Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Billy Lee Oatney, Jr. was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death (Oatney I). During its initial investigation of the murder, the state gave defendant contractual use and derivative use immunity in exchange for providing information about the circumstances of the murder. The state then shared part of defendant’s immunized statement with an associate, Johnston. As a result, Johnston provided the state with additional information about the murder, pleaded guilty to the crime, and testified against defendant in his first trial for aggravated murder. Following defendant’s conviction and sentencing, and the Oregon Supreme Court’s affirmance of the judgment of conviction and sentence in Oatney I, he obtained post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel had been inadequate for failing to move to suppress Johnston’s statements and testimony, which had derived from defendant’s immunized statement. The post-conviction court remanded the case for further proceedings. The State initiated retrial proceedings against defendant, and appealed a pretrial order that precluded it from calling “Johnston to present testimony that violates the immunity agreement of Defendant,” even if, “[w]ithin the limits of the law and the evidence presented,” defense counsel represents in opening statements that the evidence will show that Johnston or someone other than defendant committed the crime or argued in closing that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime. Defendant raised a cross- assignment of error, arguing that, if the Supreme Court reversed on direct appeal, it should also conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant would open the door to Johnston’s testimony by presenting evidence of Johnston’s judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in precluding the State from calling Johnston under the circumstances described in the order and, for that reason, did not address defendant’s cross- assignment. View "Oregon v. Oatney" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karlyn Eklof was convicted of aggravated intentional murder in 1995 and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In this, her second case seeking post-conviction relief, petitioner moved to amend her complaint a third time to introduce new claims that the State unlawfully withheld exculpatory evidence in petitioner’s criminal trial. The State presented evidence from the records of earlier cases involving the same murder, which purported to show that petitioner or her counsel knew about the allegedly withheld evidence and the possibility that it was withheld, and, therefore, reasonably could have raised her claims. After considering that evidence, the post-conviction court denied petitioner leave to amend her petition. Petitioner sought review by the Oregon Supreme Court, asking whether the merit of the proposed amendments, including whether they were procedurally barred, was relevant to determining whether to grant leave to amend under ORCP 23 A, and whether the post-conviction court erred in considering the State’s evidence. Because the State and post-conviction court identified no meaningful prejudice to the State resulting from petitioner’s proposed amendments, the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Eklof v. Persson" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Jackson was charged with and convicted of offenses that occurred during an encounter with police officers in an enclosed ATM vestibule. A surveillance video recorded the encounter and was admitted at trial as Exhibit 15. After the trial court entered the judgment of conviction, Exhibit 15 was lost or destroyed, and, in conjunction with his appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant filed a motion seeking reversal and remand under ORS 19.420(3). The Appellate Commissioner denied defendant’s motion, concluding, as a matter of law, that the lost exhibit was not “necessary to the prosecution of the appeal.” The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, and, because the Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review, held defendant’s appeal in abeyance. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in summarily denying defendant’s motion before more fully analyzing the issues defendant raised on appeal and considering whether Exhibit 15 was necessary to resolve those issues. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to undertake that analysis. View "Oregon v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Davidson was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under for his convictions for public indecency, a Class C felony, because he had been sentenced for felony sex crimes at least twice before sentencing for the current crimes. The Oregon Supreme Court held that that sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to defendant’s offenses, and it remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court concluded on remand that it was permitted to sentence defendant to any term of imprisonment short of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under ORS 137.719, in the circumstances, the trial court was required to impose a departure sentence in conformity with Oregon’s felony sentencing guidelines. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Davidson" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Jason Van Brumwell was convicted by jury on two counts of aggravated murder, for which he was sentenced to death. Defendant later brought a post-conviction relief action, and the post-conviction court ordered a new sentencing proceeding. While the post-conviction case was on appeal, the Oregon legislature enacted SB 1013, which, among other things, revised Oregon’s murder statutes to narrow the crimes that could be punished by death. Relevant here, under SB 1013, the form of murder alleged in Count 1 of defendant’s indictment, murder after having been convicted of aggravated murder previously, was classified as “murder in the first degree,” and the form of murder alleged in Count 2, murder committed while confined in a correctional facility, was classified as “murder in the first degree.” But a murder committed with both of those aggravating circumstances was now classified as “aggravated murder.” The parties agree that, because the post-conviction court ordered a new penalty-phase hearing that had yet to occur, SB 1013’s changes to the definitions of the different forms of murder applied to this case. But the parties disagreed about the effect of those changes. This case came before the Oregon Supreme Court on the State's motion to determine whether it could appeal the trial court order that granted defendant’s motion to preclude imposition of the death penalty and, if so, whether the appeal had to be brought to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the State could appeal the order, and that the appeal had to be brought to the Supreme Court. View "Oregon v. Brumwell" on Justia Law

