Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellee Raymond Haun was convicted on multiple sexual offenses for which he received a 27 to 97 year sentence in prison. Approximately one year after he was convicted, Appellee sought relief under the PCRA, arguing his trial attorney failed to contest his sentence despite his explicit request for counsel to do so. After testifying to the court regarding his wish to appeal, on cross-examination, the Commonwealth set out to elicit an admission that Appellee had committed the criminal acts for which he was convicted. The PCRA court overruled an objection to the line of questioning. Appellee then responded that he did, in fact, commit the offenses. Furthermore, he acknowledged that he previously admitted his guilt during the presentence investigation, at sentencing and in the assessment process required under Megan's Law. When asked why he wished to appeal his sentence, Appellee responded that he believed the length of his sentence was unfair. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Appellee's confession of guilt foreclosed his access to judicial review under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The Commonwealth asked the Supreme Court to revisit its holding in "Commonwealth v. Lantzy" (735 A.2d 564 (1999)) and adopt the superior court's decision which "Lantzy" reversed. "In its brief, the Commonwealth has provided [the Court] with nothing to suggest that [the Court] was wrong in Lantzy... [the Court declined] to effectively overrule [its] decision based on a presentation which refuses to come to terms with [its] opinion's governing rationale." The Court held that a concession of guilt did not per se foreclose prisoner access to the PCRA.

Appellant Shawn Walker appealed the dismissal of his motion for a new trial. In 1991, Appellant forcibly entered the home of his former girlfriend, shot and killed a man sleeping on the couch, and shot and permanently disabled the girlfriend. After finding two aggravating factors, the jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, raising numerous issues on appeal. Among them, Appellant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel allegedly failed to present specific mitigation evidence. Upon careful review of the trial court and PCRA court records, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant failed to establish that any of his claims entitled him to a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant Orlando Masionet was charged with the 1982 stabbing death of Jorge Figueroa. A local gang member testified against other members, including Defendant. One member received the death penalty; two others received life sentences. Defendant eluded capture for approximately ten years following the stabbing. Authorities sought help from the television show "America's Most Wanted" to help locate Defendant. He was eventually found in Puerto Rico and extradited to Pennsylvania to stand trial. The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Mr. Figueroa was killed to prevent him from cooperating with police regarding a robbery-homicide perpetrated two weeks earlier, and Defendant played a part in both the robbery-homicide and death of Mr. Figueroa. Defendant was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses. The jury found four aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances for which he was sentenced to death. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction in both matters. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction, and affirmed his death sentence.

The issue before the Supreme Court was a court order that directed Appellant the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) to select and pay for the services of a qualified professional to provide counseling to an incarcerated parent who sough visitation with his child. Resolution of the case was dependent upon the intended scope of section 5303 of Chapter 53 of the Domestic Relations Code relating to custody. "D.R.C, Sr." was serving time for first-degree murder. "J.A.Z.," the mother and custodial guardian "steadfastly opposed" prison visits for her son. Instead, she requested that visits be postponed until the son reached a sufficiently mature age and could make his own informed decision about visiting his father. A trial court denied D.R.C.'s request for visitation, which was timely appealed. On remand, the trial court ordered D.R.C. to present evidence that he was no longer a "grave threat of harm" to his son. This hearing was followed with a telephonic hearing in which the mother, D.R.C. and a licensed psychologist from the DOC testified. The court dismissed D.R.C.'s petition premised on language of the applicable legal standard precluded it from awarding visitation because D.R.C. never received the statutory-mandated counseling. On appeal, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred by not appointing a qualified professional to perform the counseling. The DOC intervened to challenge the trial court's directive to appoint the counselor. The court ultimately denied D.R.C.'s and the DOC's motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the legal authority relied on by the trial court was misplaced: "we find the counseling required by [statute] is not a prerequisite to a court's engaging in its evaluation of a child's best interest in the context of a request for prison visits." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct a hearing on D.R.C.'s request for prison visitation in an "expeditious manner" without resort to the application of the statute.

In the 1990s, Appellee Stephen Rambler mailed letters in an attempt to extort money from approximately thirty individuals by threatening to reveal certain sexually explicit correspondence if they did not pay him. Based on this conduct, Appellee was charged with violating federal law by mailing "threatening communications." Nearly ten years later, in November 2005, Appellee was elected mayor of Wrightsville, York County. He assumed office in January 2006. Two months later, the Commonwealth filed a complaint in quo warranto seeking to remove Appellee from office pursuant to Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth alleged that the federal offense constituted an "infamous crime" in Pennsylvania, and requested an order declaring Appellee unqualified for his mayoral office. The common pleas court ultimately issued an opinion and order in favor of the Commonwealth, removing Appellee from office, and disqualifying him from holding any office of trust or profit in Pennsylvania. Appellee appealed, claiming that his federal extortion conviction did not qualify as an infamous crime because his conviction only carried a maximum sentence of two years which is comparable to a misdemeanor sentence in state court. The Superior Court reversed. The Supreme Court found in its review that "Appellee sought to reap dishonest gain… This type of behavior is, quite obviously, 'inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and decency,' and is, moreover, akin to 'swindling, cheating, and other crimes of a kindred nature.'" The Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Father "C.S." is the biological father of two minor children, R.I.S. and A.I.S. He was incarcerated in a state correctional facility with a minimum release date of June 2012. He appealed a superior court's reversal of a trial court order that ordered the involuntary termination of his parental rights and for changes in the placement goals for the children from reunification to adoption. Upon review of the facts presented at trial, the court reversed the superior court and took the opportunity to reiterate the principle that: "a parent’s incarceration, standing alone, cannot constitute proper grounds for the termination of his or her parental rights."

