Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

While interrogating defendant George Craigen about the murder at the heart of this case (for which defendant had not yet been charged with), detectives asked defendant about firearms crimes, which defendant had already been charged with in other cases and on which he was represented by counsel. After the State brought this murder case against defendant, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation, including, evidence obtained as a result of the questioning about the firearms cases. Defendant argued that that questioning violated his right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and that all evidence resulting from the violation had to be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, renewing the argument that he had made in the trial court. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals: because the detectives violated defendant’s right to counsel by questioning him about the Felon-In-Possession (FIP) charges on which he was represented, the State cannot use evidence obtained as a result of the violation of defendant's constitutional rights. View "Oregon v. Craigen" on Justia Law

Defendant Deangelo Martin argued his due process rights were violated when the trial court ruled that hearsay evidence—a recording of the victim’s phone call to 9-1-1—was admissible to demonstrate that defendant had contacted the victim in violation of the terms of his probation. Defendant argued that the state did not show good cause for failing to produce the victim at the hearing, and that his confrontation right was thus violated. The trial court revoked probation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant argued on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting a categorical rule that, in a probation revocation hearing, the admission of evidence covered by a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule always comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant contended the ordinary balancing test under Oregon v. Johnson (190 P3d 455, rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008)) should have applied, and that, under that test, his confrontation rights were violated. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's result, but on different reasoning: the state made a strong showing of good cause under the third and fourth Johnson factors that outweighed defendant’s modest interest in confrontation as reflected by the first and second factors. Thus, the admission of the 9-1-1 recording at defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights. View "Oregon v. Martin" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the effect of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020) in an appeal of a trial court’s rejection of a post-conviction petitioner’s challenge to convictions that were obtained through nonunanimous verdicts. Petitioner raised the issue as soon as Ramos was decided—but years after the challenged convictions had become final. The issue on appeal thus concerned the “retroactivity” of the constitutional rule announced in Ramos in a post-conviction proceeding under ORS 138.510 to 138.680. The Oregon Court held that when a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on Sixth Amendment grounds, from a judgment of conviction which was based on a nonunanimous verdict and which became final before the Supreme Court’s Ramos decision issued, the petitioner was entitled to relief— assuming that none of the procedural defenses in the Post-Conviction Hearings Act were raised and sustained. "That is so because convicting a defendant on a nonunanimous jury verdict amounts to a 'substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in petitioner’s conviction *** of petiioner’s rights under the Constitution of the United States *** which denial rendered the conviction void,' for which post-conviction relief 'shall be granted.'” View "Watkins v. Ackley" on Justia Law

The trial court convicted defendant Heather Evans of initiating a false report based on evidence that she had triggered a police investigation by making a call and subsequent statements to the police that included both true and false allegations against another person. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have granted her motion for judgment of acquittal because much of what she had reported to the police had been true and there was no evidence that her false statements had resulted in any greater expenditure of police resources than would have resulted had she not made them. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed the judgment of conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court held the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and that the Court of Appeals therefore erred in reversing on that ground. View "Oregon v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Delaney appealed his convictions on multiple sex offenses arising from two separate incidents, each involving a different victim. He challenged the trial court’s refusal to sever the counts involving the first incident from the counts involving the second incident. At issue was the proper application of ORS 132.560(3), which described actions that a trial court “may order” when “it appears, upon motion, that the state or defendant was substantially prejudiced by a joinder of offenses” that otherwise satisfy the requirements for joining multiple offenses. Defendant contended the State’s pretrial description of the evidence that it expected to offer demonstrated that defendant would be substantially prejudiced by a joint trial, and he contended that the prejudice that he identified required the court to sever the counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking severance under ORS 132.560(3) must identify a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice that was more than the prejudice that was inherent whenever joined charges allow the jury to hear that the defendant may have committed other bad acts. And whether a defendant has identified a case-specific theory that meets the “substantially prejudiced” standard was a question of law that the appellate court reviews without deference to the trial court. Applying those standards, the Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to sever. View "Oregon v. Delaney" on Justia Law