At issue in this post-conviction case was petitioner Steve Franke’s attempt to prove that his criminal trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate and ineffective assistance by failing to object that an expert diagnosis of child sexual abuse was inadmissible in the absence of corroborating physical evidence. Although the objection would have been contrary to controlling Court of Appeals precedent at the time of petitioner’s 2001 criminal trial, the Oregon Supreme Court later held that the rules of evidence required exclusion of a diagnosis of sexual abuse if it was not based on physical evidence, effectively overruling the Court of Appeals precedent. To survive summary judgment, petitioner offered evidence that some criminal defense attorneys in 2001 viewed the Court of Appeals precedent as vulnerable, were raising the kind of challenge to sexual abuse diagnoses that ultimately succeeded, and were recommending that practice to other criminal defense attorneys. Petitioner contended the evidence would have allowed him to establish that the exercise of reasonable skill and judgment obligated his attorney to raise a similar objection, or at least that his attorney’s failure to raise the argument was the product of a failure to adequately prepare and familiarize himself with the state of the law. Both the post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the argument that ultimately succeeded in Southard was not so obviously correct in 2001 that the exercise of reasonable skill obligated attorneys to raise the argument, and petitioner’s evidence did not permit a different conclusion. But the Supreme Court disagreed that petitioner’s claim could be resolved on summary judgment; the evidence created genuine issues of material fact that, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, could establish the failure by petitioner’s attorney to raise a Southard-type challenge to the sexual abuse diagnosis was the product of an unreasonable failure to investigate and familiarize himself with the state of the law to the extent appropriate to the nature and complexity of the case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Franke" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Gord, Jr. fired a gun at a vehicle with two occupants, neither of whom died. He was charged with, among other crimes, two counts of attempted aggravated murder. He unsuccessfully demurred to those counts of the indictment, arguing that the state had not charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder because the death of “more than one murder victim” in the same criminal episode was a circumstance element of the crime defined in ORS 163.095(1)(d), and because a circumstance element could not be “attempted.” At trial, defendant was acquitted of both counts of attempted aggravated murder but was convicted of other crimes. On appeal, despite the acquittal, defendant challenged the denial of his demurrer, arguing that that denial prejudiced him because it allowed for the admission of evidence relevant to the counts of attempted aggravated murder that may not have been admissible if trial had been limited to the other counts in the indictment. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed based on its decision in Oregon v. Kyger, 471 P3d 764 (2020). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded defendant’s argument was without merit. Because the circuit court did not err in denying the demurrer, the Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to address defendant’s remaining arguments concerning prejudice. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ford" on Justia Law

During a single criminal episode, defendant Scott Kyger cut the necks of two people with a razor blade. For that, the state charged him with two counts of attempted aggravated murder under ORS 163.095 (2015) and ORS 161.405 (2015). Defendant was convicted of both counts. The question his appeal raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether the state charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder. Defendant contended that the existence of “more than one murder victim” was a circumstance that had to exist for a person to be guilty of aggravated murder; that it did not exist here because neither victim died; and that defendant’s intentional conduct did not amount to attempted aggravated murder because a person could not “attempt” to commit a circumstance element of an offense. In defendant’s view, the allegations supported, at most, charges for attempted murder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Kyger" on Justia Law

Defendant Erik Meiser, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia and a co-occurring antisocial personality disorder, contended the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in its understanding of the evidence required to establish that he was guilty except for insanity (GEI) with respect to charges of murder. The parties agreed schizophrenia was a “mental disease or defect” within the meaning of ORS 161.295, and they agreed that defendant’s co-occurring antisocial personality disorder was a “personality disorder” within the meaning of the statute. But they disagreed about whether ORS 161.295 required proof that defendant experienced the requisite incapacity solely “as a result of” his schizophrenia, and not in any part as a result of his co-occurring antisocial personality disorder. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended to specify that a co-occurring disorder that was solely a personality disorder was excluded from the “mental disease or defect” that forms the basis for a GEI defense, but the legislature did not intend to require proof that a co-occurring personality disorder played no causal role in bringing about the requisite lack of substantial capacity. "That conclusion resolves the issue on which we allowed review, but it leaves unresolved additional legal and factual questions regarding defendant’s proof of causation and incapacity." The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address those questions. View "Oregon v. Meiser" on Justia Law

Defendants Rocklyn Shiffer and Gina McKinney were each charged in independent cases with an assault offense requiring proof that the defendant knowingly caused physical injury to another person. Defendant Shiffer opted for a bench trial and argued that the trial court had to find that he knew that his actions would result in serious physical injury before finding him guilty. Defendant McKinney’s case went to a jury, and she requested instructions that would have required the state to prove that she knew her actions would result in the requisite physical injury. Unlike the defendant in Oregon v. Owen, 369 Or 288 (2022), Shiffer and McKinney did not argue at trial that, at minimum, the criminal negligence mental state attached to the injurious result element. Citing Oregon v. Barnes, 986 P2d 1160 (1999), both trial courts rejected their arguments, and in McKinney’s trial, the court declined to give her requested instructions and instead gave instructions focusing on her knowledge of the nature of her conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed each of their assault convictions. On review, each defendant argued the trial court erred. Defendants reasserted their arguments made at trial that a knowing mental state should have attached to the physical injury element, a conclusion the Oregon Supreme Court rejected in Owen. Additionally, each defendant made the unpreserved argument that, if the knowing mental state did not apply to the physical injury element, then the minimum culpable mental state should be criminal negligence. In Owen, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the resultant physical injury element of the second-degree assault offense required a culpable mental state and, therefore, the state had to prove that the defendant was at least criminally negligent with respect to the physical injury. As a result, the Court's decision in defendants’ cases initially was concerned with whether the holding in Owen extended to each defendant’s unpreserved argument on review that the result element of assault must have an associated culpable mental state. The Court exercised discretion to review the error in each case under plain-error review, and concluded that the error in each case was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and in part vacated the judgment of conviction in each case. View "Oregon v. McKinney/Shiffer" on Justia Law