms crimes, which defendant had already been charged with in other cases and on which he was represented by counsel. After the State brought this murder case against defendant, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation, including, evidence obtained as a result of the questioning about the firearms cases. Defendant argued that that questioning violated his right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and that all evidence resulting from the violation had to be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, renewing the argument that he had made in the trial court. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals: because the detectives violated defendant’s right to counsel by questioning him about the Felon-In-Possession (FIP) charges on which he was represented, the State cannot use evidence obtained as a result of the violation of defendant's constitutional rights. View "Oregon v. Craigen" on Justia Law

Defendant Deangelo Martin argued his due process rights were violated when the trial court ruled that hearsay evidence—a recording of the victim’s phone call to 9-1-1—was admissible to demonstrate that defendant had contacted the victim in violation of the terms of his probation. Defendant argued that the state did not show good cause for failing to produce the victim at the hearing, and that his confrontation right was thus violated. The trial court revoked probation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant argued on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting a categorical rule that, in a probation revocation hearing, the admission of evidence covered by a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule always comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant contended the ordinary balancing test under Oregon v. Johnson (190 P3d 455, rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008)) should have applied, and that, under that test, his confrontation rights were violated. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's result, but on different reasoning: the state made a strong showing of good cause under the third and fourth Johnson factors that outweighed defendant’s modest interest in confrontation as reflected by the first and second factors. Thus, the admission of the 9-1-1 recording at defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights. View "Oregon v. Martin" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the effect of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020) in an appeal of a trial court’s rejection of a post-conviction petitioner’s challenge to convictions that were obtained through nonunanimous verdicts. Petitioner raised the issue as soon as Ramos was decided—but years after the challenged convictions had become final. The issue on appeal thus concerned the “retroactivity” of the constitutional rule announced in Ramos in a post-conviction proceeding under ORS 138.510 to 138.680. The Oregon Court held that when a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on Sixth Amendment grounds, from a judgment of conviction which was based on a nonunanimous verdict and which became final before the Supreme Court’s Ramos decision issued, the petitioner was entitled to relief— assuming that none of the procedural defenses in the Post-Conviction Hearings Act were raised and sustained. "That is so because convicting a defendant on a nonunanimous jury verdict amounts to a 'substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in petitioner’s conviction *** of petiioner’s rights under the Constitution of the United States *** which denial rendered the conviction void,' for which post-conviction relief 'shall be granted.'” View "Watkins v. Ackley" on Justia Law

The trial court convicted defendant Heather Evans of initiating a false report based on evidence that she had triggered a police investigation by making a call and subsequent statements to the police that included both true and false allegations against another person. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have granted her motion for judgment of acquittal because much of what she had reported to the police had been true and there was no evidence that her false statements had resulted in any greater expenditure of police resources than would have resulted had she not made them. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed the judgment of conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court held the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and that the Court of Appeals therefore erred in reversing on that ground. View "Oregon v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Delaney appealed his convictions on multiple sex offenses arising from two separate incidents, each involving a different victim. He challenged the trial court’s refusal to sever the counts involving the first incident from the counts involving the second incident. At issue was the proper application of ORS 132.560(3), which described actions that a trial court “may order” when “it appears, upon motion, that the state or defendant was substantially prejudiced by a joinder of offenses” that otherwise satisfy the requirements for joining multiple offenses. Defendant contended the State’s pretrial description of the evidence that it expected to offer demonstrated that defendant would be substantially prejudiced by a joint trial, and he contended that the prejudice that he identified required the court to sever the counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking severance under ORS 132.560(3) must identify a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice that was more than the prejudice that was inherent whenever joined charges allow the jury to hear that the defendant may have committed other bad acts. And whether a defendant has identified a case-specific theory that meets the “substantially prejudiced” standard was a question of law that the appellate court reviews without deference to the trial court. Applying those standards, the Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to sever. View "Oregon v. Delaney" on Justia Law

This case concerned a driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) conviction following the termination of a diversion agreement. Defendant Rhonda Colgrove pled guilty to misdemeanor DUII and petitioned to enter diversion. Defendant’s diversion petition stated, in part, that she had “read and underst[ood] all of the information in the attached Explanation of Rights and DUII Diversion Agreement” and “agree[d],” among other things, to “[a]ttend a victim impact panel as ordered by the court.” Defendant failed to pay $335 in fees and to attend a victim impact panel within the diversion period. The trial court thereafter terminated the diversion agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, and defendant appealed. As pertinent here, defendant challenged her conviction on the ground that the trial court had erroneously terminated her diversion agreement either because the agreement had not set a deadline to attend the victim impact panel or because the trial court had discretion to waive the attendance requirement. The Court of Appeals assumed that defendant’s challenge was reviewable under ORS 138.105(5), but concluded that it failed on the merits. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to address the reviewability issue that the Court of Appeals did not: whether ORS 138.105(5) precluded a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest from obtaining appellate review of legal challenges to the conviction in the judgment entered in the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that such challenges were not reviewable under ORS 138.105(5). Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Oregon v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick Fox and the victims were involved in a property dispute, and the victims hired a civil attorney to assist them in that matter. During an incident regarding the property dispute, defendant struck the victims with a metal chain causing them significant injury. The state charged defendant with one count each of second- and third-degree assault, and defendant eventually pleaded guilty to both counts. During defendant’s prosecution, the victims retained the attorney who was representing them in the civil case to represent their interests in that criminal proceeding. At sentencing, the victims’ attorney argued against the state’s recommended prison sentence and advocated for a probationary sentence to increase the likelihood that defendant could pay restitution to the victims. After defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing, the state sought restitution for the medical expenses that the victims had incurred as a result of the assault and the attorney fees that the victims had incurred in the criminal proceeding. Defendant conceded that the claimed attorney fees resulted from defendant’s criminal activities but objected to their recovery, arguing that neither the medical expenses nor the attorney fees were reasonable or necessary and that the attorney fees did not constitute “economic damages” recoverable as restitution. The trial court awarded the full amount of the medical expenses. The trial court also awarded $3,200 in attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the award for the medical expenses incurred by one of the two victims but affirmed as to those incurred by the other. With respect to the victims’ attorney fees, the court affirmed the award for the attorney fees incurred in the criminal case, determining that “it is reasonably foreseeable that a victim would hire an attorney to advise them about their rights in a criminal case,” and that, “because a victim is entitled to seek separate representation, the services provided by [the victims’ attorney] that were directly related to the criminal case were necessarily incurred by the victims.” Defendant appealed both decisions by the appellate court. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the trial court erred in awarding the resulting attorney fees from the victims' counsel in defendant's criminal proceedings as restitution. View "Oregon v. Fox" on Justia Law