Cromwell Township appealed a Commonwealth Court's order that sentenced its supervisors to three to six months' imprisonment for contempt. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had approved the Township's comprehensive plan for sewage services, but the Township decided the Plan was too expensive to implement. Despite requesting several extensions of time, the Township failed to implement its plan. At the time, the Orbisonia Rockhill Joint Municipal Authority (ORJMA) which operated public sewage systems including those within the Township, was experiencing an overload in its wastewater treatment plant. The Township Board of Supervisors approached ORJMA and proposed a joint venture that would increase the capacity of ORJMA's plant and simultaneously decrease the anticipated cost to the Township for sewage treatment. The Township submitted an amended Plan which was accepted by the DEP. But prior to implementing the Plan, the Township Board elected new members. New members who openly opposed the Plan repealed the ordinances required under the amended Plan. The Township then stopped cooperating. The DEP filed suit to enforce the Plan asking that fines be levied against Board members and to set a timeline to purge the contempt. The court, unsatisfied with the Township's efforts to purge the contempt sentenced its members to jail time. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Township's failing to timely appeal the Plan and its amendment when new supervisors took office meant that the DEP's act was final, and the Township was foreclosed from challenging the Plan. However, the Court found that the Commonwealth Court's failing to use less restrictive means prior to imposing prison sentences on Board members compelled reversal: "the Commonwealth Court had lesser alternatives available to it in its attempt to compel Township's compliance with the court's prior order… but the Commonwealth Court inexplicably refused." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order sentencing Township Board members to imprisonment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Francis Bauer Harris was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, and the Commonwealth sought the death penalty. During the penalty phase of his trial, Appellant sought to establish the statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance by presenting the testimony of a psychologist. The jury rejected Appellant’s claim of a mitigating circumstance, found one aggravating circumstance, and returned a verdict of death. Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief asserting that trial counsel had been ineffective for presenting the psychologist's testimony even though counsel was aware that the doctor's evaluation had been deficient. The court of common pleas scheduled a hearing on the PCRA petition, and, to defend against Appellant’s allegations, the Commonwealth subpoenaed the psychologist to testify. The prosecution asked Appellant to waive psychologist-client privilege with respect to the doctor's testimony. When Appellant refused, the Commonwealth asked the PCRA court not only to declare the privilege waived, but also to permit it to hire the doctor as its expert for the PCRA proceedings. The PCRA court granted the motion, and Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court ordered briefing and oral argument on whether the court had jurisdiction over this appeal as a collateral appeal, and the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. On the merits, the Court held that although the Commonwealth could subpoena the doctor to testify as a fact witness, it could not hire him as its expert for the PCRA proceedings. The case was remanded for a determination of the extent of the waiver of privilege.

Appellant Freeman May appealed his death sentence imposed following his third penalty phase hearing. Appellant was convicted for the 1982 murder of Lynn Fair. After a penalty hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance, and one mitigating circumstance. The jury determined the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstance, and Appellant was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the sentence, concluding the jury could not properly consider whether appellant committed murder while in the perpetration of the felony (rape) due to an error in instructing the jury. At the second penalty phase, a new jury found one aggravating circumstance, a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, and no mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the sentence was death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and death sentence. Appellant initiated PCRA proceedings by filing a pro se petition, motions for stay of execution, and appointment of counsel. The PCRA court denied relief on all of Appellant’s issues, but granted an evidentiary hearing for his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence of Appellant’s allegedly traumatic childhood. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s ruling concerning the introduction of mitigating evidence, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated appellant’s sentence and remanded the matter for a third penalty phase. With the Commonwealth’s agreement, appellant was granted permission to appeal his sentence, nunc pro tunc. Appellant raised multiple alleged errors in the subsequent rehearings, the sum of which warranted a fourth penalty phase hearing. After careful consideration of the lengthy appellate record in this case, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the juries' findings of aggravating circumstances to warrant the death sentence. The Court affirmed Appellant's sentence.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of a superior court order that vacated a sentence imposed on Appellee Shawney Perry who was originally indicted for carrying a firearm without a license. The issue before the Court was whether the superior court misapplied the Supreme Court's directive set forth in "Commonwealth v. Walls," 926 A.2d 957 (2007) concerning the appellate review of sentences. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court failed to give sufficient deference to the sentencing court's imposition of sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court's order and remanded the case back to that court for a reexamination of Appellee's judgment of sentence.