Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal by allowance, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Superior Court improperly reversed a revocation of probation, when the revocation was premised upon the conclusion that a probationer violated restrictions contained within a document entitled "Standard Special Conditions for Sex Offenders," which was authored by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the Board), rather than a judge of the court of common pleas. Upon review, the Court held that the Superior Court erred in reversing the revocation of probation. The Superior Court's order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal by the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial which was aggrieved by the Superior Court's grant of a new trial, centered on principles of self-defense for purposes of assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the murder victim's nine-year-old conviction for robbery. The Commonwealth contended, among other points, that the Superior Court's assessment of the evidentiary ruling misapprehended the law governing self-defense. Upon review of the trial court record and the briefs submitted on appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth and reversed the Superior Court, reinstating the judgment of sentence for first-degree murder, aggravated assault and related offenses in the underlying case.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with two questions: (1) whether a defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and other crimes which rest solely on subsequently recanted out-of-court statements given to police violates the due process guarantees of either the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions; and (2) whether the confessions of a former co-defendant should have been admitted as evidence as statements against interest under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3). After careful consideration, the Court held that the recanting witnesses' out-of-court statements to the police were sufficient to sustain Appellant's convictions against a due process challenge. However, because the Court also found that the trial court erred by not allowing other portions of the co-defendant's confessions to be entered into evidence as statements against interest, the Court was "constrained" to vacate Appellant's convictions and remand the case for a new trial.

Appellant Bortela Philistin appealed an order that denied him relief from his criminal convictions and death sentence pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. A jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder and related offenses. In the penalty phase, the jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances: the victim was a police officer killed in the performance of his duties, and the Appellant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another. The jury found no mitigating circumstances; thus, it returned a death sentence. Appellant raised thirteen claims on appeal pertaining to errors at trial, the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court found no merit to Appellant's claims, and affirmed his conviction and death sentence.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act (61 Pa. C.C. 4501-4512 (RRRI Act)) applied to defendants sentenced to mandatory terms required by two drug trafficking sentencing provisions. The superior court concluded that the RRRI Act was applicable, and affirmed Appellee Frederick Hansley's sentence. The Commonwealth challenged the trial court's application of the mandatory penalties of the trafficking sentencing provisions, contending: (1) that the trial court lacked the authority to impose lesser minimum penalties than those prescribed by those statutes; and (2) the drug trafficking sentencing statutes conflict with the RRRI Act, and that the plain language of the former provisions established that the General Assembly intended the mandatory penalties to "override" any other conflicting statutes, then-existing or later-adopted. The Supreme Court affirmed, recognizing "that the effect of the RRRI Act may be to reduce the total time in prison that an offender subject to a mandatory minimum sentence must serve. But, it is eminently clear from the plain language of the legislation that the General Assembly intended that result - for a limited class of statutorily defined defendants, upon the completion of several conditions, and subject to the controlling discretion of the Parole Board. [The Court's] plain language interpretation accords with the legislative intent as [it understood] it, and gives effect to all provisions of the relevant sentencing statutes. Accordingly, the decision below is affirmed."

Appellant Mark Spotz appealed the denial of his petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for the 1995 shooting death of Penny Gunnet for which he was sentenced to death. Appellant raised numerous issues on appeal; the Supreme Court concluded that there was "no merit" to any of the issues he raised and affirmed the decision of the PCRA court.

On February 6, 2007, following a narcotics investigation and surveillance operation by the Philadelphia police and the FBI, Nasir Far, Regina Little, and Garnell Brown (collectively, "Appellees") were arrested. Appellees were charged with possession with intent to deliver PCP ("PWID-PCP"), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy. Appellees' cases were commenced in the Court of Common Pleas. Although the cases were listed for a preliminary hearing on several dates, the Commonwealth repeatedly failed to produce a chemical laboratory report of the PCP analysis, without which the Commonwealth could not present a prima facie case for PWID-PCP, and thus the cases were continued. In early 2008, Appellees moved for dismissal of the charges against them based on Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(4), which governs cases that commence in the Court of Common Pleas, but are subsequently transferred to Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Court of Common Pleas conducted a hearing, wherein the Commonwealth countered that Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, the general prompt trial rule applicable to the Court of Common Pleas applied to Appellees' cases. The court did not agree with the Commonwealth, but rather accepted Appellees' contention that Rule 1013(A)(4) controlled the time frame under which the Commonwealth was required to bring Appellees to trial in the Court of Common Pleas under the circumstances of this case. The question therefore, before the Supreme Court was which statute governed the circumstances of this case. The Court determined that the Superior Court incorrectly applied Rule 1013 to the circumstances of this case. Accordingly the Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Willie Sneed appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant fatally shot Calvin Hawkins in 1980 after discovering that Hawkins and two accomplices sold him aspirin instead of cocaine. A jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime. The jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, resulting in the imposition of the death sentence. Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. It was discovered shortly before Appellant was scheduled to be executed that no one had reviewed his initial PCRA petition. A stay of execution was granted, and in 2000, Appellant with counsel filed an amended PCRA petition raising twenty-five claims of error. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Appellant's allegations of error for "lack of arguable merit." The case was remanded to the PCRA court to conduct a new penalty phase hearing based on the Court's prior decision stemming from Appellant's pro se petition.

In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Commonwealth's waiver of application of the school zone mandatory minimum sentence at the original sentencing precluded the Commonwealth from subsequently seeking its application following the revocation of probation. In 2008, two men broke into Appellee Robert Mazzetti's apartment and stole marijuana and other items. At the time of the incident, Appellee was a college student residing in an off-campus apartment. Police would later arrest Appellee and charge him with possession with the intent to deliver the stolen marijuana. Pursuant to an agreement, Appellee pled guilty in exchange for an agreed upon sentence of twelve months of probation; the Commonwealth agreed not to prosecute the other charges. At the time of the plea, the Commonwealth agreed to waive the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to possession in a school zone. Appellee later violated the terms of his probation when he attempted to steal two jars of honey from a grocery store. The Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellee's probation, and provided notice of its intent to seek the school zone mandatory minimum for the possession conviction. The trial court deferred resentencing to allow the parties to brief the issue of whether the Commonwealth could ask the court to impose the school zone mandatory minimum at resentencing following the probation revocation. The trial court eventually ruled that it was not required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence, and the Superior Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory scheme governing the mandatory minimum precluded the Commonwealth from requesting imposition of the mandatory minimum at resentencing when it waived its initial applicability.

The Commonwealth asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the materiality requirement of "Brady v. Maryland" (373 U.S. 83 (1963)), is satisfied where the evidence not disclosed by the Commonwealth and would itself not have been admissible at trial. The Commonwealth further requested the Court reconsider, based on more recent decisions by the Pennsylvania Court and the United States Supreme Court, the Court's holding in "Commonwealth v. Green," (640 A.2d 1242 (1994)). After careful consideration, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that nondisclosed favorable evidence which is inadmissible at trial may be considered material for purposes of "Brady," as long as there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "Mere speculation by a defendant . . . will not be sufficient to meet this standard; rather, he must identify specific evidence or information that would have been uncovered, and explain how that evidence or information would have changed the result of the proceeding." Notwithstanding its holding, because the Court found in this case that Appellee did not establish there was a reasonable probability that, had the evidence withheld by the Commonwealth been disclosed, there would have been a different outcome at trial, the Court reversed the order of the Superior Court remanding for a new trial, and reinstated Appellee's judgment of sentence.