This case concerned a driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) conviction following the termination of a diversion agreement. Defendant Rhonda Colgrove pled guilty to misdemeanor DUII and petitioned to enter diversion. Defendant’s diversion petition stated, in part, that she had “read and underst[ood] all of the information in the attached Explanation of Rights and DUII Diversion Agreement” and “agree[d],” among other things, to “[a]ttend a victim impact panel as ordered by the court.” Defendant failed to pay $335 in fees and to attend a victim impact panel within the diversion period. The trial court thereafter terminated the diversion agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, and defendant appealed. As pertinent here, defendant challenged her conviction on the ground that the trial court had erroneously terminated her diversion agreement either because the agreement had not set a deadline to attend the victim impact panel or because the trial court had discretion to waive the attendance requirement. The Court of Appeals assumed that defendant’s challenge was reviewable under ORS 138.105(5), but concluded that it failed on the merits. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to address the reviewability issue that the Court of Appeals did not: whether ORS 138.105(5) precluded a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest from obtaining appellate review of legal challenges to the conviction in the judgment entered in the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that such challenges were not reviewable under ORS 138.105(5). Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Oregon v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick Fox and the victims were involved in a property dispute, and the victims hired a civil attorney to assist them in that matter. During an incident regarding the property dispute, defendant struck the victims with a metal chain causing them significant injury. The state charged defendant with one count each of second- and third-degree assault, and defendant eventually pleaded guilty to both counts. During defendant’s prosecution, the victims retained the attorney who was representing them in the civil case to represent their interests in that criminal proceeding. At sentencing, the victims’ attorney argued against the state’s recommended prison sentence and advocated for a probationary sentence to increase the likelihood that defendant could pay restitution to the victims. After defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing, the state sought restitution for the medical expenses that the victims had incurred as a result of the assault and the attorney fees that the victims had incurred in the criminal proceeding. Defendant conceded that the claimed attorney fees resulted from defendant’s criminal activities but objected to their recovery, arguing that neither the medical expenses nor the attorney fees were reasonable or necessary and that the attorney fees did not constitute “economic damages” recoverable as restitution. The trial court awarded the full amount of the medical expenses. The trial court also awarded $3,200 in attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the award for the medical expenses incurred by one of the two victims but affirmed as to those incurred by the other. With respect to the victims’ attorney fees, the court affirmed the award for the attorney fees incurred in the criminal case, determining that “it is reasonably foreseeable that a victim would hire an attorney to advise them about their rights in a criminal case,” and that, “because a victim is entitled to seek separate representation, the services provided by [the victims’ attorney] that were directly related to the criminal case were necessarily incurred by the victims.” Defendant appealed both decisions by the appellate court. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the trial court erred in awarding the resulting attorney fees from the victims' counsel in defendant's criminal proceedings as restitution. View "Oregon v. Fox" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Ralston was arrested, booked, and charged by district attorney’s information with misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and reckless driving. Five days later, the prosecutor dismissed the misdemeanor charges to investigate whether defendant had predicate convictions that would have elevated the charge to felony DUII. Six weeks later, a grand jury indicted defendant on a charge of felony DUII. By that time, video footage from the jail on the night that defendant was arrested and booked had been overwritten automatically. When defense counsel later learned that the booking video had been overwritten, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that his right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution had been violated, arguing that his inability to use the video of his booking at trial was prejudicial to him. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which held defendant did not establish prejudice resulting from the delay so as to warrant dismissal of the charges against him. The trial court judgment was affirmed in part and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Ralston" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license for refusing a breath test was valid when, in addition to providing petitioner with the statutorily required information regarding rights and consequences, the arresting officer also told petitioner that she would seek a search warrant for a blood draw if petitioner refused the test. The Department of Transportation, Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, but, after petitioner sought judicial review from the circuit court, the circuit court set aside that suspension, a decision that the Court of Appeals later affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that DMV properly suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals’ and the circuit court’s judgments. View "Murdoch v. DMV" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Burris was convicted of attempting to commit the misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm. The issue his appeal presented for the Oregon Supreme Court was the legal effect, if any, of a cross-reference between two statutes that criminalized the same conduct: possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The first statute, ORS 166.270, defined the felony offense of felon in possession of a firearm. The second statute, ORS 166.250, defined the misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession of a firearm. The statute defining the felony offense included an exception for certain persons discharged from imprisonment, parole, or probation at least 15 years earlier. The statute defining the misdemeanor offense did not include a similar exception, but it began with a prefatory clause that cross-referenced other statutes, including the felony offense. The question was whether the 15-year exception to the felony offense also applied to the misdemeanor offense through the latter’s prefatory clause. The state argued the prefatory clause’s reference to ORS 166.270 had no legal effect because, by its terms, the 15-year exception to the felony offense applied only to the felony offense and therefore did not create an exception to the misdemeanor offense. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Burris" on Justia Law